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The 9/11 terrorist attacks spawned heated debates about border security 
roles in preventing terrorism.  The United States is generally known as 
a “nation of immigrants,” welcoming those seeking economic and 
religious freedom.  This thesis explores the effects of three policy 
options (increased manpower/financial resources for border inspection 
agencies, technology, and private sector-government cooperation) on the 
prevention of terrorism within U.S. borders.  It also explores the 
effects of those policy options on trade flows and the movement of 
legitimate people across international borders.  Scope is limited to 
land border security policy from 1990-2003.  Three case studies are 
included:  (1) the Border Patrol’s “prevention through deterrence” 
strategy, which began in 1994 and benefited from a monumental increase 
in manpower/financial resources to the INS; (2) an analysis of which 
border technology options are the most secure and inexpensive means of 
preventing illegal immigration, stopping the introduction of contraband 
into the United States, and maintaining legitimate flows of 
commerce/people that have increased since the passage of NAFTA; and (3) 
an analysis of why private sector-governmental partnerships that both 
increase transportation security while lowering border wait times 
developed on the U.S.-Canadian border but not on the U.S.-Mexican 
border.  Implications are drawn for U.S. policy-makers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the most cost-
effective, reliable ways to provide land border enforcement that 
protects against the land entry of illegal contraband or persons 
without affecting free trade and the economic flow of goods and 
services across U.S. land borders with Canada and Mexico.  The 
intended audience includes policy makers in the new Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS), with emphasis on agencies in the 
Directorate of Border & Transportation Security. Policy 
recommendations may apply to military advisors working in the 
Northern Command (NORTHCOM)—particularly the National Guard and 
Reserves—if military assets will be used to supplement local and 
federal agencies dealing with homeland and/or border security. 
Major questions include:  (1) Does current land border 
security policy protect U.S. citizens from terrorist acts 
occurring within U.S. borders and if not, what can be done to 
improve policy such that both national security and free trade 
in North America can coexist? (2) Historically, what was U.S. 
illegal immigration and land border transportation policy, what 
are the current U.S. proposals for land border security policy 
reform, and what theoretical literature applies to those 
proposals?  (3) Did an increase in financial/manpower resources 
from 1994-2003 along the U.S.-Mexico border stop illegal 
immigration and if so, will increasing border security spending 
protect against terrorism? (4) From 1990-2003, what 
technological option(s) developed that will be most cost-
effective, will provide increased security, and will not 
negatively impact the flow of legitimate goods and/or people 
  2
across the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican borders? (5) Why did a 
cooperative, pre-clearance strategy between governments and the 
private sector develop post-9/11 in Canada and the United 
States, but stall along the southern border with Mexico?   
B.  IMPORTANCE 
1. Introduction/Overview/Major Questions 
The United States has always been a nation with relatively 
open borders.  The United States is known as a nation that 
welcomes those seeking political and economic freedom.1  However, 
the recent terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 had profound 
effects on the way Congress, the Bush administration,2 and many 
Americans view U.S. border security policy. After 9/11, illegal 
immigration issues suddenly became a higher priority issue.  
Moreover, 9/11 focused attention on the already increasing 
number of illegal immigrants crossing our borders and in some 
cases even caused a public backlash against traditional U.S. 
land border transportation security and immigration policies.3 
The terrorist attacks on the WTC and the Pentagon were a 
watershed event for many reasons.  First, the sheer number of 
lives lost (2,792 in NYC; 224 at the Pentagon and Shanksville, 
PA; 343 firefighters; 23 policemen; and 37 NYC/NJ Port Authority 
officers)4 was larger than any other single terrorist attack 
committed on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor in 1941.  Second, it 
was an international event because many of the victims were from 
countries outside the United States.  Third, it was a wake-up 
                     1
 Kennedy, J.F. A Nation of Immigrants. New York: Harper & Row. 1964. 
2
 Ernsberger Jr., R. “Fortress America: The United States is Toughening Up 
its Borders.” Newsweek (International Edition), 12 November 2001. 
Boudreaux, R. “Mexico Tries to Spur Talks on Migration: The legalization 
issue crept into a high-level meeting on border security and crossings.” Los 
Angeles Times (Home Edition), 25 April 2003, p. A3 (main news section). 
3
 Bokelmann, 2001. 
4
 Hirschkorn, 30 May 2003, p. 1. 
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call of sorts for the foremost military power in the world, 
which had not been attacked on such a grand scale since Pearl 
Harbor in 1941.  For these and many other reasons, 9/11 was the 
modern equivalent of the “date which will live in infamy.”5 
However, 9/11 was a defining moment for the United States 
for other important reasons as well.  The aftermath of 9/11 
spawned debates in such diverse subjects as the economy,6 
counter-terrorism,7 inter-agency cooperation,8 international 
cooperation against terrorism,9 current immigration policy,10 
border security policy,11 and airport security.12  These subjects 
are not intended to be an all-inclusive list, but such a list 
does help reveal the far-reaching effects that 9/11 has had on 
politics in this country.  The scope of this thesis is limited 
to only one of these diverse subjects:  land border security 
policy, specifically as it relates to illegal immigration and 
the transportation of goods across international land borders. 
Given the enormous impact 9/11 had on nearly every citizen 
in the United States and throughout the world, the eventual 
policy decisions about post-9/11 land border security made by 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the United 
                     5
 Roosevelt, p. 1. 
6
 Hilsenrath, p. A-2; Ip, p. A-1. 
 Wisdom, S. “The old rules are gone.” Windsor Star, CanWest Global 
Communications Corporation, 29 October 2001, p. A6. 
7
 Anderson, p. A-13; Toner, p. A-1. 
8
 Hearst News Service, p. A-20; McCutcheon, p. 1. 
9
 Shuman, pp. 53, 57-59; Sullivan, p. A-12. 
10
 See Wassem, 15 April 2002, to review the debate on visa policy.  See 
Siskin, 22 April 2002, to review immigration policy in general.  See Holland, 
15 April 2002, pp. 24-32 for a discussion about visa issuance, identification 
of immigrant status, tracking and enforcing visa restrictions, and deportation 
procedures. 
11
 Camarota, pp. 42-45. 
12
 Flint, p. 7; Loh, p. 94; Hutchinson, pp. 48-53. 
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States will have significant consequences.  The land border 
security policy decisions made today are not trivial matters.  
They heavily impact different societal groups in the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico.  Specifically, the post-9/11 border 
security institutions and policies created by Congress and the 
executive branch will have lasting consequences in a variety of 
controversial topics with both domestic and international 
implications.  Two examples of domestic considerations include 
an open vs. closed society and more efficient security measures 
vs. civil rights and privacy.13  Two examples of international 
considerations include more transnational immigration from 
Mexico vs. less transnational immigration from Mexico14 and the 
balance between increased trade flows (i.e., healthy 
macroeconomies) vs. tighter border checks on the Canadian and 
Mexican borders (i.e., secure international land borders).15 
Important ties with Canada and Mexico characterize the U.S. 
economy.  In the decade of the 1990s, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed, ensuring a continuous (if 
not increased) flow of goods across the Canadian and Mexican 
borders.  The value of U.S. trade with its NAFTA partners has 
exploded from $233 billion in 1990 to $380 billion in 1995 to 
$653 billion in 2000, a 180% overall change from 1990 to 2000.  
Before NAFTA, the U.S. conducted over one-fourth of its total 
trading with Canada and Mexico, but that number grew to nearly 
one-third by the year 2000 (see figure 1).  Clearly, Canada and 
Mexico are important to the U.S. economy. 
                     13 Ernsberger Jr., 12 November 2001. 
14 Barone, “South of the Border.” U.S. News & World Report, 133:5, 05 
August 2002, p. 34; Boudreaux, 25 April 2003, p. A3. 
15 Wisdom, 29 October 2001, p. A6; Ernsberger Jr., 12 November 2001. 
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Figure 1.   Value of U.S. trade with NAFTA countries as a 
percentage of total U.S. international trade 
 
From: BTS 01-07: U.S. Department of Transportation Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics. “North American Trade and Travel Trends.” p. 2, 4, Washington, 
DC: 2001. 
Canada has been the primary trading partner with the United 
States for decades.  Mexico is the major Latin American trading 
partner with the United States and ranks only behind Canada in 
volume of imports and exports, surpassing Japan in 1999.16  
Therefore, there are several domestic interest groups and 
organizations with key economic interests in maintaining a free, 
uninterrupted flow of goods and services across the Mexican and 
Canadian borders.17  It should come as no surprise that Canadians 
                     16 BTS 01-07, 2001, p. 3. 
17 Chinni, D. “Security, Commerce Vie on U.S.-Canada Border.” Christian 
Science Monitor. 11 December 2002. 
[http://news.findlaw.com/csmonitor/s/20021211/11dec2002091843.html]. Accessed 
06 Feb 2003. 
Canadian-American Border Trade Alliance. “The Canada/United States Accord 
on our Shared Border—A Call to Action for 2001 and Beyond.” 25 February 2001. 
[http://www.canambta.org/html/2001_accord.htm]. Accessed 30 August 2003. 
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and Mexicans also have their own political interests in mind 
when the topic of U.S. land border security policy is raised.18 
In the aftermath of 9/11, it has become imperative to ask 
some important questions:  Does current border security policy 
constitute a threat to national security?  If so, how can secure 
borders and free, unimpeded trade across U.S. land borders (both 
of which are in the interests of the United States) coexist?  
The answers to these questions entail some controversy.  While 
everyone living in the United States obviously wants to feel 
safe, not everyone (i.e., some U.S. domestic interest groups, 
U.S. local and federal agencies, and the Canadian and Mexican 
governments) agrees on how open U.S. borders should be to 
foreign visitors and to the flow of commerce across 
international borders.  For example, after 9/11, Rep. Tom 
Tancredo advocated increased security (i.e., the military) on 
the border19 while Rep. Chris Cannon continued to advocate a 
traditional, “open” immigration policy.20 
This thesis explores a variety of different ways to solve 
the dilemma of necessarily increasing border security measures 
in the post-9/11 era versus maintaining open trade flows and the 
unrestricted movement of legitimate traffic and people.  Perhaps 
these questions are best answered by analyzing U.S. policy in 
                     
 Jackson, M. “Business assured border traffic will continue to flow: 
Homeland reps suggest the use of commuter passes.” San Diego Business 
Journal, 24:12, 24 March 2003, p. 3. 
 Trickett, B. “The high cost of security; long waits hurt those least able 
to afford it.” San Diego Union-Tribune, 25 October 2001, p. B13. 
 Wisdom, 29 Octoberr 2001, p. A6. 
18
 Boudreaux, 25 April 2003, p. A3; Barone, M.  2002. 
19 Anonymous. “Border cooperation beats militarization; Canadian, Mexican, 
and U.S. governments can preserve security without calling out the troops.” 




the 1990s.  What was U.S. land border security policy from 1990-
2003 and was it linked to national security?  What solutions 
were proposed from 1990-2003?  Which policy reform proposals 
affect national security and/or domestic trade in a positive way 
or negative way?  These questions help to answer the golden 
question: what policies ensure that both national security and 
free trade in North America can coexist? 
2. Methodology and Argument 
Most U.S. military conflicts have been fought elsewhere 
(e.g., Europe, Pacific Ocean, Vietnam, and Kuwait).  U.S. policy 
after WWII has been to promote regional stability in order to 
prevent conflicts from reaching U.S. shores.21  The recognized 
contemporary term for these conflicts is “homeland defense.”22  
But what happens when the threat reaches the American homeland, 
such as it did in 1942 and again in 2001?  While the nature of 
the foreign threat is different—in the WWII era the threat was 
perceived to be foreign states while the current terrorist 
threat elusively crosses state boundaries—both eras represent 
times when national security was a big issue.23 
Conventional wisdom is that there are problems with border 
security policy and the organizations that carry them out, 
particularly post-9/11.24  The debate does not seem to be over 
the existence of a problem with border security, but rather how 
to solve this problem in the current era of globalization—that 
is, how to simultaneously secure the border against terrorism 
yet still maintain an attitude of “openness” to legal foreign                      21
 Joint Chiefs of Staff. “Shape Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy 
for a New Era.” National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 
1997, pp. 1-3, 7-8. 
22
 Lawler, B., October 2002. 
23
 Ibid, October 2002. 
24
 Camarota, December 2001 & Fall 2002; Krouse & Perl, June 2001; 
McLaughlin, March 2002. 
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visitors who mean America no harm and keep the flow of 
legitimate goods and services flowing such that our economy is 
not damaged.25  The debate has focused on the following 
solutions: (1) additional manpower on land borders and/or 
increasing funds for the agencies with land border security 
functions;26 (2) organizational changes (e.g., centralization of 
authority over agencies who perform border security functions 
and separation of “service” from enforcement functions to 
improve transparency, accountability, and inter-agency 
cooperation;27 (3) technology (examples include, but are not 
limited to a computerized entry-exit tracking system, biometric 
I.D. cards, radiation and explosives detection devices at land 
ports, and dedicated lanes for pre-screened, low-risk 
travelers); and (4) cooperation (i.e., improved cooperation 
among intelligence services, border security agencies, and 
governments of North American countries and other allied 
nations;28 improved interagency cooperation within the United 
States; improved cooperation among governmental agencies and the 
private sector;29 
These questions can be answered by studying three proposed 
solutions (i.e., increasing manpower/financial resources to 
border security agencies, using border technology, and engaging 
in cooperative partnerships between the trade industry and the                      25
 Lawler, 2002. 
26
 Camarota,  December, 2001. 
27
 Camarota, December 2001; New York Times Editorial Desk, February 2002; 
Mitchell, January 2002. 
 INS Reform and Border Security Act of 1999: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 
106th Cong., pp. 1-6, 10, 14, 23-26, 30, 51 (23 September 1999). 
28
 Sullivan, March 2002; Camarota, Fall 2002; Krouse, June 2001; Ernsberger 
Jr., November 2001. 
29
 Sullivan, March 2002; Camarota, December 2001; Krouse, June 2001; 
McLaughlin, March 2002; Ernsberger Jr., November 2001. 
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federal government) during the time period 1990-2003.  This time 
period involved significant threats to national security.  The 
Oklahoma City bombings, the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, 
and the attacks on the WTC and Pentagon in September 2001 all 
occurred during this time period. Since 9/11, many comparisons 
are made to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.  The only 
national security threat that seems to compare to 9/11 in its 
magnitude and far-reaching implications is what happened on 
December 7, 1942, yet the threat in 1942 was an external state.  
This thesis compares a time period in U.S. history (1990-2003) 
in which international terrorism, a transnational threat 
composed of non-state actors, was a primary threat. 
The initial hypotheses of this thesis in March 2002 were as 
follows:  First, border security before 9/11 constituted a 
national security threat.  Second, current land border security 
measures were inadequate in preventing illegal immigration along 
U.S. land borders.  Third, proposals to completely seal off U.S. 
borders (border militarization, fence lines, and 100% I.D. 
checks and container inspections) were either not feasible due 
to domestic trade flow pressures or not cost-effective.  By lack 
of feasibility, the argument was that propositions to completely 
seal off U.S. land borders ran counter to the economically 
liberal forces and globalization characterizing the world 
economy.  Furthermore, propositions to completely seal off the 
border damage the U.S. relationship with Canada/Mexico, are 
contradictory in nature to NAFTA (which the United States signed 
and ratified during the 1990s) and will impede the passage of 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in 2005.  Fourth, 
proposals such as biometric tracking, entry-exit tracking, the 
EZ-Pass System, additional computer data-bases, and more high-
tech sensors along the Mexican border were good technological 
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solutions and improved security, but perhaps were not 
financially cost-effective options. 
3.  Scope and Data Sources 
Since the project began in March 2002, the number of 
independent variables narrowed to three: increased 
manpower/financial resources for border agencies; border 
technology; and cooperation between international governments 
and the private sector.  This does not mean that factors like 
interagency cooperation, intelligence sharing, and possibly 
other variables are not important.  However, the scope of the 
thesis prevented study of these important variables. 
This thesis is series of case studies focusing on U.S. 
border security policies along the U.S.-Mexican and U.S.-
Canadian land borders from 1990-2003.  There are three basic 
ways that people and cargo enter the United States:  by sea, 
air, and land.30  This thesis examines U.S. border security as it 
relates to humans and commerce crossing U.S. land borders with 
Mexico and Canada and its impact on national security and free 
trade.  U.S. policymakers have concentrated almost exclusively 
on aircraft safety and airport security post-9/11, but they 
ought to be spending at least an equal amount of time thinking 
about U.S. land borders, for reasons discussed below. 
Airport security, protection against illegal entry of goods 
and people from the sea, and seaport security are not examined 
in this thesis.  Since a large proportion of legitimate traffic 
enters the United States through land international ports of 
entry31 (see figures 2 and 3), focusing exclusively on land 
border security as it relates to the entry of commerce and human 





transport are obviously key questions in the homeland security 
formula, they are both outside the scope of this thesis. 
To reiterate, this thesis will examine U.S. border security 
as it pertains to land borders only.  Why focus exclusively on 
land borders?  One reason is that airports are essentially 
chokepoints. Immigration and border security officials can 
relatively easily enforce pertinent border enforcement laws at 
airports compared to the long and wide-open land borders of the 
United States.  The fact that airports are confined in terms of 
space (i.e., a chokepoint) means that information about arriving 
visitors (be they legal immigrants or illegal terrorists) can be 
obtained beforehand (when local agencies and airlines cooperate 
effectively) and enforced.  By contrast, sea borders and land 
borders are not chokepoints, but are long and wide.  For 
example, the U.S.-Mexican border is 2,000 miles long and the 
U.S.-Canadian border is 5,525 miles long. 
Another reason to focus on land borders is because of the 
enormous opportunity for smugglers and terrorists to take 
advantage of the currently overtaxed land ports of entry.  
Border inspectors simply cannot deal with the overwhelming 
amount of commercial traffic at land borders (see figures 2 and 
3), given the current border regime strategy.  Pre-NAFTA volumes 
were large in and of themselves, but post-NAFTA volumes are 
staggering and continue to expand every year. 
Statistical data indicates that if the United States wants 
to secure its homeland from terrorism, a long, hard look at land 
borders is warranted.  It is estimated that 500 million people 
enter the country by land legally each year of which 330 million 
are non-citizens.32  In some remote areas along the northern 
                     32
 www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/sect3-1.pdf 
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border with Canada, the only protection against illegal movement 
of goods and humans is orange traffic cones.33  The number of 
inspections of people entering the United States though land 
ports dwarfs all other modes of entry (see figure 2).  
The amount of commerce that crosses our borders is equally 
staggering:  $1.35 trillion in imports and $1 trillion in 
exports crossed our borders in 2001.34  Furthermore, despite the 
rhetoric about how tight security became after 9/11, Customs 
only inspects 2% of the containers that cross U.S. land 
borders.35  Combine that statistic with the fact that trucks 
carry most of the value of commercial cargo across NAFTA borders 
(see figures 3 and 4) and one begins to see that land borders 
provide an ideal place to hide contraband and illegal 
immigrants.  Finally, number of people and vehicles at the San 
Diego/Tijuana border crossing is expected to double by 2020.36  
Clearly, terrorists, smugglers, illegal immigrants, and other 
transnational threats could potentially exploit this sheer 
volume of human and cargo traffic at land borders to perform 
terrorist acts within the United States. 
                     33
 Volpe Center. “Volpe Engineers Use Biometrics to Help Ease Border 
Crush.” [http://www.volpe.dot.gov/infosrc/journal/spring97/biomet.html]. 
Spring 1997. Accessed 22 August 2003. 
34
 www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/sect3-1.pdf 
35 Messina, I. “A closer look: Customs steps up use of gamma-ray technology 
to inspect containers at ports.” Journal of Commerce, 05 August 2002, p. 25. 
36 Lindquist, D. “Border wait to grow far worse, local officials say.” San 
Diego Union-Tribune, 03 October 2002, p. A-1 (news section). 
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Figure 2.   Inspections processed at land/sea/air ports (2001). 
 
From: GAO 03-174: General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using 
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Figure 3.   Modal shares of U.S. merchandise trade with NAFTA 
partners by value:  1997-2000. 
 
From: BTS 01-07: U.S. Department of Transportation Bureau of Transportation 
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Figure 4.   Average land modal share by value of U.S. 
merchandise trade with NAFTA partners as compared to air and 
water modes (average percent over the years 1997-2000). 
 
After: BTS 01-07: U.S. Department of Transportation (Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics). “North American Trade and Travel Trends.” p. 7, Washington, DC: 
2001. 
Despite these statistics, U.S. policy-makers have focused 
ad nauseum on airport security.  Certainly, airport security is 
important, as is security at the nation’s seaports.  
Nevertheless, given the sheer volume of traffic and sizeable 
area of responsibility over which land border inspectors 
preside, U.S. land borders deserve closer scrutiny.  Besides, a 
number of successful initiatives (e.g., the Container Security 
Initiative,37 INSPASS,38 CANPASS,39 and legislation mandating 100% 
baggage screening at airports) are already underway, but 
significant challenges remain at land border ports. 
                     37 CSI is an initiative that stations U.S. inspectors overseas to inspect 
containers at original loading points, electronically sealing the contents, 
and then tracking the shipment until it reaches U.S. ports. 
38 INSPASS is a system whereby U.S. immigration officials prescreen 
frequent flyers and issue biometric I.D. cards for quicker, more secure 
immigration processing at a select few U.S. airports. 
39 CANPASS is the Canadian version of INSPASS. 
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Data sources may include, but are not limited to the 
following: newspaper articles (e.g., New York Times and 
Washington Post); journal articles; INS statistical reports; 
official reports from the Departments of State, Commerce, 
Justice, and Transportation; federal governmental statistical 
documents; and others. 
4. Chapter by Chapter Summary 
The title of Chapter II is “Traditional and Contemporary 
Thought on Border Security.”  Chapter II provides a framework 
for the independent variables to be studied in succeeding 
chapters.  The terms border, border security, homeland security, 
and homeland defense are carefully defined.  A major proposition 
in chapter II is that the primary threats to states in the 
Western Hemisphere after the end of the Cold War in 1989 are not 
other states, but rather shared, transnational problems that 
elusively cross state boundaries.  This proposition has profound 
implications for how a border security framework should be 
constructed in the 21st century.  Contemporary theory on border 
security is also reviewed. 
The primary intent of this chapter is to summarize the 
results of a literature review about current border security 
theory in North America.  As the threats to states in North 
America have changed from primarily other states to primarily 
transnational threats (e.g., terrorism, illegal immigration, 
drug trafficking, and organized crime), the concept of what a 
border is has also changed.  The literature review will focus on 
how the definition of international borders has changed over 
time in North America. 
Chapter III examines the impact of increased 
funding/personnel solutions on the prevention of illegal 
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immigration from 1994-2003 and their effects on national 
security.  For example, has illegal immigration increased or 
decreased in the 1990s?  If illegal immigration is rising, is it 
a national security risk or a minor problem of lesser priority?  
How is the “prevention through deterrence” strategy different 
from previous border patrol strategy?  Did manpower and 
financial resources increase for the border patrol from 1994-
2003?  What effect did that have on stopping illegal immigration 
and/or improving trans-border trade flows? 
Chapter IV attempts to make sense of the incredibly large 
amount of technology currently being used to address the North 
American transnational threats of terrorism, drug trafficking, 
illegal immigration, and human smuggling.  It details the 
cooperative technological options for border security that are 
currently under investigation.  Technology analyzed includes 
radiation and explosive detection, the Vehicle and Cargo 
Inspection System (VACIS), the Secure Electronic Network for 
Traveler’s Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), and biometrics. 
Chapter V analyzes why a pre-clearance strategy to 
simultaneously improve land transportation security while 
reducing border wait time for trucks/autos on the U.S.-Canadian 
border emerged between government and the private sector.  It 
also analyzes why such a strategy has not fully developed along 
the U.S.-Mexico border.  The answers to several questions help 
determine possible barriers to future trade-governmental 
partnerships against terrorism. First, who were the 
international and domestic actors involved and how did their 
preferences develop?  Second, how did the institutional context 
shape the outcomes?  Third, why was an agreement reached with 
Canada and why did a functional agreement with Mexico fail? 
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Chapter VI summarizes the major findings of each of the 
case studies.  It draws conclusions about the proposals 
(increased funding/personnel solutions; technological solutions; 
or cooperation between the private sector and governments) 
studied and their impact on border security.  Implications for 
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II. TRADITIONAL VS. CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT ON BORDER 
SECURITY 
A. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
1. What Is a Border and What Are Its Limits? 
The traditional, Westphalian concept of borders can be 
summarized in a few sentences.  First, borders should be clearly 
defined and drawn on maps.  Second, borders should be accepted 
by all parties in treaties and authorized by the international 
community.  Third, any unclaimed territory (as delineated by 
internationally accepted maps) should eventually be resolved by 
the international community and incorporated into a new 
internationally sanctioned map.40 
Recently, some scholars have redefined traditional concepts 
of borders.  Many of these authors challenge the traditional, 
Western, industrialized, and developed world’s concept of 
borders as an international line with definitive boundaries.  
The common denominator in these arguments is the idea that the 
traditional definition of borders is mistaken. 
For example, some argue that word border was never properly 
defined in some regions.  One author argues that Western 
concepts of the term border are foreign to some Asian cultures 
and were imposed upon them by European world powers in the 18th 
and 19th centuries.  He presents evidence that before Europe’s 
colonization of Asia, Asian territory was marked by the 
following characteristics:  diffuse populations; a federalized 
governmental structure vice a centralized one; and a “ethnic 
complexity” of tribes who migrated at will without political 
repercussions.  In essence, he argues that clearly marked 
                     40
 Solomon, R.L., “Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia,” 
World Politics, 23:1, October 1970, pp. 1-2. 
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boundaries (ratified and accepted by international law) exist in 
the minds of the Western world, but in practice, may not exist 
in the minds of the people who live within those boundaries.41 
Others argue that traditional concepts of borders are 
outdated.  They claim that globalization increasingly links 
countries together.  Some neighboring countries are so 
integrated that regional economic blocks have emerged (e.g., the 
European Union, MERCOSUR, NAFTA).  In the Western Hemisphere, 
this phenomenon was initiated by a shift in U.S.-Latin American 
relations precipitated by the end of the Cold War, a guarded 
warming in Latin America to the practices of economic 
neoliberalism, and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 
(EAI).  Since the EAI was perceived as an invitation from the 
United States, instead of a unilateral measure addressing only 
U.S. interests, Latin America embraced it.  The EAI replaced 
financial aid packages with regional trade initiatives to solve 
Latin America’s seemingly continuous macroeconomic problems.42 
One of the purposes of regional blocks is to provide 
collective benefits to the population of the entire region.  To 
one degree or another, economic blocks have been transformed 
into political entities and collective security arrangements.  
For example, the EU is no longer just an economic block, but has 
passed legislation that has security implications for the 
countries involved. Some of these security issues deal 
                     41
 Solomon, October 1970, pp. 1-15. 
42
 Franko, P.M. Toward a New Security Architecture in the Americas: The 
Strategic Implications of the FTAA. 1st ed. Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. pp. 1-2. 2000. 
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specifically with perceived border threats such as illegal 
migration and organized crime from the EU’s eastern boundaries.43 
The argument that traditional, industrialized definitions 
of borders do not apply to some cultures may have merit, but 
does not apply to the scope of this thesis.  This thesis applies 
to the Western Hemisphere, a region where Western concepts of 
territoriality have always applied (even since colonial times).  
Even in Latin America (consistently labeled as the developing 
world or third world) the concept of a clearly defined territory 
over which one central, sovereign authority rules is accepted. 
However, the second argument, which postulates that our 
integrated, globalized world requires a fresh look at how we 
define our borders, has merit for the purposes of this thesis.  
In fact, the need to redefine our borders is a central thread 
running throughout the tapestry of chapters IV and V.  If 
economic integration and globalization are slowly eroding state 
sovereignty, slowly developing international institutions that 
are replacing the “anarchy”44 of international relations, and 
suggesting new approaches to border security practices, then 
integrated, cooperative approaches to border security that focus 
on risk management techniques are likely relevant. 
2. Historical vs. Contemporary Border Security 
Understanding what border security means in today’s world 
necessarily involves understanding both the historical and 
                     43
 Anderson, M. “Border Regimes and Security in an Enlarged European 
Community: Implications of the Entry into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty.” EUI 
working paper No. 2000/8. Florence, Italy: European University Institute 
(Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). February 2000, pp. 1-34. 
Bigo, D. “Border Regimes and Security in an Enlarged European Community 
Police Cooperation with CEECs: Between Trust and Obligation.” EUI working 
paper No. 2000/65. Florence, Italy: European University Institute (Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies). December 2000, pp. 1-31. 
44
 Waltz, K.N. “Political Structures.” In Keohane, R.O. (ed.), NeoRealism 
and its Critics, pp. 81-87, New York: Columbia University Press. 1986. 
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contemporary threats to states.  Threats to states have changed 
at different time periods in history, including during state 
formation,45 after states became the primary means of political 
organization,46 and in the latter part of the 20th century.47  
What are governments trying to protect their borders against?  
What border security requirements existed historically and do 
those requirements still exist? 
The modern emphasis in political science and comparative 
politics on the legitimate use of force by centralized 
governments leads one to believe that border security 
historically was a military task to prevent invasion by other 
countries.  Indeed, the colonial heights of power of Spain, 
France, and Great Britain establish this point.  Two world wars 
were fought (at least partially) to stop Germany and Japan from 
expanding her borders (and her pool of economic resources) at 
the expense of others.  The Mexican-American War broke out (at 
least partially) because U.S. citizens wanted to expand west 
while Mexico wanted to protect its territorial borders. 
Therefore, border security historically meant protection 
against invasion by other states48 as an integral part of 
creating a strong state.  Most national security studies in the 
1980s defined U.S. national security in terms of “military 
action” by “subversive ideologies and States” and U.S. “military 
                     45 Military force played a key role at this time.  In fact, state-making 
was an accidental outcome of kings and nobles attempting to monopolize 
violence in their respective spheres of influence. The line between 
legitimate and illegitimate violence was gray in the Middle Ages, as was a 
territorial noble’s or merchant’s loyalty to kings/rulers.  Eventually, kings 
overcame nobles in the quest for a legitimate monopoly on force in their 
overlapping areas of influence (Tilly, 172-75). 
46 Other states were the primary threats during this time period. 
47 Transnational threats (e.g., terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug 
trafficking) now threaten states as much or more than other states do. 
48
 Solomon, R.L., October 1970, p. 7. 
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mobilization and warfare strategies.”49  The authors of these 
studies50 were probably justified, given the existence of the 
Cold War.  However, even after the Cold War, some authors 
continue to define national security too narrowly,51 without 
serious discussion of transnational social and economic 
problems, such as illegal immigration. 
To reiterate, when states were invented as political 
entities, border security was generally a military function.  
This does not mean that militaries no longer perform this 
function.  That function still applies today.  A state’s armed 
forces are still a tool by which governments exercise the 
legitimate use of force over a clearly defined area.  Borders 
are still clearly and visibly marked on maps.  However, it is 
clear that today there is a difference between protecting one’s 
borders from invasion by another state and protecting one’s 
borders from non-state sponsored terrorism, illegal immigration, 
drug trafficking, human smuggling, organized crime, and other 
transnational threats.  In short, border security today means 
protecting against more than just invading armies or navies. 
Most industrialized countries control their international 
borders for three additional reasons.  First, to enforce the 
entry of unwanted foreign nationals (e.g., criminals, drug 
traffickers, terrorists) into their country, based on their own 
                     49 Holland, K.M., 15 April 2002, pp. 6, 8. 
50 Kaufman, D.J., McKitrick, J., & Leney, T.J (eds.). U.S. National 
Security: A Framework for Analysis. MA: Lexington Books. 1985. 
Schoultz, L. National Security and Untied States Policy toward Latin 
America. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1987. 
51 Perry, W. “The Inter-American Security Agenda,” Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, 36:3, Fall 1994. 
Wolpin, M.D. “Permissive Immigration vs. ‘Global Peace’ in the 21st 
Century,” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 23:3, Fall 
1998. 
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laws.  Second, to provide a means by which to collect tariffs, 
identify and punish people who circumvent customs laws, and 
confiscate illegal goods and contraband.  Third, to prevent 
contaminated, unhealthy, or polluted vegetation and/or animals 
from spreading disease.  In short, border security is the means 
by which industrialized countries stop unauthorized entry of 
persons, provide customs control, and enforce applicable 
phytosanitary and veterinary laws.52 
When the term border security is used in this thesis, it 
either refers to one of the latter three processes or the 
prevention/deterrence of terrorism within U.S. borders, not 
military defense from invasion by another country’s armed 
forces.  The terms national security, homeland security, and 
homeland defense have been used somewhat loosely. The 
definitions proposed by Bruce Lawler of the Department of 
Homeland Security are used here.  Homeland security is the 
collective efforts of federal, state, and local agencies to 
protect against terrorist threats.  Homeland defense are 
military actions designed to protect the homeland from other 
states and state-sponsored terrorist groups.53  The services 
provided by federal inspection agencies mentioned in this 
thesis, such as U.S. Customs and the Border Patrol, fit into the 
category of homeland security. Conversely, the services provided 
by U.S. armed forces fit into the category of homeland defense. 
3. The Effects of Integration and Globalization 
Certain historical forces ensured the emergence of the 
modern, sovereign state.  Other modern forces are possibly 
changing our definitions of the border and border security.  
                     52
 No author, 21 January 2003. [http://www.weekly.vitrum.si]. Accessed 15 
March 2003. 
53 Lawler, October 2002. 
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What are these forces?  What is causing some scholars to 
redefine international borders?  This section briefly describes 
the processes inherent in the development of the modern state54 
and the possible future disintegration of the modern state.55  It 
is important to understand these forces for one to make 
intelligent land border security policy choices. 
Increasingly, states seem to be less in control of the 
policies affecting their constituents and other internationally 
accepted institutions seem to be more in control of setting the 
agenda.  Most states seem to accept the notion that the United 
Nations must be consulted before a country can use military 
force.  NGOs (e.g., Human Rights Watch and Greenpeace) use their 
organizational strength and reach to restrict the power of 
national leaders to ignore human rights or environmental 
agendas.  The IMF holds the economic future of many developing 
countries in their hands by requiring an accepted economic 
ideology before lending money.  The OAS compels Latin American 
countries to accept democracy and shun authoritarian tendencies.  
There is an ongoing debate about whether the international 
community should allow alleged war criminals to be tried by 
their own country or in an International Criminal Court. 
What forces are at work here?  What is the source of all 
these international organizations that limit the sovereignty of 
the traditional state?  The answer can be narrowed down to 
globalization and increased international integration. 
Globalization is a common term today, but it has been 
defined rather broadly.  The definition used here assumes a 
                     54
 Spruyt, H. “The Victory of the Sovereign State.” The Sovereign State and 
its Competitors. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1994. 
55
 Ohmae, K. “Development in a Borderless World.” The Borderless World. New 
York: Harper Perennial. 1990. pp. 172-192. 
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heavy emphasis on economic integration. Globalization is defined 
as “the rising share of economic activity that takes place 
between people who live in different countries rather than in 
the same country.”56  The key factor in explaining globalization 
is economic.  The international rise in economic activity can be 
measured in four ways: foreign direct investment (FDI); 
international capital flows among countries; the flow of people 
and/or labor across national boundaries (immigration); and 
international trade in goods and services.57 
Globalization is not new.58  For example, there is evidence 
that international capital flows are actually below historic 50-
year trends previous to 1950.  Immigration, while clearly on the 
rise, still does not match previous historical patterns.59  
Global commerce, trade, and investment were increasing at 
lightning speed in the early 1900s as well.  Great Britain, at 
the peak of its colonization efforts, was recognized as the 
world’s greatest sea power and found itself at the cornerstone 
of this early 20th century free-market system.60 
If globalization existed already in the 20th century, what 
is different about 21st century globalization?  One factor 
probably sets today’s globalization apart from previous ones—the 
degree of integration.  The world has become a smaller place 
because of how interwoven and connected it is. Friedman 
correctly points out that our world today is increasingly 
                     56
 Ziblatt, August 2002. 
57
 Ziblatt, August 2002. 
58
 Wilensky, H.L. “Globalization: Does it Subvert Job Security, Labor 
Standards, and the Welfare State?” Rich Democracies. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 2002. pp. 638-39; Ziblatt, August 2002. 
59
 Wilensky, 2002, p. 638-39 
60
 Ziblatt, August 2002. 
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characterized by the word “web.”61  Whether this word refers to 
the Internet, the increasingly connected financial institutions 
and firms in the world today, or shared transnational regional 
threats (e.g., terrorism, illegal immigration, drug trafficking) 
it is clear that our world is more integrated.62 
Friedman describes three balance-of-power relationships in 
our “new international system:”63 the traditional relationships 
between nation-states; global markets and nation-states; and 
individuals and nation-states.  International relations have 
always been around in modern politics.  However, global markets 
and individuals, as a result of the recent explosion in world 
integration and information sharing, are increasingly playing a 
larger role in shaping the world.  Examples include:  (1) long-
term capital management, whose financial business compares to a 
foreign country; and (2) Osama Bin Laden, an individual who is 
essentially at war with a country.64  Nation-states are not the 
primary actors on the world stage anymore. 
Furthermore, the fall of communism meant that capitalism 
and the free-market system (which go hand-in-hand with 
globalization) became the only choice.65  The root assumption for 
this is that state-centered economic ideology may claim to 
distribute income more equitably, but they cannot generate 
income as efficiently.66  In fact, communism and all its 
ideological variants cannot generate income at all in the                      61
 Friedman, T. “The New System.” The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: 
Anchor Books. 2000. p. 8. 
62
 Gilpin, R. “The Second Great Age of Capitalism.” The Challenge of Global 
Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2000. pp. 15-20; Friedman, 
2000, p. 8; Ohmae, 1990, pp. 172-75. 
63
 Ibid, p. 6. 
64
 Ibid, pp. 13-15. 
65
 Ohmae, 1990, p. 186; Friedman, 2000, pp. 101-11. 
66
 Friedman, 2000, pp. 101-11. 
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interwoven, connected, competitive system in which the world now 
lives.67  Countries that resist the free-market system today 
simply get left behind.68 
Globalization has limited the economic and political 
choices of sovereign states.  Brazil’s economic woes recently 
required a $30 billion loan from the IMF.  The loan was granted 
with strict budgetary limits that epitomize the neo-liberal 
economic rules.  Cast this scenario against the backdrop of the 
2002 Brazilian presidential elections, in which two left-leaning 
candidates, who both campaigned on an increased social spending 
agenda, led the polls. Naturally, this difference led to 
complaints about how IMF rules restrict Brazil’s sovereignty.69 
Friedman’s analogy of the “golden straitjacket”70 is 
accurate, albeit rigid.  Most states can still shape their 
economic destinies.  Wilensky would probably consider Friedman’s 
analogy an overstatement:  “Political, economic, demographic, 
and social structures . . . overwhelm the external pressures and 
shocks as sources of national policies and performances.”71 
Nevertheless, increasingly there do seem to be limits and 
constraints on policy-making.  The scope of the debate ranges 
widely.  There are those who predict a complete revolution in 
the international system in which globalization is the 
gravedigger of sovereign states.72 Yet some still believe that 
“the nation-state remains the ultimate object of allegiance; 
                     67
 Ohmae, 2000, p. 186. 
68
 Ibid; Friedman, 2000, pp. 102-103. 
69
 Rohter, L. “Brazilians Find a Political Cost for I.M.F. Help,” New York 
Times, 11 August 2002, pp. 1-4. 
70
 Friedman, 2000, p. 101. 
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 Wilensky, 2002, p. 640. 
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 Ohmae, 1990, pp. 172-92; Ziblatt, August 2002. 
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national institutions and policies continue to make a big 
difference for real welfare.”73  Nevertheless, the literature 
does accept the notion that globalization has resulted in a more 
integrated world and that states probably have less sovereignty 
entering the 21st century than they did entering the 20th 
century. 
In summary, the two most important developments of 
globalization affecting border security are: (1) the scope of 
primary actors in the international system today is more complex 
and variegated than a system only involving nation-states; and 
(2) capitalism has become the major macroeconomic system of 
choice,74 resulting in increased economic integration and by 
extension, security integration.  Both of these developments 
converge on two implications: (1) globalization has limited the 
effectiveness of the nation-state in unilaterally shaping its 
own border security practices against transnational threats; and 
(2) transnational threats (e.g., terrorism, illegal immigration, 
drug trafficking, and global organized crime) are more of a 
concern than other states in today’s world and they require 
joint solutions. 
This does not mean that states will disappear in the near 
future or that states can no longer exert authority over their 
border security practices.  This overemphasizes the effects of 
globalization and ignores the fact that states are still major 
players in both internal and external affairs.75  However, if 
integration has become the norm, then integrated, cooperative 
approaches to border security are vital to addressing terrorism 
and homeland security issues. 
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 Wilensky, 2002, p. 669. 
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 Friedman, 2000, pp. 13-16, 101-111. 
75
 Wilensky, H.L., 2002, pp. 637-39. 
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Most of the recent border security literature advocates re-
conceptualizing the way we view borders.  Stephen Flynn, 
Demetrious Papademetriou, Deborah Meyers, and CIC-Canada promote 
the idea that the current era of globalization necessitates a 
change in the concept of borders.  There are two significant 
ways that the border is being redefined in North America. 
First, the prevailing argument is that traditional 
definitions of the term border are outdated and do not 
adequately address the global nature of terrorism, given the 
present level of globalization.76  This argument proposes that 
the most salient threats to North America are “borderless 
networks” emanating “from everywhere and nowhere” outside of 
North America.  It also proposes that bilateral border security 
cooperation between Canada and the United States (with eventual 
inclusion of Mexico in a multilateral border security regime) is 
the proper way to address those threats.77 
Second, there is an argument that the actual, physical 
location of international borders is not the place to enforce 
border security.  Filtering illegal immigrants and contraband 
from legal citizens/visitors and legitimate goods at 
international borders actually contributes to the problem.  
Proponents argue that the concept of borders must be pushed out 
and away from North American international land and sea borders.  
Advocates say this will create additional time and additional 
mechanisms by which to filter out the bad from the good.78 
                     
76
 Haynal, G. “Interdependence, Globalization, and North American Borders.” 
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/Governance_Symposium/security.htm. 18 
January 2002. pp. 53, 67. Accessed 27 February 2003. 
77
 Haynal, 2002, pp. 53-54. 
78
 Flynn, S.E. “Transforming Border Management in the Post-September 11 
World.” 
[http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/Governance_Symposium/security.htm]. 18 
January 2002. pp. 37-49. Accessed 27 February 2003. 
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Flynn equates the current mentality of searching all goods 
and people at ports of entry to searching for a “needle-in-a-
haystack.”79  His solution is not to inspect everyone and 
everything at international land borders.  Rather, determine in 
advance what is legitimate (i.e., low-risk) and suspect (i.e., 
high risk) through the use of shared international technologies 
and practices at locations as far away from the physical border 
as possible. Then, communicate this information electronically 
to border inspection agencies and only inspect the high-risk 
people and goods at the physical borders.  To steal Flynn’s 
analogy, “the goal must be to limit the size of the haystack in 
which there are most likely to be illicit and dangerous 
needles.”80  This is what the term risk management when used in 
discussions about border security means. 
Pushing the border out is not just a theoretical concept.  
Most policy makers are convinced of the value of this 
redefinition of the border as well.  Admiral James Loy, 
commandant of the Coast Guard, has said that “the border of the 
future must be pushed outward . . . We need to press our borders 
all the way to the cargo’s origin.”81 
B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY U.S. BORDER SECURITY 
POLICY 
More organizations than just the enforcement arm of the INS 
(i.e., the Border Patrol) play a role in preventing illegal 
immigration.  Sometimes the INS (and in particular the Border 
                     
Beardsworth, R. “Border & Transportation Security.” CS 4920: Homeland 
Security Research Seminar. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. April 
2003; Lawler, October 2002. 
79
 Flynn, 2002, p. 40. 
80
 Flynn, 2002, p. 41. 
81 Bartelme, T. “Senators get lesson in Charleston port security; Commerrce 
panel hears testimony from federal officials, port security experts.” Post 
and Courier (Charleston SC), 20 February 2002, p. 1A. 
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Patrol) is falsely blamed for most failures to prevent illegal 
immigration into the United States.  By law, the prevention of 
illegal immigration is a shared federal responsibility. 
STATE DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Consular Affairs (overseas consular posts)
1.  Issue visas to foreign nationals to enter USA
2.  Maintain computerized data base (CLASS) of suspect foreign persons 
based on input from other intelligence and federal inspection agencies
FEDERAL INSPECTION AGENCIES AT PORTS OF ENTRY
1.  Customs Service (Treasury Dept.)
2.  INS (Dept. of Justice)
3.  Animal & Plant Health Inspection Service (Agriculture Dept.)
4. Public Health Service (Health & Human Services Dept.)
1. Collect tariffs, prevent entry of illicit drugs/contraband
2. Prevent illegal entry between POEs / Facilitate legal entry at POEs / 
Enforce immigration law within boundaries of USA
3. Prevent intro of unlawful or otherwise harmful plants / animals into USA
4. Prevent intro of infectious diseases into USA
 
Figure 5.   Agency roles in preventing illegal entry of people 
and/or goods into the USA 
 
After: Krouse, W.J. & Perl, R.F. “Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border 
Security Options and Issues.” Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress. 
18 June 2001. pp. CRS1-CRS3. 
Krause and Perl explain the prevention of illegal entry of 
people and contraband as consisting of two concentric circles.  
Each circle represents a filter by which potential terrorists 
and/or the contraband used to commit terrorism can be screened 
and prevented from entering the United States.  Figure 5 
graphically depicts two important pieces of information in this 
model: (1) what service is performed; and (2) what federal 
agency performs that service, according to U.S. law. 
The notions that traditional definitions of the border are 
obsolete, that the border and federal border inspection 
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functions should be expanded outward, and that countries must 
cooperate against transnational threats are rather new ideas in 
practice, if not in theory.  Proponents of these concepts argue 
for more “filters,” i.e., more opportunities to capture illegal 
immigrants and contraband away from U.S. international ports of 
entry (POEs) before they even reach U.S. physical borders.  The 
strategy still includes federal inspection agencies at/between 
POEs as an integral part of the solution, but emphasizes other 
federal and international cooperative functions away from POEs 
as the final piece of the border security puzzle.  Figure 6 
displays these additional “filters” (portrayed as additional 
concentric circles) away from the border to graphically portray 
how border security is envisioned in the 21st century. 
OVERSEAS LOCATIONS
NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY PERIMETER
INTERNATIONAL PORTS OF ENTRY
INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT
Border security at/between 
sea, land, air POEs
Border security at/between NAFTA external 
borders (Canada, USA, Mexico)
Border security outside NAFTA borders--
Mega-ports, overseas consulates, personnel 
stationed in non-NAFTA countries




Figure 6.   Additional border security “filters” 
 
After: Krouse, W.J. & Perl, R.F. “Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and 
Border Security Options and Issues.” Congressional Research Service. The 
Library of Congress. 18 June 2001. pp. CRS1-CRS3. 
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C. A CLOSED BORDER HAS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
Several authors note that U.S. policy in the 1980s and 
1990s focused on cracking down on illegal immigration.  Strict 
border controls have been ongoing since the late 1970s.82  
Chapter III describes this phenomenon in detail, but for now, 
Rosenblum’s work gives a good summary.  He defined three phases 
of border escalation during this time period.  The three phases 
included the time periods 1978-80, 1980-88, and 1994-2000.83 
In phase one (1978-80), INS funding increased by 24% as 
border agencies purchased new technology and equipment.  Phase 
two (1980-88) featured the “lost decade” of the 1980s in Latin 
America as a major factor in increased illegal immigration 
statistics. Total Border Patrol apprehensions increased 
dramatically and closely mirrored the increased apprehensions of 
illegal immigrants from Mexico.  In 1986, Congress passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which provided severe 
sanctions for certain categories of U.S. employers who employed 
illegal immigrants.  Subsequently, The INS reported that total 
arrests (interior enforcement and apprehensions at the border) 
increased.  Funding also increased again from 1986-1988. 
Phase three marked the beginning of the “prevention through 
deterrence” strategy shift (see Chapter III).  Significant 
legislation, the Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant 
Responsibility Reform Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 was passed.  This act 
                     82 Dunn, T.J. “The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: 
Low-intensity Conflict Doctrine Comes Home.” Austin, TX: Center for Mexican 
American Studies, University of Texas at Austin. 1996. p. 176. 
Andreas, P. Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Cornell 
University Press, 2000. pp. 3-4, 51, 85, 105-11, preface. 
Rosenblum, M.R. “U.S. Immigration Policy: Unilateral and Cooperative 
Responses to Undocumented Immigration.” 
[http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/igcc/rom01.html]. December 2000. Accessed 11 
March 2003. 
83 Rosenblum, M.R., December 2000, pp. 1-8. 
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provided for 1000 new border patrol agents and 300 new INS 
support staff annually for five years.  Although subsequent 
budgets fell somewhat short of the mandated manpower levels, 
manpower levels within the INS still surged.  IIRIRA also 
permitted the INS to use quicker, more efficient deportation 
procedures and limited the legal rights of illegal immigrants.84 
The evidence suggests that more focus on inspections at 
U.S. land borders is diametrically opposed to a healthy regional 
economy in North America.  For example, consider border wait 
times immediately after 9/11 (see figure 7).  These figures only 
represent a best estimate and actual wait times varied 
considerably across ports of entry.  Nevertheless, the figures 
do give a sense of the tremendous impact that increased security 
had on the economies of all the NAFTA countries. 
The huge traffic jams significantly affected social and 
economic activity in all three countries.85  San Ysidro, one of 
the busiest crossings on the U.S.-Mexican border, averaged 
88,000 daily crossings before 9/11, but in the months following 
the attacks, this number dropped to 58,000.  The number of 
bicycles used to cross jumped from 20/day to 2,000/day as people 
tried desperately to find ways to reduce wait time.86  The 
maquiladora auto industry in Mexico lost close to U.S. 
$10,000/day in the weeks after 9/11.87 
                     84 Ibid, pp. 3-6. 
85 O’Connor, A. “A Year After: Southern California.” Los Angeles Times, 11 
September 2002, p. 16 (main news section). 
Jackson, M. “Surviving 9/11: A time for reflection; border firms still 
assessing damage from tight security.” San Diego Business Journal, 23:36, 09 
September 2002, p. 1. 
86 Canto, 30 December 2001. 
87 Jones, R.B. “California, Baja leaders tout cross-border relations.” San 
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Figure 7.   Border wait times for traffic after 9/11. 
 
From: Canto, M. “At border, hard job has gotten tougher//Security: Drug 
smuggling is back after a post-Sept 11 lull. Hunt for terrorists continues.” 
Orange County Register (California), 30 December 2001, news section. 
 Dougan, M. “Crossing a U.S. border? Better bring a good book.” San 
Francisco Chronicle, 04 November 2001, p. T3 (travel section). 
Many of the busiest crossings on the U.S.-Canadian border 
were even worse.  For example, some ports were reporting “20-
mile backups, 14-hour waits, and multimillion-dollar factory 
shutdowns” immediately after the attacks.  On a border where a 
truck crosses the Ambassador Bridge every six seconds, those 
slow-downs translated into huge corporate losses for both 
Canadian and U.S. businesses.  Paul Cellucci, the U.S. 
ambassador to Canada echoed the feelings of the trade industry: 
“Closing this border is not the answer.  We need that border 
open for business.  More open than ever.”88  The increased 
security and losses in revenue caused some transportation 
services to add a special “homeland security surcharge,” a cost 
which will eventually be passed onto consumers.89 
                     88 Pianin, E., Graham, B., & Connolly, C. “Across U.S., a security 
scramble; patchwork measures may be insufficient, experts say.” Washington 
Post (Final Edition), 23 September 2001, p. A01. 
89 Whitten, D.L. “Con-Way Says It Will Impose $8 Border-Security Fee.” 
Transport Topics, 18 November 2002, p. 3, 36. 
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The dilemma of increased security to safeguard U.S. 
citizens versus the need to expedite legitimate border crossers, 
businesspeople, and commerce across the border in the current 
age of globalization is more acute than ever now.  Where should 
the apex of U.S. border policy be placed when the United States 
essentially has a teeter-totter that is trying to balance 
security with ease of movement?  Are the two mutually exclusive?  
Can America protect itself against terrorism and still maintain 
a growing, vibrant market economy with Canada and Mexico?  The 
following section introduces some of the proposals discussed in 
recent years that aim to achieve that very goal. 
D. BORDER SECURITY REFORM PROPOSALS SINCE 9/11 
This section reviews current border security reform 
proposals.  This section is not intended to be a comprehensive 
review of every U.S. immigration and transportation reform 
proposal ever made.  Its primary focus is on proposals made 
since 9/11.  The intent is to capture the ongoing debate since 
9/11 about how to improve homeland security.  The interest in 
immigration and transportation security reform surged after 
9/11.  The current U.S. administration views the prevention of 
terrorism—not only in the United States but abroad as well—as a 
top priority.  My preliminary research from March 2002 until 
about December 2002 convinced me that most reform proposals to 
improve border security and stop terrorism on U.S. soil fit into 
one of four broad categories: (1) increasing manpower/financial 
resources to federal border inspection agencies; (2) improving 
cooperation; (3) implementing technology; and (4) reforming 
bureaucratic organizations, i.e., organizational changes. 
Randy Beardsworth, the Director of Operations within the 
new Border & Transportation Security Directorate (BTS) of DHS, 
recently participated in a seminar at Naval Postgraduate School. 
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His comments at that seminar confirmed that policy-makers, as 
well as theorists, are talking about reform in terms of the 
categories mentioned above. He outlined three important 
strategic priorities for BTS:  (1) effective reorganization of 
federal border inspection agencies; (2) pushing our borders out 
as far as possible, i.e., a “layered approach” to homeland 
security; and (3) using effective technologies.90 
1. Increasing Manpower and Financial Resources 
The Border Patrol did not receive the financial resources, 
equipment, and manpower that it felt it needed until at least 
the last couple of decades.  The economic woes of the 1980s in 
Latin America helped fuel a large influx of both legal and 
illegal immigrants that has continued into the 21st century.  
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the Border Patrol finally began 
to receive support in Congress for additional funding, as well 
as military assistance (especially in the form of equipment, 
engineering support, and infrastructure support).  Some authors 
have criticized the military assistance and the additional 
funding.  Others, including but not limited to border 
communities and their government representatives, have praised 
the additional attention Congress has given the Border Patrol. 
The INS always had two very different missions and funding 
for the INS was separated into these two functions.  One branch 
of the INS was responsible for facilitating and processing legal 
immigration claims—more of a “service” oriented responsibility.  
The other branch of the INS was responsible for enforcing the 
law.  Enforcement activities included such things as detention 
and deportation of illegal aliens, the prevention of illegal 
immigration between ports of entry, and ensuring illegal 
immigrants did not sneak through legal ports of entry using                      90
 Beardsworth, April 2003. 
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fraudulent documents or human smugglers.  This branch of the INS 
was more of an “enforcement” oriented responsibility. 
There is no question that funding for border enforcement 
activities has increased over the past three decades, most 
dramatically in the 1990s.  Budget outlays for INS enforcement 
expressed as a percentage of the U.S. budget remained steady 
from 1970-1976, spiked in 1977, and then returned to steady, yet 
slightly increased levels from 1978-1988.  From 1988-1993, the 
average budget level was steady, yet slightly increased again as 
compared to 1978-1988.  Then in 1994, the year the Border Patrol 
implemented their new “prevention through deterrence” strategy, 
the average budget outlay increased dramatically every year 
throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century.  Figure 8 
demonstrates this graphically.  Figure 9 more accurately 
portrays the gradual trend of increased financial outlays (up 
until the dramatic increases of the 1990s) by eliminating the 
irregular year of 1977, when budget outlays spiked incredibly 
high only in 1977 and then returned to more regular levels. 
Funding for border inspection agencies continued to 
increase after the creation of the new Dept. of Homeland 
Security (DHS).  The amount of money currently spent on border 
inspection functions dwarfs funding levels for most other 
operational DHS directorates and other DHS operational 
organizations, such as the Coast Guard (see figure 10).  The 
Directorate of Border & Transportation Security (BTS)—where both 
the Border Patrol and U.S. Customs currently operate—receives 
more funding than any other DHS directorate except the 
Directorate of Science & Technology.91  Even so, many of the  
                     
91 Fobes, J.L. “Overview of Policy Issues in Homeland Security.” CS 4920: 
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Figure 8.   Budget outlays for INS enforcement activities 
expressed as an average percentage of the total federal budget 
per decade—1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
 
From:  Rosenblum, R. “U.S. Immigration Policy: Unilateral and Cooperative 
Responses to Undocumented Immigration.” December 2000. 
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Figure 9.   Budget outlays for INS enforcement activities 
expressed as an average percentage of the total federal budget 
per decade—1970s, 1980s, 1990s (excluding the year 1977) 
 
From:  Rosenblum, R. “U.S. Immigration Policy: Unilateral and Cooperative 
Responses to Undocumented Immigration.” December 2000. 
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EP Directorate of Emergency Preparedness & Response
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BTS Directorate of Border & Transportation Security
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Figure 10.   DHS budget (in millions of U.S. dollars), 2002-2004. 
 
From: Fobes, April 2003. 
 
experimental technologies under investigation in DST (e.g., 
remote detection of radioactive/nuclear material, VACIS, and 
high explosives detection)92 will eventually be used by BTS.  
Therefore, direct funding for DST indirectly funds BTS. 
Nor is the spending spree on border security over yet.  
Congressional appropriation bills for fiscal 2004 exceeded the 
Bush administration’s budget requests for border protection and 
related activities.  The House measure requested $9 billion (an 
                     92 Fainberg, T., May 2003. 
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increase of $400 million from FY 2003) while the Senate version 
requested $8.2 billion.  Most of this money was appropriated to 
the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, a division of BTS.93 
But does higher spending levels equate to improved 
security?  The evidence suggests that the United States is 
spending more money on border security than it ever has in three 
decades.  Chapter III demonstrates strikingly similar findings 
regarding manpower levels in the Border Patrol along the U.S.-
Mexican border.  For this reason, studying the effectiveness of 
the Border Patrol during the period of 1994-2003 is a good way 
to study whether increased funding/manpower levels alone keeps 
Americans safe.  Chapter III details what happened to funding 
and manpower levels on the U.S.-Mexico border during this time 
period, establishes a link between illegal immigration and the 
prevention of terrorism, and answers the question of whether 
increased manpower/resources alone prevents terrorism. 
The debate about increased funding for federal agencies 
with border security or homeland security responsibilities does 
not only revolve around the Border Patrol.  Numerous cases have 
been made to increase funding to nearly every agency from the 
overseas consular posts that process visa applications to U.S. 
Customs to U.S. intelligence agencies. Furthermore, the post-
9/11 funding levels for border security in general indicate that 
increased financial resources continue to be a priority in both 
the legislative and executive branches (see figure 8). However, 
chapter III uses the Border Patrol from 1994-2003 as a model 
that potentially applies to other agencies as well. 
 
                      93 Anonymous. “House OKs $9 billion for border security.” American Shipper, 
August 2003, Washington, D.C., p. 70-71. 
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2. Cooperation in Homeland Security 
a. International Cooperation 
Recently, especially since NAFTA, the United States 
and Canada have increasingly talked about a “North American 
security perimeter.”94  It should be emphasized here that this 
“security perimeter” only applies to protection against North 
America’s common transnational threats (terrorism, drug 
trafficking, illegal immigration).  It is not an alliance such 
as NATO or a Western Hemispheric policy, such as the Monroe 
Doctrine. 
Currently, this “security perimeter” is probably best 
viewed as a bilateral project between Canada and the United 
States vice a multilateral agreement that includes Mexico.  
During recent U.S. congressional testimony, two migration policy 
analysts from the Migration Policy Institute presented arguments 
in favor of security integration among Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico, calling it a “NAFTA Border Zone.”95 
Mexico has a history of shaky relations with the 
United States.  The Mexican-American War in the mid-1800s 
resulted in loss of territory to the United States. Pancho 
Villa’s exploits across the Rio Grande and U.S. President 
Wilson’s invasion of Vera Cruz during the Mexican Revolution set 
precedents for unwanted involvement in Mexican affairs, at least 
in the eyes of Mexico.  Disagreements about Mexican sovereignty 
over natural oil resources in which U.S. companies invested                      94
 Wang, T. “The Debate over the North American Security Perimeter,” 
Century Foundation, 10 May 2002, p. 1. Accessed 23 July 2003 at following 
website: [http://www.homelandsec.org/Pub_category/pdf/Security_Perimeter.pdf]. 
CIC Canada, Update 2000. 
95
 Papademetriou, Demetrious G. & Meyers, Deborah Waller. “NAFTA Border 
Zones: Security and Integration.” Testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Immigration of the Judiciary Committee, U.S. Senate, 17 October 2001. Accessed 
27 February 2003 at the following web address: 
[http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/2001_10_17.html]. 
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after the Mexican Revolution further strained relations.  Mexico 
obviously may be less ecstatic about “North American security 
arrangements.” 
Nevertheless, these expressions about continental 
security are a natural expansion of dialogue among countries 
that already have close economic ties, not only in North 
America, but also in Europe.  For example, several authors 
demonstrate that the European Union (EU) is not only a common 
economic market, but also currently employs its continental 
unity as a strategy to combat illegal immigration.96  Another 
economist recently wrote about the effects of recent economic 
ties since the 1990s—as evidenced by NAFTA in North America and 
the ongoing FTAA negotiations in the entire Western Hemisphere—
on security arrangements between Latin America and the United 
States.97 
b. Interagency/International Cooperation 
Recently, many people have characterized the 9/11 
attacks as an intelligence failure.98  The technical inability of 
many computer databases to share information, as well as the 
lack of cooperation among the diverse group of agencies with 
portions of responsibility for border security have both been 
blamed as likely causes for the attacks.  These problems are 
very relevant to improving homeland security. 
However, this thesis does not address this important 
variable for one main reason.  The evidence in favor of 
increasing interagency cooperation and international cooperation                      96
 Altamirano, D.R. “Illegal Immigration in Europe: Balancing National and 
European Union Issues,” in Illegal Immigration in America: A Reference 
Handbook, ed. D.W. Haines & K.E. Rosenblum. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
1999, pp. 454-459; Gorman, S., 1 December 2001, p. 3655. 
97
 Franko, 2000, pp. 66-87. 
98 Schaal, D. “Biometrics demo shows how to ID ‘the bad guy.’” Travel 
Weekly, 08 November 2001, p. 10. 
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is so strong that I take it as a given in border security.  That 
is, there is no need to study if increasing cooperation will 
improve land border security.  Obviously, it will.  Future 
research in this important area should focus on how to improve 
interagency cooperation, not why it is important. 
Similarly, there is no question that international 
cooperation against terrorism is a must.  The reason for this is 
that terrorism elusively crosses state boundaries.  It may or 
may not be sponsored by other governments.  Other legitimate 
governments may indirectly sponsor terrorism while showing 
another face to the international community.  In short, 
terrorism is a sometimes vague, elusive, and obscure enemy that 
is difficult to defeat unilaterally.  Therefore, while the 
intricacies of getting governments to cooperate against 
terrorism is a relevant topic is outside the scope of this 
thesis, future research should focus on how to get governments 
to cooperate, not why they should cooperate. 
c. Industry and Government Partnerships 
Most of the literature on cooperation against 
terrorism focuses on international cooperation and inter-agency 
cooperation in government.  Yet it is important to understand 
that private industry can help in the war on terror.  Badolato 
mentions government and industry cooperation as one of the four 
keys to meeting the future challenges of transportation 
security.99  Rothkopf points out that venture capitalism100 was a 
factor in winning the Cold War.  He claims that when the roles 
of the private sector (e.g., developing innovative technologies, 
                     99 Badolato, E. “Cargo Security: High-tech Protection, High-tech Threats.” 
TR News, vol. 211, November-December 2000, p. 16. 
100 In general, venture capitalism refers to agreements between government 
and private investors whereby government lends money at lower rates to 
private investors in exchange for the private investor’s investment in risky 
but promising security ventures. 
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publishing standardized, objective homeland security readiness 
indicators, researching and marketing innovative technologies, 
and helping to finance risky technologies) are fused with the 
roles of government (e.g., defining a national strategy, 
providing insurance for investors against lawsuits, providing 
start-up funding with investment programs, sharing vital 
technologies among government agencies, and developing 
legislation to codify the balance between privacy and security) 
more can be accomplished than each could do singly.101  Others 
believe that involving the private sector in security issues 
will help break through the existing slow, bureaucratic 
procurement processes and infuse some urgency into current 
inter-agency cooperation rhetoric.102 
3. Technology Solutions 
Technology is a critical piece of the puzzle if authorities 
are to strike a balance between security and the rapid movement 
of legitimate goods and people across borders.  Robert C. 
Bonner, U.S. Customs Commissioner said the following: 
Technology is our greatest ally in preventing 
terrorists from getting weapons of mass destruction 
across our borders . . . It is technology that is 
allowing us to facilitate the movement of goods and 
people while simultaneously giving us the capacity to 
detect weapons of mass destruction. 
There are a number of innovative technologies for border 
security.  However, technology is expensive and most of the 
current land border technologies are untested.  Chapter IV 
analyzes some of these current technologies with an eye towards 
                     101 Rothkopf, D.J. “Business versus terror.” Foreign Policy, Issue 130, 
May/June 2002, pp. 56-65. 
102 Hughes, J. “Involve U.S. citizens in homeland security.” Christian 
Science Monitor, 19 June 2002, p. 9. 
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making recommendations for the ones that both improve border 
security and reduce border wait times. 
4. Organizational Changes 
Organizational structure is also debated frequently.  The 
INS was criticized for decades because of its management and 
financial practices as well as its dual roles of service and 
enforcement.  At least seven studies dating from 1973 to 1988 
recommend a unified management structure at ports of entry.103  
Yet despite attempts to legislate reform,104 it took 9/11 to 
convince Congress and the executive branch to make a change.  
The recent change this year that split the INS into separate 
branches focusing on enforcement and service roles within the 
new Homeland Security Department is supported by previous 
studies, but will need to be watched and studied closely in 
order to ascertain its effects on illegal immigration as well. 
Obviously, the most dramatic organizational change since 
9/11 was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the reshuffling, elimination, and/or creation of a 
variety of agencies within that Department. For the purposes of 
this thesis, it is important to note that the Border Patrol and 
U.S. Customs were organizationally transferred to the 
Directorate of Border & Transportation Security.  Other 
functions of the INS were organizationally transferred to a 
separate bureau within DHS. 
                     103
 See the following Senate hearing for a synopsis of these studies: 
Controlling the Flow of Illegal Immigration at U.S. Land Borders: Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. 
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 INS Reform and Border Security Act of 1999: Hearing before the 
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Organizational changes are not addressed in this thesis.  
This variable is important and relevant to the debate at hand.  
However, it is my contention that it is too early to 
longitudinally study the recent addition of the new Homeland 
Security Department and the subsequent reshuffling of government 
agencies within that department.  While it has been talked about 
extensively since 9/11, the official creation of DHS occurred 
only recently in March 2003.  Most offices are still recruiting 
personnel and establishing infrastructure.  Therefore, any study 
of its effectiveness would be a study of a department that has 
not been given sufficient time to do its intended job. 
Since the scope of this study focuses on 1990-2003, there 
may be some confusion about the organization of the federal 
inspection agencies in question when reading subsequent 
chapters.  A referral to any federal inspection agency in 
subsequent chapters necessarily refers to its land border 
inspection function that existed before DHS was implemented in 
March 2003, as well as its land border inspection function that 
transferred to DHS after March 2003.  The text sometimes refers 
to border security agencies as if there were no DHS yet.  This 
is not a major problem if one bears in mind that U.S. Customs 
Service and the Border Patrol are still performing the same 
functions, but are under new management. 
Hopefully, the organizational changes made improve inter-
agency cooperation, reduce bureaucratic red tape, focus federal 
inspection agencies on the primary threat (terrorism), and 
streamline the funding processes.  Nevertheless, the bottom line 
is that agencies such as the Border Patrol and Customs are still 
performing land border security functions.  How effective 
organizational changes will be in performing that function or 
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how these changes affect the focus of their missions is a 
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III. DOES INCREASED MANPOWER AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
STOP ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION ON THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of 9/11, it became imperative to ask some 
important questions:  First, do current levels of illegal 
immigration constitute a national security threat?  Are current 
manpower and funding levels sufficiently preventing and/or 
deterring illegal immigration?  Can a closed border that 
entirely prevents illegal immigration also support an unimpeded 
flow of legitimate persons across U.S. land borders (both of 
which are in the interests of the United States) in the current 
era of globalization?  What factors most contribute to an 
effective policy that prevents illegal immigration? 
The answers to these questions entail some controversy.  
While everyone living within U.S. borders obviously wants to 
feel safe, not everyone (e.g., U.S. immigration advocate groups, 
Mexican-American immigrants, U.S. federal inspection agencies, 
U.S. congressional delegates, and the Mexican government) agrees 
on how open our borders should be to foreign visitors, students, 
and immigrants across the Mexican border.105  For example, Rep. 
Tom Tancredo recently advocated militarization of the border 
while Rep. Chris Cannon continues to advocate a traditional, 
“open” immigration policy.106   
This chapter examines illegal immigration policy during the 
decade of the 1990s along the Mexican border with respect to one 
of the independent variables introduced in chapter 2:  manpower 
and resources.  The dependent variable in this chapter is still 
                     105
 Ernsberger Jr., R., 12 November 2001. 
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prevention of terrorism within U.S. borders.  It is assumed that 
in general, increased levels of illegal immigration correlates 
with increased numbers of terrorist acts within U.S. borders. 
However, the primary purpose of the chapter is to examine 
whether or not increases in manpower and resources alone 
sufficiently secures U.S. borders from illegal immigration.  The 
independent variable in this chapter is the increase of 
personnel and financial resources for U.S. federal inspection 
agencies responsible for the prevention of illegal immigration.  
From 1990-2003, that agency was primarily the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), specifically the Border Patrol 
(but as demonstrated in Chapter II, this was indeed a shared 
responsibility before DHS was created).  After March 2003, the 
new Directorate of Border & Transportation Security within the 
new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took the lead.107  
While the reorganization of responsibility for preventing 
illegal immigration may be still ongoing, it appears that the 
Immigration/Customs Enforcement and Customs & Border Protection 
divisions will now have the lead in preventing illegal 
immigration.108  Nevertheless, from 1990-2003, the lead agency 
for preventing illegal immigration was the INS, specifically its 
enforcement arm (i.e., the Border Patrol). 
The dependent variable in this chapter is the prevention or 
deterrence of terrorist acts by deterring or preventing illegal 
immigration.  The scope of this case study applies to the 
                     107
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southern border of the United States.  It is assumed that the 
prevention or deterrence of illegal immigration along the 
southern border will likely reduce the number of terrorist acts 
committed within U.S. borders, since that is where the most 
apprehensions of illegal immigrants occur.  The link between 
illegal immigration and terrorism is explored in a later section 
of this chapter.  This chapter does not address terrorism 
committed on U.S. property overseas or outside the coastal, 
land, or airspace boundaries of the United States. 
A short outline of the chapter’s structure follows.  First, 
the large volume of trade and flow of people along the southern 
U.S. border and the implications of that for immigration policy 
is discussed.  Second, a discussion about the relevance of 
current trends in illegal immigration to national security is 
presented.  Third, illegal immigration enforcement policy from 
1990-2003 is examined with respect to the independent variable: 
increased manpower and resources.  Fourth, other variables 
besides manpower/funding increases are briefly mentioned as 
alternatives.  Finally, preliminary conclusions about the 
prospects of increased manpower/funding increases for future 
border enforcement policy are offered. 
B. THE DILEMMA:  TRADE OR SECURITY? 
The U.S. economy has important traditional ties to Mexico.  
In 1994, NAFTA was signed, ensuring an increased flow of goods 
across the Mexican border.  Mexico currently trades more with 
the United States than with any other country except Canada. 
The Mexican border has become extremely congested. Between 
1986 and 1994, exports more than quadrupled.  After 1994, trade 
with Mexico more than doubled again following NAFTA 
implementation.  In 1992, U.S.-Mexican trade was valued at $75.8 
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billion and in 1998, total trade value reached $173.4 billion.  
By 2000, the figure reached $261.7 billion, which averages out 
to $700 million per day.  The number of railroad crossings also 
nearly doubled from 1992 to 1998.  By late 1997, Mexico was our 
second largest export market.  Some 89% of Mexican exports are 
destined for the United States and 73% of its imports come from 
the United States.  This increase in trade, mostly handled by 
trucks, sometimes causes lines that can reach several miles long 
during peak periods.  The four million truck crossings recorded 
in 1998 was a 30% increase from 1996.  At some major ports of 
entry along the southwest border (Laredo, Otay Mesa, El Paso, 
and Nogales), wait times can reach as high as 2-3 hours. 
Overland pedestrian traffic continues unabated also. In 
contrast to the U.S.-Canadian border—which saw same-day travel 
decline dramatically from 1990-1999 (partly due to unfavorable 
exchange rates for Canadian money)—same-day travel along the 
U.S.-Mexican border rose 19% during that same time period. Of 
the 530 million crossings into the United States in 2000, 438 
million were overland and 290 million were from Mexico 
(approximately 800,000 per day, up from 750,000 per day in 
1998).109 An estimated 80% of all INS and Customs inspections are 
completed at land borders. It is estimated that 1.3 million 
people cross the border daily. Some 10 million people from both 
Mexico and the United States live on the U.S.-Mexico border.110 
It goes without saying that there are several domestic U.S. 
and Mexican interest groups, citizens, communities, and 
                     109 BTS 01-07, 2001, pp. 17-19. 
110
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organizations with key economic and social interests in 
maintaining a free, uninterrupted flow of goods, services, and 
people across the U.S.-Mexican border.  It should come as no 
surprise that the Mexican government also has its own economic 
interests in mind when the topic of U.S. border security policy 
is raised.111  Yet 9/11 refocused the nation on the importance of 
security along our 2,000-mile border with Mexico.  The dilemma 
between the desire for increased security and the need to keep 
the economy rolling was painfully evident immediately after the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks, as the government reacted by 
sealing off the border with National Guard troops and 
implementing lengthy inspection procedures, costing firms 
billions in revenue and stacking up traffic for hundreds of 
miles on either side of the border (12/23 southern ports of 
entry were closed at some point following the 9/11 attacks). 
C. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
Estimates of illegal immigration in the United States are 
on the rise.  It is impossible to accurately know for sure how 
many illegal aliens enter the United States annually.  Some 
estimates run as low as 250,000112 while other estimates are as 
high as 800,000.113  In any case, the trend has been for the 
estimated number of illegal aliens in the country to increase—
from 3.8 million in 1994, to 5.5 million in 1998, to 8.5 million 
in 2002.114  One study’s estimates were as high as 11 million.115  
Congressional testimony by border patrol agents indicate that                      111
 Barone, 05 August 2002, p. 34. 
112
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for every illegal alien apprehended, 2-3 escape into the 
interior.116  There was widespread feeling among legislators, the 
INS, and border communities that the southwest border was “out 
of control” in the early 1990s.117   
It would appear at first glance that whatever strategy the 
United States had been pursuing to stop illegal immigration 
prior to 1994 had not been working.  But is illegal immigration 
a national security threat?  Some may argue that most illegal 
aliens seeking entry along the southwest border are just 
poverty-stricken refugees and honest, yet downtrodden foreigners 
seeking a better quality of life in the United States.  For the 
most part, that statement is true.  However, in the decade of 
the 1990s, illegal immigration has become increasingly tied with 
terrorism—not because most illegal immigrants are terrorists, 
but because those who advocate terrorism on U.S. soil sometimes 
use complex U.S. immigration laws and our open, free society to 
enter the country illegally.  The significance of the rising 
tide of illegal immigrants in this country is the subject of the 
next section. 
D. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION:  NATIONAL SECURITY RISK? 
Do the seemingly porous borders of the United States pose a 
risk to national security?  Traditionally, the literature on 
immigration policy has not been linked to national security 
implications or vice versa.118  Moreover, the mindset of agencies 
involved in border security has not been focused on deterring 
terrorism, but rather on “keeping poverty-stricken foreigners 
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from becoming illegal immigrants, busting drug traffickers, and 
confiscating salami that doesn’t meet FDA standards.”119 
The evidence in favor of considering illegal immigration a 
national security risk seems to be mounting.  For example, a 
recent study examining the last 48 militant, Islamic extremists 
who have committed terrorist acts on American soil since 1993 
(to include the perpetrators of 9/11) found that they exploited 
nearly every immigration loophole imaginable.  For example, 
22/48 violated some immigration law to enter the country.  At 
the time their crimes were committed, several (12/48) were 
illegal aliens.  Prior to committing their crimes, another five 
had at one time been illegal aliens.  Eight of them had worked 
in the United States illegally prior to their crimes.  Thirteen 
of them overstayed their visas.  Two were on federal watch lists 
for being suspected terrorists, four exploited the country’s 
visa waiver program to enter the country, four were ineligible 
for visas under the terms of current law (but were given visas 
anyway), and one benefited from a lack of INS detention space 
(he was released on parole after having attempted fraudulent 
entry at a port of entry).120  While this evidence cannot support 
the conclusion that immigration policy is completely to blame 
for the flurry of contemporary terrorist activity today (26/48 
terrorists did not break any immigration laws in the study) it 
is clear that illegal immigration can no longer be viewed 
separately from the broader context of national security. 
Recently, most attention has focused squarely on the 9/11 
conspirators, but terrorists were exploiting immigration laws 
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long before September 2001.  Ayman al-Zawahiri, who ranks second 
only to Osama bin Laden in the Al-Queda network, used fake 
passports in the early 1990s to enter the United States and set 
up funding operations in California mosques.  Additionally, 
Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, an Indonesian bomb specialist for the 
terror group Jemaah Islamiah, was arrested in 2002 with forged 
passports.  He was planning to conduct a series of attacks, 
including a bombing of the U.S. embassy in Singapore.121 
Immigration advocates argue that the illegal immigration 
population is harmless.  It is true that most illegal immigrants 
are poor, disenfranchised Latin Americans and Asians seeking a 
better life.  In the last decade, the top fifteen countries with 
unauthorized residents in the U.S. population included ten from 
Latin America and most were from Mexico (see figures 11, 12, and 
13).122  The large volume of illegal immigration closely tied to 
seasonal agricultural periods, as well as economic conditions in 
Mexico123 clearly indicates that most people only want to get 
into the United States to work and take advantage of its 
favorable economic conditions. 
However, if one accepts the assumption that the real 
national security threat is from terrorist cells whose origins 
are from countries traditionally connected to the current 
radical, militant, Islamic “jihad” so prevalent today, then a 
closer look is warranted.  For example, the State Department 
                     121 Smith, P.J. “Transnational Terrorism and the al Queda Model: 
Confronting New Realities.” Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly, 
32:2, Army War College, Summer 2002, pp. 6-7. 
Blontank, P. “Fathur Used Fake ID to Obtain Passport,” Jakarta Post, 28 
January 2002. 
122
 U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. “Estimates of the 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States.” 
[http://www.immigration.gov]. p. 9. Accessed 21 March 2003. 
123
 Migration Policy Institute, Accessed 19 March 2003. 
  59
believes that “Muslims with political grievances” committed 
fourteen of the fifteen lethal and politically motivated attacks 
on Americans abroad in 2002.124  Furthermore, in Europe—where 
postwar labor shortages encouraged Turks, Algerians, Moroccans, 
Tunisians, and Pakistanis to immigrate from 1950-1970 and to 
bring their families in the 1970s—the Muslim population is three 
times larger than in the United States.  This fact by itself 
means nothing, and most Muslims in both Europe and the United 
States are nonviolent and obey the law.  Still, U.S. ties to 
Israel remain strong, which means anti-Semitic incidents in 
Europe have indirect ties to how Muslims feel about Americans.125 
. . . the communities most resentful of Israel in 
Europe are Muslim.  The perpetrators of anti-Semitic 
incidents in France are not right-wing extremists 
protecting the “French race” from Jewish 
contamination:  The 400 or so anti-Semitic incidents 
documented in the country during 2001 have mostly been 
attributed to Muslim youth of North African origin.  
Such incidents tend to spike upwards during times of 
Israeli-Palestinian trouble—further proof of the 
Muslim role.126 
People who fit this description are increasingly being 
apprehended at the border.  Ten Egyptians were recently arrested 
near Douglas, AZ.  Only hours after 9/11, an anonymous tip 
resulted in the arrest of 41 undocumented Iraqis ready to cross 
into the United States.  Two weeks later, 13 Yemeni nationals 
were apprehended in a Mexican hotel across the border from 
Douglas, AZ.127 One border patrol agent, when interviewed 
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recently, claimed that “one out of ten arrests” on the border 
involved someone from “a country like Yemen or Egypt.”128 
The national security threat posed by illegal immigration 
is becoming more sophisticated in nature.  In 1998, an Iraqi-
born human smuggler, George Tajirian, was sentenced to 13 years 
in prison for running a human smuggling ring that brought over 
1,000 illegal aliens into the United States from Middle Eastern 
countries.  The smugglers used staging areas in Greece, 
Thailand, Cuba, Ecuador, and ultimately Mexico before sneaking 
their clients (from places such as Palestine, Jordan, Syria, 
Iraq, and Yemen) across the U.S.-Mexican border.  Convincing 
evidence at the trial indicated that many of Tajirian’s clients 
had ties to terrorist organizations or had criminal histories.129 
Another smuggling ring attempting to bring Middle Eastern 
people across the Mexican border was broken up in December 2002.  
The ringleader was a Mexican national of Lebanese descent.  
Although none of the illegal immigrants who used this smuggling 
operation to get into the country have yet been identified with 
terrorism, the fact that such a route existed is cause for 
concern.  The potential for terrorists to exploit such an 
operation for their own purposes is entirely feasible.130 
The number of illegal aliens who are citizens of nations 
currently on the State Department’s watch list of countries with 
ties to the Al Queda terrorist cell131 that were formally removed 
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from the United States increased every year from 1995-2000 (see 
figure 14).  Furthermore, most of the countries on that watch 
list are from Asia, a region currently tied with South America 
for having the second-largest undocumented population in the 
United States (see figure 13). 
While the increase may simply be a function of the overall 
increase in immigration discussed earlier rather than an 
explosion of terrorists trying to sneak across the border, it is 
nonetheless undeniable that increased numbers of aliens from 
countries tied to terrorism are reaching North America with the 
intent to cross into the United States.  Again, immigration 
advocates are correct in pointing out that most immigrants 
(legal or illegal) are harmless.  However, the Camarota study 
and the trends outlined above is cause for concern.  After all, 
it only takes one terrorist to render all the harmless 
immigration patterns irrelevant.  Indeed, it only took a handful 
of them on September 11, 2001 to temporarily bring the most 
powerful nation on earth to its knees, completely rewrite the 
agenda of the current administration, and forever change the way 
many Americans view their international borders. 
So is illegal immigration really a national security 
threat?  It is probably not as big of a problem as the huge 
knee-jerk reaction after 9/11 would indicate.  After all, just 
prior to the 9/11 attacks, President Bush was reportedly getting 
closer to an immigration deal with President Vicente Fox of 
Mexico that included amnesty for existing undocumented workers, 
more guest worker programs, and the like.132  Nor did the 
frenzied, emotional demands by some talk show hosts, 
Congressional delegates, and newspaper editorials to reform the  
                     132
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M exico  58.3% El Salv ador 8.5% G uatem ala 3.4%
C hina 2.0% Phillipp ines 2.0% H aiti 1 .9%
C olom bia 1.4% D om . R ep . 1.3% H onduras 1.2%
All o thers 15.3%  
Figure 11.   Estimated unauthorized resident population Top 10 
countries, 1990 
 
From: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. “Estimates of the 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States.” 
[http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/aboutus/statistics/lll_Report_1211.pdf]. 
p. 9. Accessed 21 March 2003. 
M e x ic o  6 8 .7 % E l S a lv a d o r 2 .7 % G u a te m a la  2 .1 %
C o lo m b ia  2 .0 % H o n d u ra s  2 .0 % C h in a  1 .6 %
E c u a d o r 1 .5 % D o m . R e p . 1 .3 % P h illip p in e s  1 .2 %
All o th e rs  1 1 .4 %  
Figure 12.   Estimated unauthorized resident population Top 10 
countries, 2000 
 
From: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. “Estimates of the 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States.” 
[http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/aboutus/statistics/lll_Report_1211.pdf]. 
p. 9. Accessed 21 March 2003. 
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N o rth  Am erica  80 .8% As ia  7 .1%
S o u th  Am erica  7 .1% E u ro p e  2 .7%
Africa  1 .9% O cean ia  0 .3%  
Figure 13.   Unauthorized resident population by region, 2000 
 
From: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. “Estimates of the 
Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States.” 
[http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/aboutus/statistics/lll_Report_1211.pdf]. 
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Figure 14.   Numbers of formal removals of illegal aliens from 
countries with ties to Al Queda terrorist cells 
 
From: INS Statistical Yearbook, 2000. 
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INS, militarize the border, and crack down on immigration in 
general exist to the extent that they did after 9/11.  If the 
national security threat posed by illegal immigration had really 
been as serious as post 9/11 hoopla suggested it was, then there 
would have been similar proposals throughout the 1990s and 
leading up to the attacks, not just immediately after the 
attacks.  Nevertheless, the evidence presented above suggests 
that illegal immigration can no longer be viewed in isolation 
from security of the homeland.  The practices, policies, and 
procedures of our overseas consulates, immigration officials, 
and border enforcement personnel exist in a precarious time in 
which measures to stop illegal immigration have potential 
national security implications. 
Given the evidence presented in this section, it can be 
concluded that there is indeed a correlation between illegal 
immigration and terrorism committed within the United States.  
How strong is that correlation?  This study does not employ the 
use of statistical analysis to quantify the link between illegal 
immigration and terrorism.  Further research should take a 
closer look at empirically quantifying the correlation between 
illegal immigration and terrorism committed inside the United 
States.  Nevertheless, the conclusion here is that if measures 
are not taken to continue unabashedly enforcing our nation’s 
existing immigration laws, the United States can probably expect 
more terrorist attacks within the United States in the future. 
Assuming that a link does exist between illegal immigration 
and terrorism committed on U.S. soil, what is the most effective 
way for the United States to enforce immigration laws?  What was 
the strategy of the U.S. border patrol prior to 1994?  What was 
their strategy from 1994-2003?  Does a strategy that includes 
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increasing the manpower and financial resources to border 
security agencies prevent or deter illegal immigration (thereby 
preventing terrorist attacks on U.S. soil)?  These questions are 
answered in the following section. 
E. PREVENTION THROUGH DETERRENCE 
1. Operation “Hold the Line” 
In October 1993, Silvestre Reyes successfully convinced top 
INS officials to experiment with a fundamentally different 
strategy to controlling the border.  The laboratory for Reyes’ 
experiment was El Paso, Texas, one of the two most heavily 
trafficked corridors for illegal aliens along the southwest 
border (apprehension rates ranged from 250,000 to 350,000 per 
year).  Reyes put administrative duties aside, moved nearly 
every agent he had up to the border to create a visible presence 
(400/650 agents were assigned to line duty), mandated overtime, 
and manned the border 24/7 with a virtual wall of law 
enforcement personnel in an all-encompassing full court press to 
deter illegal aliens from crossing the border.  Even the name of 
the month-long trial, “Operation Blockade,” (later renamed 
“Operation Hold the Line”) signified the Border Patrol’s resolve 
to plug the hole of undocumented aliens flowing into El Paso.  
The operation was too resource-intensive to continue 
indefinitely, but the approach was a success.  It caught the 
eyes and ears of legislators and earned the widespread support 
of the local community.133 
2. The Southwest Border Strategy of Deterrence 
The origins of the border patrol’s current multi-year, 
multi-phase strategy to wrest back control of the U.S. southwest 
border began with the efforts of Silvestre Reyes.  The strategy—
                     133
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developed during the Clinton administration under the auspices 
of INS Commissioner Doris Meisner, a proven scholar in 
immigration affairs—was significantly different from previous 
practice.  Previous efforts had concentrated on apprehending 
illegal aliens soon after their entry into the country.134 
The new strategy, unveiled in late 1994, focused on making 
the odds of successfully crossing the border appear so unlikely 
that no one would even try.  Agents were tasked with creating a 
presence and removing easy access to entry.  In short, the INS 
would practice “prevention through deterrence.”135 Significant 
objectives of the strategy were: (1) provide adequate resources 
to “deter, detect, and apprehend” illegal aliens; (2) Take back 
control of major entry corridors; (3) Seal off the most heavily 
trafficked routes of illegal entry, thereby shifting traffic to 
lesser-used, more rural, and more remote corridors where agents 
would have the advantage; (4) prevent illegal crossings at the 
ports of entry; and (5) provide workable ports of entry that 
facilitated legitimate travel and commerce.136  To INS officials 
who lauded the program “the goal [was] clear:  a border that 
deters illegal immigration, alien smuggling, and drug 
trafficking and facilitates legal immigration.”137 
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A significant piece of the strategy involved increased 
resources for the beleaguered border patrol (objective one above 
calls for “adequate resources . . . to deter, detect, and 
apprehend illegal aliens”).  Implementation of this strategy 
during the period from 1994-2001 makes a good case study of 
whether or not increasing manpower, finances, and resources is 
the best way to target illegal immigration for a couple of 
reasons.  First, the border patrol traditionally has been 
understaffed, undermanned, and under funded.  A former INS 
commissioner once referred to his agency as the unwanted “ugly 
stepchild of the justice department.”138  Another border patrol 
sector chief testified that the most technological weapon he had 
prior to 1994 was a pen.139  Second, as will be shown, the period 
1994-2001 represents a phenomenal increase in manpower, 
resources, and finances for the U.S. border patrol.  Therefore, 
this period appears particularly suited to study the effects of 
increased manpower and resources on stemming illegal 
immigration, since it is a historical time period in which 
Congress has gone to extraordinary lengths to increase funding. 
Full implementation of the deterrence strategy involved 
four main phases that progressively targeted the most 
problematic areas and then extended outward.140  Phase 1 entailed 
regaining control of the two most heavily trafficked U.S. 
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sectors—San Diego, CA and El Paso, TX.  These two sectors had 
historically recorded some two-thirds of all annual 
apprehensions by the border patrol.141  The worst stretch was the 
first 14 miles in Imperial Beach, beginning at the Pacific Ocean 
and extending east (25% of all arrests occurred here). 
Phase 1 (1994-1997) entailed the addition of 800 new agents 
from 1993-1995 (and requests for 700 more in 1996), 140 new 
support personnel to free up agents from paperwork, 25 new IR 
scopes, hundreds of sensors/radios, 19 miles of corrugated steel 
fence line, the installation of computers in over 283 stations, 
and over 1,000 vehicles.  Another 85 agents were held in reserve 
to react to unexpected traffic shifts.  Most of these resources 
were concentrated in El Paso and Imperial Beach.142 
Due to terrain and population differences, Reyes’ virtual 
blockade approach employed in “Hold the Line” was modified 
somewhat for San Diego’s “Gatekeeper.”  Most agents were sent 
within two miles of the border in three lines, each line farther 
back from the border.  Crossers who were not deterred visibly 
were apprehended within a mile of the border and immediately 
removed.  Agents hoped that deterrence would occur as word 
filtered back to Mexico that crossing illegally was a losing 
battle.143  This multi-tiered, back-up approach was described as 
a strategy of “guaranteed apprehension.”144  However, the broad 
strategy of “prevention through deterrence” generally still 
applied, even though local tactics varied slightly. 
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Another significant addition during this time period 
(impossible without the increased funding by Congress) was the 
implementation in some stations of INS’ automated fingerprinting 
system, known by the acronym IDENT.  IDENT allowed agents to 
fingerprint apprehended aliens and store it in a database as a 
sure-fire way to catch repeat offenders who tried to cross 
illegally again.  Until 1995, illegal aliens who tried to cross 
more than once could successfully hide their identity and avoid 
the felony charges that by law accompany repeat offenders. 
Phase 2 focused on the Tucson, AZ sector and three sectors 
in south Texas—Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen.  Resources were 
continually balanced in an effort to maintain control of the San 
Diego and El Paso sectors while extending control to these 
latter sectors.  Phase 3 (ongoing) targets the rest of the 
southwest border—Marfa, Yuma, and El Centro.  Finally, phase 4 
(not implemented yet) is intended to extend control to the U.S. 
northern and coastal borders. 
The INS predicted six consequences of the shift in 
strategy.  First, an initial rise in arrests would occur as 
illegal aliens experienced opposition, followed by a decrease in 
arrests.  Second, illegal traffic flow would shift from the 
urban areas (where illegal aliens could blend in) to other low-
volume, rural, remote, and more rugged areas, where agents 
presumably would have a better chance to make apprehensions.  
Third, there would be an increase in the number of attempts to 
use fraudulent documents to gain admission at U.S. ports of 
entry.  Fourth, due to the more difficult circumstances, human 
smuggling fees would increase.  Fifth, there would be an 
eventual decrease in the number of attempted re-entries 
(recidivism) as people began to realize that crossing illegally 
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was hopeless.  Sixth, local crime along the border would 
diminish.  The INS claimed that materialization of these 
predictions would indicate that deterrence had indeed taken 
effect.  Therefore, they made plans to use these indicators as 
empirical evidence of success or failure of the strategy.145 
3. New Manpower/Resources for the Border Patrol 
The 1990s were a decade in which political will in Congress 
was matching the desire of the INS and the public to crack down 
on illegal immigration.  As such, funding and support reached 
record highs.  Figure 15 shows the unparalleled increase in the 
number of authorized border patrol agents along the border.  
Agent manpower tripled from 1993 to 2000.  Likewise, immigration 
inspectors stationed at ports of entry increased from 1,117 to 
1,865, a 67% increase.  Currently, the INS fields more agents 
authorized to hold a gun and make arrests than any other federal 
agency.  Border patrol agents and immigration inspectors are 
among the top ten fastest growing federal government jobs.146 
The INS experienced a dramatic rise in financial benefits 
also.  The INS budget tripled from 1993 to 1999 ($1.5 billion to 
$4.2 billion).  From 1994 to 1998, $3.3 billion was spent on 
upgrading the border patrol.  The president’s budget proposals 
for the border patrol alone (not including the rest of the INS) 
were $917 million in 1999 and reached $1 billion in 2000.147 
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Figure 15.   Authorized border patrol agents, 1993-2000 
 
From: General Accounting Office (GAO-01-842). “INS’ Southwest Border 
Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years.” Washington, 
D.C., August 2001. p. 4. 
Enhancing Border Security. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 106th Cong., p. 47 (10 February 
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The border patrol facelift included deploying a plethora of 
technological innovations, upgrading transportation needs, and 
building physical barriers.  For example, from 1989 to 1992, 58 
helicopters and 43 fixed-wing aircraft were added to INS 
inventories.148  From October 1994 to June 1998, there were 
dramatic increases in the deployed numbers of IR scopes (12 to 
599) and ground sensors (448 to 1214). Computer inventories 
jumped from 100 to 1350.  Vehicle numbers rose from 700 to 
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1765.149  Automated fingerprinting programs, video surveillance 
units, and mapping systems were diligently expanded.150 
Finally, in 1990 the INS began a multi-year construction 
project, spurred on by recommendations from a Sandia National 
Laboratories study that espoused multiple physical barriers vice 
increases in manpower for a variety of reasons:  deterrent 
effects; early detection and delay of escape; and the channeling 
effect it would have into advantageous areas for the border 
patrol.151  A 10-foot high, corrugated steel fence in the San 
Diego sector was finished in late 1993 with plans to use fencing 
in other key urban sectors.152  A road paralleling the fence was 
completed in November 1992 to allow better access to the border 
and along the fence line.153  By July 1997, 46 miles of fencing 
had been completed and included sectors such as Yuma and Tucson 
(as well as double barriers in San Diego).154  By May 2001, 76 
miles of fencing had been completed along the southwest border, 
with an additional 32 miles planned.155 
Obviously, the new strategy was a monumental attempt to 
stop illegal immigrants dead in their tracks at the border with 
a virtual wall of fencing, technology, and people (in other 
words, increased funding/manpower).  As an immigration official 
stated in congressional testimony, the goal was “to ensure 
maximum border enforcement through unprecedented enhancements of 
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personnel and technology to deter people from trying to cross 
the border illegally (italics and underline my own).”156 
Stated differently, since 1994, the border patrol and the 
government’s approach to solving illegal immigration have been 
primarily to throw money at the problem.  While this statement 
may seem too simplistic, perhaps underestimates the perceived 
value of the change in tactics, and possibly ignores other 
variables (e.g., technology, inter-agency and bilateral 
cooperation) there is no denying that none of it would be 
possible without the record personnel and allocation increases. 
It is safe to say that this case study effectively isolates 
the variable of organizational changes from the variable of 
increased manpower/resources.  The INS did not officially become 
part of the Department of Homeland Security, with separate 
chains of command for service and enforcement responsibilities 
until just within the past couple of months.  Therefore, 
although there have been repeated recommendations in the past to 
restructure the INS, in practice its historical organizational 
structure remained intact during the time period covered by this 
case study.  Therefore, the success or failure of the southwest 
border strategy (at least during the years 1994-2001) cannot be 
attributed to effective organizational changes. 
It is more difficult to make the same claim for variables 
such as technology and cooperation.  For example, much of the 
increased funding was spent on technological initiatives such as 
IDENT, IR scopes, human sensors, ISIS, and the like.  
Furthermore, many bilateral cooperative efforts between the 
United States and Mexico, as well as evidence of differing 
degrees of improved inter-agency cooperation occurred during the 
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1993-2001 period.  However, many of the technological and 
cooperative initiatives represent pilot programs and/or were not 
fully implemented across all sectors until the latter part of 
the decade.  Therefore, it is this author’s contention that some 
preliminary conclusions, if carefully prepared, can still be 
made about the prospects of high levels of funding and manpower 
for border agencies as a solution to illegal immigration.  The 
next section addresses the effectiveness of relying on increased 
manpower and resources to stop illegal immigration. 
4. Effectiveness of the Southwest Border Strategy 
Congressional mandate requires that the INS’ “prevention 
through deterrence” strategy be periodically measured to 
ascertain its effectiveness.  Three studies conducted by the 
General Accounting Office have been the primary means by which 
this mandate has been fulfilled.  The tone of these reports 
ranged from guarded optimism early on in the process to 
inconclusiveness and guarded pessimism as time passed.157 
In general terms, most of the six outcomes predicted by the 
INS did occur as promised.  Apprehension rates did decrease in 
the heavily trafficked San Diego and El Paso sectors and shifted 
to less heavily trafficked sectors, as expected (see figure 16).  
El Paso’s apprehension rates fell by a whopping 70%.  The San 
Diego sector rate fell by 25%, which included a 40% reduction in 
the most heavily trafficked sector in the United States, the 14-
mile “Imperial Beach” area.  The San Diego sector remains under 
control today, with only 12% of arrests occurring there.  In 
fact, there are recent reports of agents becoming bored with 
their jobs in the San Diego sector.  For example, from 1996-
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2000, 1189 agents were lost to attrition and a 1998 survey found 
that 60% of agents were actively looking for work elsewhere. 
Illegal documents intercepted at land entry ports initially 
increased by 500%.  Following phase 1, the number of false 
claims of citizenship and false documents at ports of entry in 
the San Diego sector rose to 200 per day.  Likewise, between 
1997 and 1998, these same measures increased by 4% and 17%. 
Smuggling became more prevalent as aliens realized the 
border was not as easy to cross.  INS officials reported 
anecdotal reports of smuggling fees as high as $1,000-$1,500 
(prior to 1994, the figure averaged around $250).  Prosecutions 

















Figure 16.   Shift in percentages of SW border apprehensions to 
rural sectors after phase 1 ops. 
 
From: GAO-GGD-99-44: General Accounting Office, “Status of Southwest Border 
Strategy Implementation.” p. 21. Washington DC. 19 May 1999. 
 
year period (1993-96).  In San Diego, Operation Disruption was 
launched to combat the increase in human trafficking.  Smuggling 
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rings and staging areas were identified, drop houses were 
pursued and eliminated, and smuggling entry trends were 
monitored.  In May 1995 alone, 500 alien smugglers and 700 
vehicles were seized, and from May 1995 to May 1999, an 
additional 1900 smugglers were arrested.  By the end of the 
decade, an estimated 75% of illegal aliens used a smuggler. 
Finally, there were anecdotal and empirical reports of 
decreased local crime figures.  INS officials claimed that in 
the San Diego sector, overall crime was down 30%, violent crime 
was down 21%, and property crime was down 30%.  Other reductions 
occurred with homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
residential burglary, and vehicle theft, which all decreased by 
11-34% by 1995, following “Gatekeeper.”  There were no murders 
along the border in San Diego in 1994, as opposed to 10 in 1990. 
A Nogales county attorney reported “a 64% decline in the number 
of felony filings against Mexican illegal aliens between 1998 
and 2000” after the deterrence strategy was extended to Nogales.  
In Brownsville, illegal aliens were blamed for daily muggings at 
a local park near the Rio Grande River, but now the park is 
deemed safe again.158 
Despite these apparent victories, the GAO’s reports did not 
fully endorse the strategy, mostly because they felt the data 
being used by the INS to measure success was not objective and 
measurable.  For example, does an increase in apprehensions 
really mean more illegal aliens are coming across the border, or 
does it just as easily suggest better law enforcement?  
Furthermore, do increased fraudulent attempts at ports of entry 
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suggest more aliens are trying to cross there vice between ports 
of entry or do those figures simply represent more effort to 
detect fraud?  As mentioned above, the number of inspectors at 
ports of entry was increased concurrent with the implementation 
of the strategy in anticipation of this shift, so the answer to 
that question is ambiguous.  Additionally, the crime rates cited 
were not deemed to be valid by the GAO because they were locally 
collected by other agencies that did not distinguish between 
crimes committed by aliens versus crime committed by U.S. 
citizens.  Finally, although the INS anecdotally claimed 
recidivism was down significantly due to Operations “Gatekeeper” 
and “Hold the Line,” it was unable to back up its claim that 
repeat crossers were being reduced at the border because they 
experienced difficulty in fully implementing their automated 
fingerprinting system (IDENT) across the board and had no data 
for the GAO, even by the year 2001.159  The most recent GAO 
report is particularly critical of INS methodology: 
Whether INS’ strategy has deterred illegal entry 
overall or whether it has merely shifted traffic to 
different locations is unclear . . . INS has not 
conducted a comprehensive, systematic evaluation of 
the strategy’s effectiveness in detecting and 
deterring aliens from entering illegally, as we 
recommended in our 1997 report.  With no baseline data 
to compare results against and with the passage of 7 
years since INS began implementing its Southwest 
border strategy, undertaking such an evaluation 
becomes increasingly difficult.  By necessity, the 
evaluation would be a retrospective study that relied 
on available data rather than systematically gathered 
evaluation data . . . As a result, what effect the 
strategy has had on overall illegal immigration along 
the Southwest border may never be fully known.160 
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The GAO has implored the INS to begin using the automated 
fingerprint data being accumulated since 1995 in order to reach 
more empirically valid results: 
Although illegal alien apprehensions have shifted, 
there is no clear indication that overall illegal 
entry into the United States along the Southwest 
border has declined.  INS’ current efforts to measure 
the effectiveness of its border control efforts could 
be enhanced by analyzing data in its IDENT system.  
These data offer INS an opportunity to develop 
additional performance indicators that could be 
incorporated into its Annual Performance Plan review 
process and could help INS assess whether its border 
control efforts are associated with an overall 
reduction in the flow of illegal aliens across the 
border.  Borderwide analysis of the IDENT data could 
be used to address several important questions related 
to illegal entry.161 
The INS has since made an effort at improving its empirical 
framework for analysis. They recently hired Advancia Corporation 
to study the southwest border strategy with more empirical 
rigor.  Advancia did a very thorough literature review and 
employed a weighted, mathematical system to determine the most 
empirically valid indicators for use in studying the effects of 
the southwest border strategy.  Advancia claimed that coming up 
with more objective, measurable indicators of success or failure 
was the first step to determining the effectiveness of the 
“prevention through deterrence” strategy.  Some of the initial 
indicators in use by the INS (apprehension rates, shifts in 
traffic flows, and increases in smuggling activity) received 
high ratings as valid indicators by Advancia.  Others did not 
(local crime rates, increased smuggling fees, and increased port 
of entry fraud) so Advancia will not be using them in their 
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future studies.162  However, this study was not completed until 
2001, and therefore the new objective measures have not been 
applied yet.  Nor are Advancia’s reports easily accessible to 
the public.  Thus, the GAO reports and existing literature 
available in public libraries and on the Internet weighed 
heavily in the conclusions that follow in Chapter VI. 
Other analyses of border enforcement during the 1990s have 
been equally as skeptical as the GAO reports.  Dunn identifies 
several trends of INS activities from the period of 1989 to 1992 
(immediately before the implementation of “Hold the Line” and 
“Gatekeeper”).  These included the following:  enforcement 
became more serious and severe; funding increased significantly 
while manning increased only slightly; detention of criminal 
aliens became increasingly emphasized; construction of physical 
barriers and additional detention space rose; the INS became 
increasingly associated with drug enforcement at the expense of 
illegal immigration enforcement; and the border became 
increasingly militarized.163 
In his view, these trends ultimately resulted in the 
following outcomes.  First, there were dramatic reductions in 
alien apprehensions in certain areas (San Diego and El Paso) and 
shifts in traffic flows.  Second, while some improvement with 
regard to abusive behavior by border patrol agents occurred in 
some areas, other areas registered increased abusive behavior 
(there were 971 documented human rights abuses by border 
agencies from 1989-91, a 57% increase in civil rights cases 
during those same years, and 90 reported border patrol shooting 
incidents in 1990).  Third, there were severe growing pains in 
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the INS, resulting in mismanagement and overall lack of 
financial responsibility.  Finally, there were an increased 
number of injuries to illegal aliens as they tried desperately 
to scale walls and canyons, as well as cross deserted, remote 
areas in severe climates.164 
Andreas, who studied the entire decade of the 1990s, was 
equally as skeptical.  In his view, there has been an escalation 
in border policing during the decade.  The characterization of 
this escalation has changed from a historical focus of deterring 
armies concomitant with miniscule political priority to a modern 
focus on deterring drugs and illegal immigrants concomitant with 
a high-profile political priority, including an increasing link 
between law enforcement and national security institutions.  His 
conclusion is that the expansion in border policing has not 
actually deterred illegal immigration, but has rather created an 
image of a safer, more orderly border with the illusion of 
increased territorial sovereignty.165  In his own words: 
In a relatively short period of time, border control 
has changed from a low-intensity, low-maintenance, and 
politically marginal activity to a high-intensity, 
high-maintenance campaign commanding enormous 
political attention on both sides of the territorial 
divide.166 
At the same time, he also documents several unwanted 
consequences of the escalated border enforcement activities.  
First, human smuggling continued to grow, while the skill and 
sophistication of smuggling rings became unprecedented.  
Smugglers now commonly use semi-trucks to blend in with the 
increased NAFTA trucking, and they even use underground tunnels.  
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Furthermore, their own technology is many times as good as or 
even better than that of the border patrol.  Second, the major 
growth in border patrol personnel has resulted in a less 
experienced cadre of agents, with increased potential for 
bribery and corruption.  Third, Andreas agrees with Dunn with 
respect to the overall scale of migrant deaths (see figure 17), 














Figure 17.   Migrant deaths:  1993-2000 
 
From: Public Policy Institute of California. “Has Increased Border 
Enforcement Reduced Unauthorized Immigration?” 
[http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/RB_702BRRB.pdf]. July 2002. Accessed 11 
September 2003. 
 
Other unexpected and unwanted side effects of the shift in 
traffic have been described in the literature as well.  The San 
Diego sector began to be linked with an explosion of wildfires 
in East County forests resulting from alien campfires, as well 
as fires deliberately set for diversionary purposes.  The number 
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of wildfires in California was 12 times more likely after 
implementation of Operation Gatekeeper as compared to pre-
Operation Gatekeeper levels, at a predicted hospital cost of $40 
million to California taxpayers.  Many local politicians in 
counties east of Imperial Beach felt the wildfires were the 
result of the new strategy because it shifted traffic routes 
east into their forests and canyons.168 
Additionally, during phase 2, the INS did not have enough 
agents to cover the entire Tucson sector, so the small community 
of Douglas, AZ was overrun with illegal immigration due to the 
shift in traffic patterns from San Diego, causing intense public 
outcries, the formation of vigilante organizations, and a 
pattern of citizen arrests by gun-toting ranchers whose 
livestock and property were being destroyed.  The apprehension 
rates in Douglas reached the historically high rates previously 
seen in San Diego and the Mexican mayor of Agua Prieta (Douglas’ 
sister city) reported as many as 100,000 new migrants loitering 
for a chance to cross—this in a town whose normal population is 
around 120,000.169 
The most telling sign of failure is the overall estimate of 
illegal aliens currently in the interior of the United States.  
As shown earlier, this number continues to grow.  The estimated 
8.5-11 million illegal aliens within U.S. borders seems to be 
the most conclusive proof that a monumental increase in manpower 
and resources for the border patrol did not stem illegal 
immigration in the 1990s.  Despite the pockets of border where 
the INS has seemingly gained control of illegal immigration, in 
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the final analysis, increases in manpower and resources alone 
has not prevented an overall increase in illegal immigration 
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IV. TECHNOLOGY IN LAND BORDER SECURITY 
A. WHY TECHNOLOGY:  THE ISSUE DEFINED 
Technology can be a very valuable tool in border security, 
primarily because it tends to be a force multiplier for border 
inspection agencies and because it saves precious time.  The 
list of border-related technology is immense and includes: (1) 
computer-related options such as IDENT, ENFORCE, a computerized 
entry-exit tracking system (CIPRIS, then SEVIS, and currently 
NSEERS), and the Trilogy Project, a program designed to get 
government agencies working from the same database; (2) 
immigration enforcement technology such as the Geographical 
Information Systems Project, the Resource and Effectiveness 
Model (REM), “laser” ID cards, the Integrated Surveillance 
Intelligence System (ISIS), UAVs, aerostats, and the sensors, IR 
scopes, and night vision technology mentioned in this report; 
(3) technology that separate high-risk travelers from low-risk 
travelers and quickly move the legitimate travelers through POEs 
(NEXUS, SENTRI, FAST, the EZ-pass system); (4) transportation 
security options that separate well-known, low-risk and unknown, 
high-risk carriers and their cargo away from the border (ITDS, 
ACE); (5) an array of technology used directly at the border 
which quickly scans people or containers vice having to manually 
inspect them (VACIS, RVIS, biological/radiological particle 
detectors, personal radiation detectors, high explosives 
detection systems, isotope identifiers, X-Ray imaging machines, 
and fiberoptic scopes); and (6) cargo tracking systems that 
trace cargo from original loading points to destined locations. 
The disadvantages of technology include the following: (1) 
technology can be expensive, and as demonstrated in chapter III, 
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increasing finances to border agencies doesn’t always correlate 
completely with effectiveness; (2) technology is time-consuming 
to implement; (3) technology requires maintenance and skilled 
technicians/operators, which translates into a long-term funding 
commitment from Congress;170 (4) some technology architectures 
are rigid, i.e., new or updated applications may not be 
feasible, thus ensuring an outdated system. 
Most of these technologies, as well as current research and 
development on cargo security fit into four main areas: 
• Cargo tracking systems. 
• The improvement of locks, seals, and containers. 
• The development of fast-working, non-intrusive X-
Ray and detection devices. 
• The integration of security into the new cargo 
handling and e-business supply chain management 
systems.171 
The explosion of technological options for border and 
transportation security precludes fitting them all within this 
chapter’s scope, but in many cases they do speed up border law 
enforcement and act as force multipliers.  Currently, many of 
these options are experimental in nature or are still being 
tested as pilot programs.  Many technological breakthroughs have 
already secured approval from Congress and are making a 
difference by both securing U.S. borders and reducing congestion 
at U.S. borders.  Examples are the U.S. Custom’s Automated 
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Commercial Environment (ACE),172 its International Trade Data 
System (ITDS),173 and electronic seals.174 
This chapter analyzes some of the experimental or pilot 
programs under investigation by border security agencies and 
Congress.  Emphasis will be placed on new technologies that 
demonstrate three characteristics:  (1) those that secure U.S. 
borders from terrorism, but also speed the passage of legitimate 
people and goods across the border; (2) those that have not 
already secured long-term Congressional funding; (3) those that 
are either in the research and developmental stages or currently 
are deployed as pilot programs at certain ports; and (4) those 
that emphasize border security principles highlighted in Chapter 
II (e.g., risk management, pre-clearance, adding additional 
filters, and extending the border out).  The purpose for 
focusing on these technologies is to provide recommendations for 
prioritizing the limited Congressional funds that are available, 
as well as to help answer the overall question posed by this 
thesis:  what can be done to improve policy such that both 
national security and free trade in North America can coexist? 
The research conducted in this chapter indicates that 
Congress should make long-term investments in three specific 
technologies.  First, the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System 
(VACIS) should eventually be installed at all land border ports, 
based on its significantly enhanced ability to prevent both                      172 ACE is a multi-year, multi-million dollar computer system that allows 
Customs to manage trade manifests electronically on the internet instead of 
with paper forms.  It also allows businesses to electronically submit trade 
information in advance to Customs agents, so that lengthy inspection time is 
eliminated at the border. 
173 ITDS is a revolutionary subsystem of ACE allowing trade data to be 
captured electronically and shared among 104 government agencies, so that 
separate inspections are not required when a truck arrives at the border. 
174 Electronic seals are part of the Container Security Initiative, whereby 
containers are inspected at their port of origin and then electronically 
tracked via GPS after being locked for shipping to ensure integrity. 
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cargo and human smuggling while simultaneously lowering border 
wait times. Second, the Secure Electronic Network for Traveler’s 
Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) should be expanded to include more 
ports of entry and should receive long-term Congressional 
funding commitments, based on its principles of secure risk 
management while simultaneously lowering wait times.  Finally, 
biometrics should be used in land border security, but on a 
smaller scale than presently envisioned.  It is argued here that 
the sheer volume of people crossing at U.S. borders precludes 
the use of a national ID card that employs biometric technology. 
B. SECURING THE BORDER AGAINST SMUGGLED CONTRABAND 
Possibly no government agency is more affected by the large 
trade volumes generated by NAFTA than U.S. Customs.  Speeding 
commerce through border checkpoints has worried U.S. Customs 
since NAFTA passage.  However, these worries became especially 
acute as an increased emphasis on security after 9/11 became a 
reality.  Business revenue losses,175 job cutbacks, and auto 
plant shutdowns176 became imminent as increased security and 
inspections turned the border into a virtual parking lot177 (see 
figure 6, p. 33) and damaged the economy.178 
1. Explosives Detection Technology 
a. Explosives Detection Technology Defined 
Explosives detection falls into one of five 
categories:                      175 Barber, M. “Port gets a new tool to fight terrorism: High-tech system 
will help inspectors screen ships more quickly.” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 
27 April 2002, p. B1 (news). 
176 Bartelme, T. “Ports called soft underbelly in war on terror.” The Post 
and Courier, Charleston SC, 17 February 2002, p. 1A. 
177 Dougan, 04 November 2001, p. T3. 
178 Grunwald, M. “Economic Crossroads on the Line; Security Fears have U.S. 
and Canada Rethinking Life at 49th Parallel.” Washington Post, 26 December 
2001, p. A01 (A section). 
Jackson, M. “Long Waits At Border Hurt Firms, Employees.” San Diego 
Business Journal, 22:40, 01 October 2001, p. 1. 
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• Searching cargo or baggage by hand 
• Canines trained to detect explosives by smell 
• Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) Units 
• Explosive Detection Device/System (EDD or EDS) Units 
• Automated X-Ray Machines 
Automated X-Ray machines apply only to baggage 
screening.  Searching cargo by hand for possible bombs is 
obviously out of the question at land ports due to time 
constraints.  Customs only searches 2% of commercial cargo 
entering the country as it currently stands.  Therefore, only 
the remaining three options will be explored in this chapter. 
Canines have the longest track record in explosives 
detection.  Trained dogs are used not only to detect explosives, 
but also to sniff out drugs.  Several different law enforcement 
agencies, such as Customs, DEA, and FBI use dogs for detection. 
ETD units collect particles or vapors in order to 
analyze and determine the presence of explosives.  The 
technological means for ETD include chemiluminescence, ion 
mobility spectroscopy, and gas chromatography.  Unlike EDD and 
EDS units, which have traditionally only been used in airport 
settings, ETD units have been used on cargo containers in the 
past.179 
Different types of ETD processes exist.  Directed ETD 
occurs when another device, such as an X-Ray machine, indicates 
that something might potentially contain an explosive (hence, 
the bag/container is directed toward additional screening using 
trace detection).  Non-directed ETD refers to the process by 
which the inside of a bag/container is checked without any 
                     179 NMAB-482-5: National Materials Advisory Board. “Assessment of 
Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security: First Report.” 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 2000. p. 3. 
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previous screening that indicated a potential problem.  Finally, 
open-bag ETD occurs when the bag/container is opened and samples 
are taken from both the inside and the outside of the bag.180 
EDD and EDS units belong to a family of technology 
known as bulk explosive detection equipment.  This equipment 
includes anything “that remotely senses some physical or 
chemical property of an object under investigation to determine 
if it is an explosive”181 and includes technologies such as 
radiography and tomography.  The difference between an EDD and 
an EDS is that the former is only certified to detect one 
specific type of explosive while the latter is “composed of one 
or more integrated explosives-detection devices.”182 
The metrics that determine the usefulness of a device 
includes probability of detection rates, probability of false 
alarm rates, and throughput rates.  In other words, how likely 
are irregularities detected when they are actually present, how 
often do alarms sound when no irregularity is present, and how 
fast does the job get done.  FAA certification has not 
traditionally been granted in airport settings unless certain 
minimal standards are met in all three areas.  Another 
consideration when weighing the options is cost.  The following 
sections evaluate these technologies along these lines. 
b. Pros/Cons of Explosives Detection 
The primary advantage of any detection system is its 
ability to reliably inform an inspector whether contraband of 
one type or another is present without having to manually open a 
bag/container.  Therefore, technological automation presumably 
                     180 Butler, V. & Poole Jr., R.W. “Re-thinking Checked Baggage Screening.” 
Reason Public Policy Institute: 2002. pp. 3, 19. 
181 NMAB-482-5, 2000, p. 3. 
182 Ibid, p. 9. 
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speeds up the process while reassuring inspectors that no 
further action is necessary.  In short, these systems presumably 
do more work than a human can do and don’t get tired or bored.  
The question is, which system is the best at all four metrics 
mentioned earlier? 
The following table compares some data available on 
these systems.  Data for hand searches and automated X-Ray 
machines are included just for comparative purposes. 
 
Table 1.   Comparison of Explosive Detection Alternatives 
 
From: Butler, V. & Poole Jr., R.W. “Re-thinking Checked Baggage Screening.” 
Reason Public Policy Institute: 2002. p. 4. 
 
Several disadvantages emerge after carefully perusing 
this chart.  First, note the paucity of research regarding 
explosives detection technology.  Despite the exaggerated claims 
of vendors, most of their products simply have not been proven 
in the laboratory, let alone field-tested in a real-time 
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environment.183  In fact, none of the X-Ray based technologies on 
the market have passed the FAA bulk explosives-detection 
certification tests,184 even though over 100 of these devices had 
already been deployed by 1999.185  Only the CTX-5000 SP (a device 
made by InVision Inc. that depends on CT scans vice X-Ray scans) 
is certified in the lab environment by the FAA.186  However, 
field tests at San Francisco International, even this device 
revealed excessive false alarm rates that ultimately took longer 
for security personnel to sort through than if they had never 
used the device at all.187  ETD technology is even more immature 
than EDS technology, mostly because tests cannot be performed 
yet due to a lack of standard methodology for doing so.188 
Second, devices that have been tested are very 
unreliable.  They either miss legitimate contraband that really 
is there or sound an alarm when no contraband is present, 
introducing additional human interpretation into the process and 
causing excessive delays.  The only somewhat decent false alarm 
rates occur with ETD, but only when both the inside and outside 
were swiped, thus significantly decreasing throughput rates.  
The only system with real applicability to land ports, i.e. 
those that detect concealed items and explosive residue/vapor on 
passengers themselves “pose a number of health, legal, 
operational, privacy, and convenience concerns.”189 
                     183 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262: General Accounting Office. “Aviation Security: 
Technology’s Role in Assessing Vulnerabilities.” Washington DC, 19 September 
1996, p. 6; Butler & Poole, Jr., 2002, pp. 4-5; NMAB 482-5, 2000, pp. 3-6. 
184 NMAB 482-5, 2000, p. 37. 
185 Ibid, p. 38. 
186 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262, 19 September 1996, p. 7. 
187 NMAB 482-5, 2000, pp. 37-40. 
188 Ibid, pp. 41-45. 
189 GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262, 19 September 1996, p. 8. 
  93
Finally, EDD/EDS/ETD costs more than traditional 
methods, such as canines.  EDS especially is very expensive.190  
Therefore, most explosives detection technology is an 
unnecessary waste of travelers’ time and taxpayer money, despite 
the fact that Congress mandated its use in airports following 
9/11.  It might have a future in airport security, but Congress 
should not allocate funds for it at land ports at this time. 
2. Radiation Detection Technology 
a. Radiation Detection Technology Defined 
Traditionally, radiation detection has not played a 
border security role. Radiation detection equipment is marketed 
towards maintaining safe working environments in medical and 
nuclear reactor settings, allowing first responders to nuclear 
accidents an means of initial detection, keeping steel mills and 
junkyards free from contamination, and managing various other 
environmental/geophysical measurements.  Nevertheless, like 
explosives detection, 9/11 jump-started a frenzy of research and 
development in the radiation detection industry with an eye 
towards border security and surveillance. 
Radiation detection is a tricky business.  Many 
ordinary materials—such as clay tiles, marble, bananas, and 
earthenware—emit various levels of radiation naturally.  Yet a 
border inspector’s concern is with two main radiation sources:  
(1) gamma-emitting isotopes, the most likely source for so-
called “dirty bombs” (the technical term is radiological 
dispersion device or RDD); and (2) enriched uranium (which emits 
gamma rays) or plutonium (which emits insignificant levels of 
gamma rays but high levels of neutrons), both weapons-grade 
materials likely to be present in a nuclear device.  Thus, for 
                     190 Butler & Poole, Jr., 2002, pp. 1-8; GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-262, 19 
September 1996, p. 6-10. 
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border inspection purposes, equipment would need to detect gamma 
rays and neutrons and such equipment is not currently available. 
Current equipment also varies depending on how 
detection occurs.  Some devices passively measure radiation.  
Others must actively interrogate the measured substance by 
discharging radiation into it, a process that theoretically 
could accidentally detonate the measured substance if it was 
designed to be a bomb.191  Enriched uranium, for example, cannot 
be detected passively at present.192  Consequently, using active 
detection methods might play right into a terrorist’s hands. 
b. Pros/Cons of Radiation Detection 
The advantages of having a device that alerts border 
inspectors to the presence of unauthorized nuclear material are 
obvious.  Preventing a nuclear event is far more desirable than 
responding to one after the fact.  Such a device would also fit 
nicely into the layered-approach model described in Chapter II.  
That is, they could be deployed overseas to detect smuggled 
nuclear material as terrorist cells move it secretly across 
international borders to prevent it from ever reaching North 
American shores.  In short, radiation detection would provide 
another filter (see figure 5, page 34) to sift out terrorism. 
Unfortunately, the current technology does not 
accomplish what it needs to do at land ports.  Each commercially 
available product is designed to do a specific task that is not 
compatible with large-scale cargo surveillance at land ports.  
Table 2 summarizes the pros and cons of these devices. 
 
                     191 Mottley, R. “Detect, not detonate.” American Shipper, January 2003, p. 
59; Fainberg, May 2003. 
192 National Research Council: Committee on Science & Technology for 
Countering Terrorism. “Making the Nation Safer: The role of science and 






Tracks dosage exposure, alerts to hazards, 
protects from overexposure 
Low sensitivity--only alerts to significant 
radiological event 
Excellent battery life (months) Cannot detect alpha, low energy beta 
Small size (pager or wrist watch) Not sensitive enough to find contraband 
radioactive material 
Simple (no user action required), often very 
rugged, low-cost ($200-800) 
 
Applications:  First responders to radiological probs (e.g., hospital staff 
PERSONAL RADIATION PROXIMITY ALERT SYSTEMS 
Excellent sensitivity, even to naturally 
occurring radiation 
No determination of how much radiation is 
present, only that it is there 
Capable of finding contraband radioactive 
material 
Poor discrimination of natural rad. and 
contraband (high false alarm rate) 
Good battery life (several weeks) Cannot detect alpha, low energy beta 
Small size (pager/notebook size) Expensive ($800-$2,000) 
Simple (no user action required) Not rugged—shock sensitive 
 Only function at small ranges 
Applications: Law enforcement (currently deployed with all Customs agents) 
ISOTOPE IDENTIFICATION EQUIPMENT (GAMMA SPECTROSCOPY) 
Excellent sensitivity, even to naturally 
occurring radiation 
High false alarm rate—Detects commercial, 
medical, or natural sources (though options 
for further analysis can resolve this) 
Capable of finding contraband radioactive 
material 
Not 100% effective and accurate assessment 
requires an experienced spectroscopist 
Can track dose rates and total user dose 
exposure 
Expensive ($8,000-$12,000) and requires 
extensive training 
Identifies many common isotopes Cannot identify all known isotopes and can 
mis-identify some isotopes 
Applications: Experienced responders (follow-up hazmat or emergency response) 
SIMPLIFIED CONTAMINATION SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
More sensitive than electronic dosimeters Less sensitive than radiation proximity 
alert systems 
Better range than personal radiation 
proximity alert systems 
Range improvements offset by only average 
sensitivity 
Smaller size (notebook size), rugged, and 
low-cost ($300-$600) 
Occasionally detects legit commercial, 
medical, or natural sources 
Simple (user action only 2 switches) Inaccurate measures of high dose rates 
Variable alarm threshold set points Require more training (though not as much as 
isotope identification) 
Applications: Occasional users (emergency responders, hospital staff) 
INDUSTRY STANDARD RADIATION INSTRUMENTS 
Generally very accurate and sensitive Generally requires a trained, knowledgeable 
user 
Application: Experienced, well-trained users, such as health physicists and 
radiation technicians at nuclear power plants, hospitals, and research labs 
Table 2.   Comparison of current radiation detection devices 
 
From: Buddemeier, B.R. “Radiological Emergencies: Tools, Training, and 
National Assistance for First Responders.” Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory (Contract # W-7405-Eng-48). 24 July 2003, pp. 5-10. 
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3. Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) 
a. VACIS Defined 
X-Ray imaging has seen limited use at some land border 
crossings and especially at airports to prescreen baggage and 
containers.  Nevertheless, its cost and poor image quality 
(requiring extensive interpretation on the part of the user) 
usually precluded justification for widespread use.  Quality 
imaging techniques for security screening purposes were a 
reality only in the movies, such as in Terminator II and Total 
Recall.  Then, in the early-to-mid 1990s, Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC) introduced VACIS. 
VACIS was first deployed in 1999 by Customs mostly 
along the U.S.-Mexican border in large-volume ports such as 
Laredo and El Paso.  SAIC was awarded a $25 million contract to 
manufacture and install 29 VACIS over a 19-month period.  The 
original role of VACIS was drug interdiction.193  However, after 
9/11, the primary role of VACIS shifted to counter-terrorism 
(searching for illegal weapons or bombs).194  The post-911 
homeland security emphasis resulted in several additional 
contracts for SAIC. Currently, there are over 100 VACIS machines 
deployed on U.S. borders and around 200 deployed worldwide.195 
VACIS permits Customs to conduct fast, non-invasive, 
imaging of lorries, sea containers, and vehicles that might 
contain contraband, undeclared cargo, explosives, weapons, and 
                     193 Science Applications International Corporation. “SAIC’s VACIS II to 
Search for Contraband at U.S. Borders.” 26 July 1999. [http://www.saic.com]. 
Accessed 20 August 2003; Barber, 27 April 2002, p. B1. 
Battagello, D. “Customs delays border X-Rays: Machine scans trucks for 
drugs, illegal migrants.” Windsor Star, 30 November 2001, p. A3 (local news). 
194 Schiesel, S. “Their Mission: Intercepting Deadly Cargo.” New York Times 
(East Coast Late Edition), 20 March 2003, p. G1. 
195 Kittikanya, C. “Tighter Checks a Boon for Singapore-Based Firm’s Cargo 
X-Ray.” Bangkok Post, 27 February 2003. 
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even hidden humans.  A gamma-ray generator unit uses a Cobalt-60 
energy source to direct low levels (5 microrems/hour) of gamma 
rays into the subject of inspection in order to produce a real-
time, X-Ray-like image on a computer screen at a remote station. 
The basic set-up can be applied in a variety of ways.  
The Fixed VACIS machine is a 50-foot by 50-foot structure that 
looks similar to a local car wash.  This version requires a 
driver to move the vehicle through the VACIS machine at speeds 
lower than 5 mph.  The Mobile VACIS has a hydraulic arm mounted 
on a truck.  The arm straddles a stationary container/vehicle 
and the truck moves the hydraulic arm the length of the 
container/vehicle.  The Portal VACIS is designed for high-
throughput areas at port gates and roadways.  It is engineered 
to operate in smaller areas and work in conjunction with 
existing infrastructure, such as weigh scales.  The technology 
has even been expanded to work at train stations to allow trains 
to pass through the VACIS without having to stop and open its 
train-cars for inspection.196  Figures 18-21 exhibit the 
different VACIS applications. 
b. Advantages of VACIS 
The benefits of VACIS can be summed up three ways.  
First, it saves time by allowing agents to screen cargo at much 
higher throughput rates than by hand.  Second, VACIS poses 
significantly lower health risks than conventional X-Ray 
machines.  Third, it permits as thorough an inspection as a 
manual inspection, but in a non-invasive manner. 
                     196 Battagello, 30 November 2001, p. A3; Barber, 27 April 2002, p. B1. 





Figure 18.   A typical Fixed VACIS site. 
 




Figure 19.   A typical Mobile VACIS application. 
 






Figure 20.   A typical Portal VACIS site 
 
From: The Net Risk. “VACIS II.” [http://www.thenetrisk.com]. Accessed 25 
April 2003. 
The VACIS unit is the 
structure on the left
RAIL VACIS
 
Figure 21.   VACIS technology adapted to a rail port 
 




VACIS is a valuable asset because of its phenomenal 
throughput rate, compared to the traditional way Customs 
inspects cargo. There are no official test statistics available, 
but interviews with Customs agents confirm how much time is 
saved using VACIS.  One official said that it would take two 
days for 15-20 inspectors to open and inspect twelve maritime 
containers.  VACIS can do all twelve containers in about less 
than an hour with two people (three with Mobile VACIS).197 
A faster throughput rate allows Customs to increase 
the overall number of containers that are inspected.  This is 
critical, because Customs was heavily criticized following 9/11 
for only inspecting 2% of the cargo containers that crossed U.S. 
borders.198  At one port, VACIS technology doubled the number of 
inspections over the course of a year.  Another official echoed 
those same statistics at his port of jurisdiction.199  Despite 
the lack of standardized testing, it is generally accepted that 
VACIS has a throughput rate of about 8-11 containers per hour.200 
VACIS is hassle-free because no sophisticated safety, 
environmental, or health precautions are necessary. The 
radiation exposure hazard from VACIS is virtually nothing.  In 
fact, it is a factor of 100 to 1,000 times less than standard X-
Rays.  For example, a dental X-Ray exposes a patient to 4,000 
times the amount of radiation than one pass through a VACIS 
machine does. VACIS exposure levels are even lower than what 
U.S. standards require.  In layman’s terms, VACIS emits one 
                     197 Armstrong, D. “New gatekeepers: Gamma-ray monitors search incoming 
containers.” San Francisco Chronicle (Saturday Final Edition), 21 September 
2002, p. B1 (business section). 
198 Barber, 27 April 2002, p. B1. 
199 Bartelme, 17 February 2002, p. 1A. 
200 Ibid; Schiesel, 20 March 2003, p. G1. 
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quarter of what a person standing on a Seattle street corner is 
exposed to.201 
Nor is the quality of inspections is not hindered 
using VACIS.  Gamma rays penetrate much better than X-Rays do, 
permitting inspectors to see through 3-6” steel walls.  Gamma 
rays also produce a sharper image and the system’s software 
allows agents to switch between black/white/color contrasts to 
detect densities and other anomalies.  The inspection is also 
thorough, because VACIS can see through false walls, the vehicle 
itself, and even inside individual objects.202  “If there’s a 
core of something hidden inside something else, the machine will 
see the core.”203  Finally, unlike bulk explosives, trace, and 
radiation detection technology—all of which generally search 
only for a specific type of radiation or explosive substance—
VACIS represents one-stop shopping.  It catches anything that 
hides, including drugs, illegal cargo, suspicious objects (such 
as bombs), and even humans.204 
c. Disadvantages of VACIS 
Despite its superior throughput rate, some officials 
have expressed concern that it still has the potential to delay 
traffic and slow down the economy.  For example, the recent, 
post-9/11 slew of VACIS purchases has the Ontario Trucking 
Association worried.  The OTA stated that if VACIS is not used 
in conjunction with a risk management plan designating high-risk 
shipments only for VACIS inspection, then it could be a 
drawback.  “We look at it with some understanding and respect, 
                     201 Barber, 27 April 2002, p. B1. 
202 Ibid; Armstrong, 21 September 2002, p. B1; Canadian Press Newswire. 
“Port of Montreal adds new gamma-ray machine to curb smuggling, terror.” 
Canadian Business and Current Affairs, 07 January 2003, section JA 7’03. 
203 Barber, 27 April 2002, p. B1. 
204 Ibid; Battagello, 30 November 2001, p. A3. 
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but also some concerns.  This is a border that is extremely busy 
and this is something that could further disrupt traffic,” said 
Massimo Bergamini, VP of Public Affairs for OTA.205 
The OTA also points out that if governments don’t 
implement common policies, problems can result.  “It’s not a 
negative thing as long as some policy is developed.  I am 
concerned about whether it will unduly affect traffic.  You have 
to develop a risk-assessment model, so you don’t just start 
pulling over trucks at random,” said Bergamini.206 
Others are not convinced that VACIS does not present a 
radiation hazard.  They cite the asbestos controversies of 
recent years as evidence (asbestos was not discovered to be 
harmful until some workers were exposed to it for years).  Some 
dockworkers and truckers, supported by the International 
Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), refuse to drive their 
trucks through the contraption.  When this happens, Customs 
officials must unload the containers and scan them later, which 
potentially causes delays.  There are currently no long-term 
exposure rate studies to measure the effects of VACIS on 
personnel who work around these systems.207 
Yet the primary disadvantage of VACIS is its cost.  
Each individual VACIS is a multi-million dollar system.  Most 
sources report VACIS costs in the $1 to $1.3 million ranges,208 
although Customs was able to acquire some of them as low as 
$862,000 each (since they bought them in bulk quantities).209  
                     205 Battagello, 30 November 2001, p. A3. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Armstrong, 21 September 2002, p. B1. 
208 Espinoza, J.N. “Scanner expected to speed up rail traffic at bridge 
near Texas/Mexico border.” Brownsville Herald, Brownsville TX, 21 May 2002; 
Battagello, 30 November 2001, p. A3; Barber, 27 April 2002, p. B1. 
209 SAIC, 26 July 1999. 
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But beyond manufacturing and installation costs, Customs also 
has a contract with SAIC for $46.5 million for maintenance and 
support for its installed systems.210  In the case of VACIS then, 
the primary question is whether or not the security benefits of 
VACIS outweigh potential health risks, traffic delays, and cost. 
4.  Recommendations: Thumbs Up or Down? 
a. Explosives/Radiation Detection 
Explosives detection technology is a bust in the 
airport environment.  Therefore, there is no reason to think it 
can be expanded to land ports, where the amount of people and 
cargo to be screened is much more immense.  Explosives detection 
technology costs more than dogs, even though it is not proven to 
be more reliable than canines and cannot move goods through the 
line any faster than canines.  It cannot detect the types of 
explosives used in the USS COLE attacks in Yemen, such as 
plastic and sheet explosives.  Most importantly, the technology 
is in its infancy and therefore has for the most part not been 
either laboratory or field-tested. Federal, state, and local 
agencies should be wary of purchasing this equipment until 
industry improves the technology and/or proves its reliability. 
Most of the evidence stacks up against commercially 
available radiation detection equipment as well.  Indeed, a 
perusal of table 6 above highlights three main reasons not to 
use radiation detectors at land border ports.  These reasons 
include the following: (1) they are not foolproof; (2) they were 
not designed for the specific characteristics of land border 
ports; and (3) the costs do not outweigh the benefits. 
Radiation detection, like explosives detection, is 
still in its infancy when applied to a homeland security 
                     210 SAIC. “SAIC Wins U.S. Customs VACIS Maintenance and Support Contract.” 
[http://www.saic.com]. 17 October 2002. Accessed 20 August 2003. 
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setting.  Probably the most practically important metric for a 
radiation detector is its false alarm rate, especially at land 
border ports.  The sheer volume of traffic and people at land 
border ports necessarily means that a border agent has only 
about 20-30 seconds to make a decision.  Repetitive false 
alarms, which can take up to several minutes to resolve, skew 
the delicate balance between the benefits of ensuring no “dirty 
bombs” ever get through versus the need to keep traffic flowing, 
especially in today’s globalized, just-in-time-delivery economy. 
Testing confirms the excessively high false alarm 
rates of radiation detectors. For example, the Austrian 
government sponsored a radiation detection pilot program as part 
of the Trafficking Radiation Detection Assessment Program in the 
year 2000. The program was designed to capture data at the 
Nickelsdorf border crossing between Austria and Hungary.  Over a 
period of six months, the researchers averaged around 13 hits 
for every 900 or so trucks that normally cross the border.  None 
of the detained trucks contained weapons-grade material (most 
hits were attributable to such things as contaminated scrap 
metal and electrical pulses generated by old cars).211  Some 
first-generation U.S. systems have error rates as high as 25%.212 
A U.S. Customs pilot program in Detroit, America’s 
busiest border truck crossing, showed similar results.  During a 
two-week trial, a sophisticated sensor revealed high readings 
during a specific time period.  The matter took weeks to 
resolve, as officials spent valuable personnel time tracking 
down all vehicles that had crossed the border during the time 
                     211 Ladika, S. “New effort puts radiation sentinels at the borders.” 
Science (Washington), 292:5522, 01 June 2001, p. 1633. 
212 Johnson, J. “U.S., Tennessee to test truck radiation detector.” 
Transport Topics, 02 December 2002, No. 3514, p. 10. 
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the high reading had occurred.  In the end, officials attributed 
it to a “false positive, rather than a successful attempt to 
smuggle nukes into the United States.”213  A typical example of 
what is to come should radiation detectors be installed nation-
wide. 
Moreover, terrorists can exploit vulnerabilities in 
radiation detection systems. Detectors, no matter how sensitive, 
have range limitations and cannot detect radiation sources if 
they are shielded or encased in lead.214  Furthermore, most 
detectors cannot distinguish very well between different types 
of isotopes or they only detect the isotope that is giving off 
the highest level of radiation. For all practical purposes, this 
means well-shielded material or even material buried deep in a 
pile of legally transportable isotopes might not get detected.215 
This is not to say that radiation detection cannot be 
modified to fit the needs of Customs agents.  A joint project by 
the Department of Energy, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and 
the Tennessee Department of Safety and Transportation recently 
installed a $100,000 scrap metal radiation scanner (it had been 
placed in storage after its intended use) at a heavily 
trafficked route weigh station near Knoxville.  The manufacturer 
(Exploranium Radiation Detection Systems) claims a low 0.1% 
false positive metric216 and recently convinced the Virginia Port 
Authority to install similar scanners at marine terminals in 
Newport News, Portsmouth, and Norfolk.217 Government has recently 
                     213 Hosenball, M. “Stepped-up scrutiny at the borders.” Newsweek (New 
York), 140:12, 16 September 2002, p. 8. 
214 Fields & Begley, 12 June 2002, p. B2. 
215 Ladika, 01 June 2001, p. 1633. 
216 Johnson, 02 December 2002, p. 10. 
217 Dujardin, P. “Norfolk, VA, ports scan for bombs.” 
[http://www.centredaily.com]. 22 December 2002. Accessed 27 August 2003. 
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built upon this idea by starting a program in large metropolitan 
cities whereby surplus radiological detection equipment is 
supplied free of charge to state and local agencies.218 
One initiative is particularly applicable to 
commercial cargo security. Thermo Electron Corp. has partnered 
with Advent Inc. to develop a “rectangular deployment unit the 
size of a container top that fits between a spreader bar and the 
roof of a container being lifted on or off a ship by a crane.”219  
The device is intended to take advantage of the 45 seconds to 1 
½ minutes of time it takes for a crane to lift a container onto 
the pier during unloading to passively scan for radioactive 
materials, so as not to slow down the current operational flow 
of port operations. 
Other initiatives exist as well.  For example, another 
passive screening technique comes from Porter Technologies in 
Greer, South Carolina.  Small, 6”-long sensors are fitted into 
pre-drilled holes in container doors.  The sensors not only 
detect radiation levels, but also indicate when the door has 
been breached and a hand-held monitor can display images of the 
inside of the container.220  The Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) is also studying ways to outfit 
inspectors with a hand-held device that is capable of 
distinguishing between medical isotopes and contraband isotopes.  
Their battery-powered device was named as one of the 100 most 
significant technological achievements of the year 2000.221 
                     218 Department of Energy. “Pilot program aids emergency responders 
[radiation detection equipment].” DOE This Month, 25:9, September 2002, p. 7. 
219 Mottley, January 2003, p. 59. 
220 Ibid, pp. 59-60. 
221 Anonymous. “Custom-made dosimeter detects nuclear smuggling.” Nuclear 
News (H.W. Wilson-AST), 43:11, October 2000, p. 69. 
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Despite these advances, the fact remains that 
radiation detection still has problems.  For example, cost is a 
limiting factor for radiation detection systems because of the 
sheer number of land border ports in North America.222  Also, 
Thermo Electron and Advent’s invention uses passive methods, so 
there is no guarantee that it can detect highly enriched 
uranium.  Furthermore, while the hand-held dosimeter made by the 
INEEL is more selective and discriminatory, it still doesn’t 
solve the range problem.  An inspector would still need to 
physically approach every vehicle rather than scanning it with 
some type of stationary, portal device as it crossed the border. 
In summary, explosives and radiation detection might 
have a future, but the federal government should not be blinded 
into thinking that buying these hi-tech gizmos would solve 
illegal immigration and ultimately terrorism within U.S. 
borders.  The technology is new, not foolproof, not designed for 
land border ports, and expensive.  As far as this author is able 
to discern, there is very little valid, measurable data on 
detection probability, false error, and throughput rates.  In 
some cases, no industry-wide methodological standards exist 
either.  Given that bombing attempts against U.S. commercial 
aircraft occur only once every 10 years and similar miniscule 
numbers apply to land border ports, it can safely be said that 
only one potential terrorist attack out of several billion or 
even trillion possibilities exists.  Therefore, measuring the 
number of times a terrorist act was actually prevented through 
the use of this equipment “is almost impossible” and can “only 
be estimated through comprehensive testing and evaluation.”223  
It is likely that for these reasons, the National Research 
                     222 National Research Council, 2002, p. 55. 
223 NMAB-482-5, 2000, p. 43. 
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Council does not currently endorse any specific type of 
explosives or radiation detection systems for operational use.224 
b. Vehicle/Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) 
VACIS is potentially a force multiplier for Customs.  
Unlike explosives and radiation detection, it has been proven to 
be a reliable technology in the field.  It is a versatile and 
mobile technology that is proving its worth in the field. 
For example, VACIS is increasingly demonstrating that 
it can expose contraband at the border.  During summer 2001, 
Customs seized two tons of marijuana hiding among a shipment of 
crackers and fruit juice.225  In March 2002, at the Laredo border 
crossing, another 2,000 pounds of marijuana was seized by 
Customs on a railcar coming from Mexico.226  At the Blaine border 
crossing, 600 kilos of marijuana tucked among packaged wood 
shavings were seized from a truck headed to California.227  Even 
the Canadians are finding VACIS is a boon for inspectors.  They 
found 11.5 tons of hashish mixed with cat food and cotton fabric 
from a shipment that originated in Pakistan.228  All of these 
successes would have been impossible without VACIS. 
It isn’t just drug busting going on either.  
Significantly, undeclared Swedish missiles were recently found 
in a shipment (the Swedes accidentally sent them to the wrong 
port).229  Despite the fact that the missile shipment was an 
                     224 Ibid, pp. 1-4, 36-45. 
225 Bartelme, 17 February 2002, p. 1A. 
226 Espinoza, 21 May 2002. 
227 Keating, J. “X-Ray machine uncovers truckload of B.C. pot.” Vancouver 
Province, Vancouver BC, 15 May 2003, p. A31 (news section). 
228 Southam News (CP): Sault Star. “Customs officers find 11.5 tonnes of 
hash.” The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), 23 January 2003, p. A13 (news in brief 
section). 
229 Bartelme, 17 February 2002, p. 1A. 
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honest error, this incident still demonstrates the value and 
validity of VACIS.  
It will be remembered that the primary indictments 
against VACIS were health risks, effects on traffic wait times, 
and cost.  The health concern is not a valid concern.  Existing 
studies confirm that there are no adverse effects on humans at 
the low levels at which VACIS emits gamma rays.  Most of the 
health concerns represent scientific ignorance on the part of a 
special interest group that let their emotions get in the way of 
common sense.  The complaints by the ILWU occurred during their 
contract negotiations with management and well-publicized strike 
in West Coast seaports in 2002.  In fact, the concerns voiced by 
truckers and longshoremen have been resolved.  The incidents in 
which truckers refused to drive through VACIS portals were 
minimal anyway and overall made little difference.  Besides, 
Customs closely monitors the exposure levels of its employees 
with radiation pagers anyway, so if it ever is a concern, they 
will be able to take action.230 
The traffic delay concern is unfounded as well.  VACIS 
is not used randomly and without any coherent strategy.  Customs 
uses its Automated Targeting System (ATS) to determine which 
containers are high-risk before conducting an inspection with 
VACIS.  In fact, after 9/11 Customs completely re-prioritized 
the criteria in this software program in order to integrate 
VACIS into its existing inspection process. 
Furthermore, the concern about common policies is 
being addressed, at least on the U.S.-Canadian border.  For 
example, Canada’s largest railroads, U.S. Customs, and Canadian 
Customs authorities recently signed an agreement that proves 
                     230 Armstrong, 21 September 2002, p. B1. 
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international cooperation is a reality.  Under the accord, the 
United States pays for the installation of seven VACIS machines 
and Canada pays for the facilities and infrastructure where they 
will be housed.  The VACIS machines and the unarmed U.S. Customs 
agents are located on Canadian soil, but if VACIS reveals the 
need to unpack any containers, hand inspections occur on the 
U.S. side.  If it becomes necessary to unpack more than five 
percent of the train’s cargo, U.S. funds will pay the associated 
costs of repacking the goods.231  Additionally, the United States 
recently signed border accords with both Canada and Mexico that 
both emphasized the importance of collaborating on technology 
that improves border security.232 
Finally, is VACIS really worth millions of dollars?  
This author believes it is.  The urgency and importance of 
securing the intermodal transportation system is unmatched 
today.  Customs Commissioner has testified that “world trade 
would grind to a halt if terrorists used containers to smuggle 
weapons of mass destruction into the country.”233  VACIS is the 
best technological tool currently available to detect WMD.  If 
it prevents even one catastrophic event, its high cost is 
justified.  Ask the family members of the victims of 9/11 if 
they would rather have their loved ones back or take the 
millions of dollars the federal government has granted in 
compensation.  If the skeptic really searches his soul, he will 
find that VACIS is indeed part of the solution to terrorism. 
                     231 Williamson, D. “Border scanner on track: Device to peer into rail 
cars.” Windsor Star, 05 April 2003, p. A3 (local news section). 
232 Treat, J. “A New, Improved U.S.-Mexican Border?” 
[http://www.americaspolicy.org/pdf/commentary/0203immig.pdf]. 28 March 2002. 
Accessed 29 August 2003; CIC Canada, 2000. 
233 Bartelme, T. “Senators get lesson in Charleston port security: Commerce 
panel hears testimony from federal officials, port security experts.” Post 
and Courier (Charleston, SC), 20 February 2002, p. 1A. 
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C. SECURING THE BORDER AGAINST ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
1. Secure Electronic Network for Traveler’s Rapid 
Inspection (SENTRI) 
a. SENTRI Defined 
SENTRI was originally a grass-roots program that grew 
out of a local problem in the San Diego/Tijuana communities.  In 
1994, the San Diego Dialogue (SDD), a local think tank, produced 
the only scientifically valid survey of local border crossers 
that exists.  The results (shown in table 3) had profound 
implications for the way INS inspectors were doing business. 







times per month) 
34.9% 182,000 
Very frequent (20 




First time 17.3% 90,000 
Occasional (under 
one per month) 
8.8% 46,000 
Low Frequency (1-3 





TOTAL 100% 521,000 100% 
 
Table 3.   Proportion of frequent border crossers in San 
Ysidro and Otay Mesa ports of entry (1994). 
 
From: Nathanson, C.E. & Lampell, J. “Identifying Low Risk Crossers in Order 
to Enhance Security at Ports of Entry into the United States.” San Diego 
Dialogue, University of California at San Diego, January 2002, p. 2. 
 
Using INS and U.S. Customs data, as well as conducting 
over 6,000 random interviews, SDD discovered that most of the 5 
million monthly, northbound border crossings at the San Ysidro 
and Otay Mesa ports of entry were low-risk, frequent crossers.  
The researchers also found that most of the people interviewed 
for the survey welcomed extensive background checks by the 
government in exchange for faster treatment at the border.  
Subsequently, a multi-agency team—consisting of law enforcement 
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personnel from the INS, Customs, DEA, FBI, Dept. of 
Transportation, and lawyers—developed SENTRI.234 
SENTRI combines technology and risk management to 
allow border inspectors to work smarter, not harder in improving 
security while simultaneously facilitating the movement of low-
risk, frequent travelers.  Participants are subjected to an 
intensive, criminal background check (proof of U.S. citizenship, 
financial solvency, auto insurance, vehicle registration) that 
can take months to complete.  Digital fingerprints are also 
taken and entered into a centralized database.  If deemed low-
risk, a transponder is installed in the windshield of the 
traveler’s car.  This transponder keys an inspector’s computer, 
which boots up a photo and detailed information about the 
traveler (taken during the prescreening process) before the 
traveler even reaches the inspection booth.  Because the 
inspector is able to review information in advance, no lengthy 
questions are needed when the traveler reaches the inspection 
booth.  Participants get to use dedicated lanes set aside only 
for those who participate in the program.235  Inspectors reserve 
the right to complete random, full inspections when they deem it 
necessary.  Figure 22 is an example of SENTRI in action. 
b. Advantages of SENTRI 
There is not much to dislike about SENTRI.  Its 
proponents tout it as a win-win situation for law enforcement 
and the local community.  It reduces wait time for citizens of 
the border communities of Baja California, Mexico, and San 
Diegans, who both suffered from long border wait times even 
                     234 Nathanson & Lampell, January 2002, pp. 2-4. 
235 Ellingwood, K. “Device Speeds Up Border Crossings; Technology: Demand 
is rising for system that Ids pre-screened motorists, allowing them to avoid 
long post-Sept. 11 lines.” Los Angeles Times (Record Edition), 06 March 2003, 
p. B6 (California; Metro Desk section). 
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SENTRI
1. Transponder keys 




2. Inspector reviews 
passenger, vehicle 
info before the 
traveler pulls up to 
the inspection 
window






time at the border
 
Figure 22.   The SENTRI inspection process 
 
From: Volpe Center. “Volpe Journal 30th Anniversary—A Special Edition.” 
December 2001. [http://www.volpe.dot.gov/infosrc/journal/30th/security.html]. 
Accessed 30 August 2003. 
 
before the 9/11 attacks.  Post 9/11 wait times, which can be up 
to two hours in regular lanes, are never more than 15 minutes in 
SENTRI lanes.  In fact, wait times are limited to just minutes, 
or nothing at all most of the time since the plan was 
implemented.236 
Yet it also fits nicely into the border paradigm 
introduced in Chapter II, because the rigor of inspection takes 
place away from the border and “limits the size of the 
haystack”237 that immigration officials must sort through in 
their search to keep terrorists out.  Furthermore, SENTRI has 
                     
 236 Jackson, M. “Business assured border traffic will continue to flow: 
Homeland reps suggest the use of commuter passes.” San Diego Business 
Journal, 24:12, 24 March 2003, p. 3. 
 237 Flynn, 2002, p. 41. 
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the potential to become a more precise security tool, because 
future applications could potentially make use of biometrics to 
allow for almost foolproof methods of identification (see the 
biometrics section in this chapter for a full analysis of 
biometrics). 
An added benefit for the federal government is that 
SENTRI helps pay for itself.  User fees offset much of the cost 
associated with SENTRI.  In order to enroll, users pay a $129 
fee.  The fee must be repaid to renew the application 
periodically.238  The fee is higher at another SENTRI site on the 
southern border in El Paso, TX.239 
c. Disadvantages of SENTRI 
Not everyone is jumping on the SENTRI bandwagon.  The 
biggest deterrents to SENTRI enrollment are its cost and 
enrollment processing time.  Some have criticized SENTRI as a 
program intended only for the wealthy.  Finding spare change in 
the amount of U.S. $129 is especially difficult for some Mexican 
nationals to do on a regular basis.240  Others have also heavily 
criticized an initial enrollment processing time of six months.  
This wait grew to as much as eight months after the popularity 
of the program exceeded INS ability to process the applications 
that were pouring in.241  Could the SENTRI lanes become just as 
                     238 Nathanson & Lampell, January 2002, p. 4. 
 239 Gilot, L. “Term for commuter lane users extended.” El Paso Times, 06 
March 2003, p. 1B (news section). 
240 Anonymous. “Eugenio Elorduy, governor of Baja California.” Sand Diego 
Union-Tribune, 09 March 2003, p. G5 (opinion section). 
241 Anonymous. “INS to Spend $1 Million to Ease Borderr Traffic.” Los 
Angeles Times (Record Edition), 25 May 2002, p. B12; Nathanson & Lampell, 
January 2002, p. 4; Boudreaux, 25 April 2003, p. A3; Smith, D.G. “Endurance 
test for border pass worth the wait.” San Diego Union-Tribune, 22 July 2002, 
p. D-3 (lifestyle section). 
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congested as the regular lanes if everybody enrolled?  Finally, 
some view the annual requirement to reapply as inflexible.242 
Some U.S. officials viewed the program with skepticism 
when they learned that Mexican citizens from Baja, California 
could participate.  The reason for this is that the ability of 
the criminal justice system in Mexico to adequately screen 
potential applicants (in the opinion of some critics) is 
limited.  That is, some feared that allowing Mexican authorities 
to conduct portions of the background check for Mexican 
nationals attempting to participate would diminish confidence in 
the program’s ability to completely screen out suspect 
individuals.243 
Other criticisms of SENTRI exist as well.  Some people 
feel that the potential for smuggler abuse at SENTRI lanes is 
high.  That is, professional criminals could take advantage of 
the system to speed up and safeguard their illicit activities.  
Indeed, there are already three documented incidents of people 
attempting to smuggle both drugs and illegal immigrants across 
the border in SENTRI lanes.244  Another common critique of SENTRI 
is that its applicability to the entire nation is limited to 
ports where highway infrastructure supports it.  That is, in 
order for SENTRI to have a real impact, sometimes additional 
lanes need to be constructed.  In some ports of entry, existing 
space is already at full capacity. 
                     242 Anonymous, 09 March 2003, p. G5. 
243 Dellios, H. “House OKs bill on border security; High-tech tactics urged 
for tracking Mexican migrants.” Chicago Tribune, 09 May 2002, p. 1; Cantlupe, 
J. “America’s balancing act on the border: Between trade and terror.” Copley 
News Service, 15 April 2002, Washington wire section. 
244 Morgante, M. “Ashcroft praises border passes for approved travelers.” 
Associated Press State & Local Wire, 14 January 2003, state/regional section; 
Anonymous. “Inspectors thwart illegal crossings.” San Diego Union-Tribune, 27 
August 2003, p. B2. 
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2. Biometrics Applied to Land Border Security 
a. Biometrics Defined 
The movie Minority Report, starring Tom Cruise, 
featured a futuristic environment in which crimes were solved 
before they happened and department stores scanned their 
customer’s retinas for security and advertising purposes.  
Digital fingerprint scans and the like are no longer something 
seen only in the movies.  Technology has progressed to the point 
that scenarios in a James Bond movie will likely be applicable 
in everyday situations within a few years.  The buzzword to 
describe these futuristic applications is biometrics. 
Biometrics refers to the real-time, digital capture of 
the distinct individualities that set all human beings apart 
from one another.  Biometrics can include a variety of different 
measurement types: retinal scans; face recognition; voice 
recognition; digital fingerprints; and hand geometry are common 
ones.  People can even be digitally identified by how they 
smell, how they walk, how they type on a computer, and how they 
sign their name. Think of biometrics as your fingerprint on a 
computer instead of on a piece of paper.245  The ability to 
digitally capture and store templates of each individual’s 
unique, biological characteristics makes biometrics an 
intriguing option for border security functions. 
Biometric technology has been around since the 1970s, 
but its application was limited to high-security installations, 
such as nuclear plants or top-secret Defense Department 
facilities.  However, since 9/11, private industry realized the 
applicability of biometrics to a number of border security 
                     245 Bois, A. “Aviation seeks new security tools.” Interavia, December 2001, 
p. 36; GAO 03-174: General Accounting Office. Technology Assessment: Using 
Biometrics for Border Security, Washington DC, November 2002, pp. 39-52. 
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problems.  The number of firms investing in biometrics before 
9/11 was around 20 at most, but now there are over 200, with new 
ones being added weekly.  Stock sales in one such firm rose as 
much as 80% and biometric sales are expected to reach $900 
million by 2006.246 Currently, there is an explosion of off-the-
shelf technology with law enforcement and security applications. 
The scope of this analysis is limited to only four 
biometric measurements, based on years of research and 
recommendations from the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and General Accounting Office (GAO).  
Ninety-five percent of current applications are concentrated in 
seven types.  They are digital fingerprints, retinal/iris scans, 
hand geometry, facial recognition, voice recognition, hand 
signature dynamics, and keystroke dynamics.247  Of these, the GAO 
determined that only four (digital fingerprints, iris scans, 
hand geometry, and facial recognition) and the ICAO determined 
that only three (digital fingerprints, iris scans, and hand 
geometry) apply in a border security setting.248 
There are a number of important metrics that are 
critical to choosing a biometric system to fit the needs of land 
border security ports.  Among these are false match rates (FMR), 
false nonmatch rates (FNMR), and failure to enroll rates (FTER).  
A false match occurs when an identity is incorrectly matched, 
and a FMR is the probability that an identity will be matched to 
the wrong person.  A false nonmatch occurs when a valid identity 
is incorrectly not matched like it should be, and a FNMR is the 
probability that a valid identity is wrongly not matched.  FTER 
                     246 Bois, December 2001, p. 36. 
247 Momberger, M. “’Biometrics’ seen revolutionizing security measures.” 
Airport Forum, 20:3, June 1990, p. 14. 
248 GAO-03-174, November 2002, pp. 69-70. 
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refers to the probability that a system cannot enroll certain 
individuals in the system for various reasons that do not allow 
the system to initially capture a biometric template (e.g., a 
person who has lost both hands in an accident). 
The time it takes to enroll someone and the time it 
would take to process someone through a port of entry are key 
considerations in a land border security scenario.  The 
overwhelming crush of people and vehicles at the border 
necessitates that the time it takes to process someone through a 
biometric system be very short or the security measures taken 
will bring economic livelihoods to a standstill on both sides of 
U.S. borders.  The next two sections examine the pros and cons 
of biometrics in detail. 
b. Advantages of Biometrics 
Obviously, the overriding advantage of using 
biometrics for border security is in its automated, accurate, 
timesaving capacity.  “Biometrics has the potential for 
increasing handling efficiency while at the same time enhancing 
security, a somewhat unexpected combination.”249  Biometrics work 
on one-to-one search principles.  Other systems, such as credit 
card validation systems, must verify a user number against a 
database of invalid numbers.  Biometrics, on the other hand, 
matches encrypted, unique features with a previously stored 
machine scan of only one physical characteristic.  Since the 
system is only matching two pieces of information together, 
rather than one against potentially millions of pieces of 
information, verification is quick and accurate.250 
Biometrics permit a much more precise determination of 
identification.  Several authors have pointed out the difficulty                      249 Bois, December 2001, p. 36. 
250 Volpe Center, Spring 1997. 
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in overcoming fraud and forgery in current identification 
systems.251 Chapter III discussed the increase in fraudulent 
documents at ports of entry that resulted once the Border Patrol 
rolled out their new strategy to prevent illegal immigration in 
1994.  Yet with biometrics, fraud or forgery is difficult, if 
not impossible.  Furthermore, even if imposters gain access to 
the system, they cannot subsequently switch identities, because 
they cannot switch their biological trait characteristics.252  
Finally, the integrity of the system is not compromised due to 
stolen or lost cards, because only the rightful owner has the 
biological traits linking him to that card.253 
Proponents laud the extremely discriminatory abilities 
of biometrics.  One reviewer claimed that laboratory tests of 
some biometric systems revealed very low false acceptance rates 
(0.0001% to 0.1%) and false rejection rates (0.00066% to 
1.0%).254  Biometric systems are more foolproof than the bar-code 
2D systems typical of ATM cards, credit cards, and some driver’s 
licenses.  Bar codes are machine readable, but are considerably 
less secure.  Bar codes can be created on a home printer and 
laminated to a driver’s license and once the encryption scheme 
for bar codes is compromised, the entire system is corrupted.  
On the other hand, the chips using smart card or laser card 
                     251 Ham, S. & Atkinson, R.D. “Modernizing the State Identification System: 
An Action Agenda.” [http://www.ppionline.org]. 07 February 2002. Accessed 18 
August 2003; Ham, S. & Atkinson, R.D. “Using Technology to Detect and Prevent 
Terrorism.” [http://www.ppionline.org]. 18 January 2002. Accessed 18 August 
2003; Smith, Summer 2002, pp. 4-8. 
252 Bois, December 2001, p. 36; Volpe Center, Spring 1997; Ham & Atkinson, 
18 January 2002, p. 5. 
253 Allen, D. “Biometrics may be wave of future.” Army Communicator: Voice 
of the Signal Regiment, 27:1, Army Signal Center, Spring 2002. 
254 Anonymous. “Biometrics for Airport Applications.” Airports 
International, December 2001, p. 29. 
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technology are individually encrypted; so in the unlikely event 
that one card is hacked, all other cards remain secure.255 
Biometrics potentially fulfill various other 
functions.  A smart card using biometric encryption can 
ultimately replace a plethora of plastic in one’s wallet.  The 
digital chips carrying biometric identifiers have enough memory 
to store everyday applications, like ATM card numbers, credit 
card numbers, garage key access, frequent flyer numbers, and a 
grocery store discount card number.  Citizens already carry many 
of these things already, but they could all be placed on one 
card, allowing the user to use his smart card for a sort of 
digital one-stop shopping. Individual users could allow private 
companies to download their company applets onto the chip, for 
applications ranging from paying with digital cash to 
downloading a hotel room key onto the smart card from the 
Internet.256 
Biometric applications could save taxpayers money by 
streamlining government processes as well.  Ham and Atkinson 
list a number of these applications: 
 
• Hand-held devices for police officers that can 
read and verify smart ID cards, putting an end to 
writing down driver’s license information on 
paper citations. 
• Upgraded Electronic Benefits Transfer system to 
reduce food stamp fraud with biometric 
verification. 
• Voter registration and identification, including 
an interlinked voter sign-in database to 
                     255 Ham & Atkinson, 07 February 2002, p. 4. 
256 Ibid, p. 3-4, 9. 
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eliminate the possibility that the same 
individual will vote in multiple precincts (which 
in turn will eliminate the need for early voter 
registration), as well as secure online voting. 
• Integrated digital cash systems, to allow one 
card to pay for parking meters, highway tolls, 
public transit, and so on. 
• Online adjudication of minor violations such as 
traffic citations. 
• Paying taxes. 
• Obtaining/renewing licenses and registrations.257 
c. Disadvantages of Biometrics 
The disadvantages of biometrics for land border 
security scenarios are more numerous than one might initially 
think.  Most of the literature addresses the drawbacks in terms 
of five main categories.  These include concerns about privacy, 
standardization, accuracy, processing and management, and cost. 
Possibly the biggest obstacle to employing the use of 
biometrics is that many people fear an invasion of privacy.  
Anytime personal information is collected from individuals and 
stored in a centralized database, civil liberties can be 
threatened.  Most of the concerns revolve around the following: 
• Widespread use of biometric data strips one of 
anonymity. 
• Centralized databases share information across 
agencies, possibly resulting in information that was 
intended for one use being used for other purposes 
(“function creep).  For example, social security 
                     257 Ham & Atkinson, 07 February 2002, p. 8. 
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numbers over time have begun to be used for purposes 
other than what they were intended for. 
• ID theft is a possibility if corrupt government 
employees take advantage of the system. 
• Profiling, i.e., “the reconstruction of a person’s 
movements or transactions over a specific period of 
time, usually to ascertain something about her habits, 
tastes, or predilections,” is a drawback to 
biometrics.258 
In short, many people are asking significant 
questions:  Who has access to the information?  What data is 
included in the biometric database? How will data be used once 
it is captured?  Along these same lines, liability becomes an 
issue. Who will pay litigation damages if someone sues and 
wins?259  The government?  The vendor of the technology?  The 
inspector who used the biometric technology?  This concern is 
not far-fetched.  Legal action is currently pending in the 
European Court of Justice against a joint EU-USA decision to 
allow transfer of Customs and immigration data on passengers 
flying to U.S. airports.260  Australia’s Federal Privacy 
Commissioner, Malcolm Crompton, sums up privacy concerns nicely: 
Biometrics are powerful tools that also can go 
powerfully wrong.  It is therefore very important that 
privacy issues are addressed during the development of 
biometric identifiers.261 
                     258 Sutherland, D.W. “The Hi-Tech Menace.” American Spectator, 32:2, 
February 1999, p. 60-63; GAO-03-174, November 2002, pp. 115-117. 
259 Wilkinson, C. “Nine-one-one: Airport security post September 11.” 
Airports International, December 2001, pp. 22-23. 
260 Jane’s Information Group. “A new role for biometrics.” 01 June 2003. 
[http://www4.janes.com]. Accessed 25 August 2003. 
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The fact that biometrics are an emerging industry 
means that vendors are attempting to cash in on the demand for 
them, resulting in the possibility of widespread types of border 
security systems that are mutually incompatible. One Delta 
executive has said that biometrics “is still a bit of a Wild-
West industry.”262 It still needs to be established which systems 
work best and where.  It is possible that some ports might get 
impatient with the bureaucratic inertia of Congress (who are 
currently debating the use of biometrics), buy a system now, and 
then find out that the system they bought is not acceptable to 
the newly created Transportation Security Administration. 
Standardization is an international issue as well.  
There are a “wide variety of proprietary systems with limited 
lifetimes, a lack of communication with other systems, and no 
industry commonality.”263  For example, if European countries 
decide to use iris scans as their biometric standard, but the 
United States favors hand geometry, then a proliferation of 
different systems will have to be bought in order to accommodate 
all international travelers. 
Biometrics are not 100% accurate either.  The low 
false acceptance and false rejection rates cited earlier came 
out of laboratory settings, which are a controlled environment.  
But no biometric technology in large scale, everyday usage 
matches the success percentages of vendor-controlled tests.  A 
standardized methodology for testing biometrics was not 
developed until 2000, so operational testing is just now 
underway.  Furthermore, researchers in Germany proved they could 
                     262 Newton, G. “Biometrics’ Identity Crisis,” Airlines International, 8:1, 
February/March 2002, p. 33. 
263 Pilling, M. “Biometrics on trial.” Airport World, 7:1, February/March 
2002, p. 41. 
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defeat facial, fingerprint, and iris recognition technology 
using various sophisticated techniques.  Finally, a small 
percentage of people are unable to enroll in some biometric 
systems due to a loss of both limbs, significantly worn fingers 
due to manual labor or exposure to corrosive materials, 
arthritis, pregnancy, hand injuries, poor eyesight, and various 
other limitations.  Poor lighting, too much subject movement, 
and glare from the sun can also affect the performance of 
biometric technology enough to affect system accuracy.264 
Managing a large biometric database can be intense 
work.  One significant concern is that if initial verification 
and enrollment is not carefully controlled and accurately 
conducted, there is the possibility that the very people that 
the system is attempting to exclude will find a way into the 
system, creating a false sense of security.  That is, if initial 
documents (e.g., birth certificates and driver’s licenses) to 
gain entry to the system are forged, then nothing has been 
accomplished.265  Biometrics “will not verify who a person is—
only that he or she matches with an initial biometric 
reading.”266  Because initial enrollment must be so thorough and 
detailed, getting a large database (such as a national ID 
system) off the ground could potentially take years. 
Database size affects accuracy and performance as 
well. The larger the population of the database, the more chance 
there is for false negatives and false positives.  A large 
database is inherently harder to manage because of technical 
issues, such as keeping the data clean and keeping the database 
                     264 Ibid, p. 42; GAO-03-174, November 2002, pp. 69-73. 




functioning properly.  Mass registration is logistically 
difficult, due to the need for skilled technicians, proper 
equipment, and proper infrastructure to support it.267 
Finally, cost is a deterrent for such a large 
undertaking.  Biometric technology is not cheap.  The GAO 
estimates that the total cost (including initial infrastructure, 
employee training, ongoing maintenance costs, and personnel 
requirements) just to implement biometrics into the existing 
visa issuance system in the United States would be $12 
billion.268 Some sort of national ID card system incorporating 
biometrics might cost even more. 
3. Recommendations:  Thumbs Up or Down? 
a. SENTRI 
SENTRI is one of the few technological options 
discussed that truly conforms to both the letter and spirit of 
the law as it pertains to a layered, integrated, risk management 
approach to border security.  In fact, that is what SENTRI is 
all about: risk management.  Despite its limitations, SENTRI is 
the “best and most effective investment the government can make 
for improving security at the border.”269  Besides, the critics 
of SENTRI do not have any better ideas and just about anything 
that even remotely resembles SENTRI is better than the current, 
archaic system of manually checking everyone at the border. 
Most of the concerns with SENTRI have been dealt with 
anyway.  The annual enrollment requirement has been extended to 
two years.  This decision reduced processing time and saved 
federal funds.  Additionally, investments have been made in a 
new processing facility in the San Diego area that addresses the 
                     267 Newton, February/March 2002, p. 31. 
268 Jane’s Information Group, 01 June 2003. 
269 Nathanson & Lampell, January 2002, p. 4. 
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slow processing time (e.g., work space added, additional 
employees hired, and new automated equipment added to speed 
processing).  Federal officials promise that processing time 
will eventually be cut in half to two months.270  Furthermore, 
the enrollment fee was reduced to $105 in spring 2003.271 
None of the other fears have turned out to be 
justified either.  First, excessive interest in SENTRI has not 
resulted in the dedicated lane wait times equaling those in the 
regular lanes.  The wait in the regular lanes is still much 
worse (2 hours versus only 15 minutes in the SENTRI lanes).272  
Second, the busiest border crossings all have highway 
infrastructure potential for SENTRI programs.  Programs have 
already been expanded to El Paso, TX and Nogales, AZ and lanes 
have been added in San Ysidro for both vehicles and 
pedestrians,273 with potential SENTRI lanes existing in 
Brownsville, TX.274  Third, as far as the smuggler abuse in 
SENTRI lanes is concerned, the aforementioned three incidents 
are isolated cases.  Nothing further has happened.  Besides, the 
perpetrators were exposed and arrested by vigilant immigration 
inspectors anyway,275 so the integrity of the system does not 
seem to be compromised. 
                     270 Canto, M. “Making a sprint for the border: Security—INS chief announces 
$1 million effort to cut waiting time for pre-screened travelers.” Orange 
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272 Jackson, 24 March 2003, p. 3. 
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SENTRI should be expanded.  The government has a good 
thing going here, but it has not capitalized on its potential.  
SENTRI enrollment was still at only 42,000 in March 2003.276  
Initial researchers of the program point out that enrolling all 
300,000 frequent crossers in the San Diego area would cut 
congestion and focus inspection efforts even more.277  As Doris 
Meisner, INS Commissioner from 1992-2000 has stated: 
SENTRI is the best tool available and operational 
today to insure border security because it takes the 
guesswork away. It basically moves a vast majority of 
people who are lawful and law-abiding and allows the 
resources to be focused on the people who could be 
questionable, the people that are first time crossers, 
the people who are high risk . . . SENTRI lanes really 
represent the wave of the future in this new era.278 
b. Biometrics 
There is no question that incorporating biometrics 
into the current U.S. system of identification would be a huge, 
expensive undertaking.  Additionally, there are significant 
privacy issues to address.  Nevertheless, many of the drawbacks 
inherent in biometrics can be overcome with proper strategic 
vision and management savvy. 
To address the privacy issues, Ham and Atkinson have 
correctly pointed out that biometric technology itself is 
privacy-neutral.  Biometrics do not abuse peoples rights, other 
people do.  Therefore, the United States can still take 
advantage of the limitless potential of biometrics, as long as 
proper oversight and legislation addresses the privacy issues.  
Their advice to policy-makers is right on track: 
                     276 Sanchez, L. “Fast-track border permits are now valid for 2 years.” San 
Diego Union-Tribune, 06 March 2003, pp. B-4:7; B-2:1-2; B-6:6. 
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• Mandate that the “onboard” thumbprint scans only 
be used to match the card to the cardholder, and 
never stored in a central database. 
• Prohibit agencies from selling information—
government or private—stored on the card. 
• Specify that the rules that govern the 
circumstances under which an ID card must be 
presented and the information recorded by 
government agents will not change with the 
addition of computer chips to the cards. 
• Prohibit private companies from using the 
“official” data on the cards for any purpose 
other than verifying identity (e.g., grocery 
stores may not capture age and gender data to 
ascertain shopping habits). 
• Specify that verifying the card against the 
onboard biometric data will be optional in non-
secure facilities (e.g., airports may be required 
to check thumbprint scans but not bartenders). 
• Impose severe criminal penalties on anyone who 
attempts to “hack” a smart ID card, and attach 
substantial liability to manufacturers that sell 
cards with serious security defects.279 
Most of the complaints by civil libertarians are 
exaggerated claims of worst-case scenarios.  The fact is, 
Americans already show biometric identification on their 
driver’s licenses anyway (listings include hair color, height, 
weight, eye color, etc.). Adding an encrypted chip with 
biometric data simply makes existing identification more secure 
and less subject to forgery.280  
Even so, there are a number of ways around the privacy 
issues besides just legislation and oversight.  For example, the 
                     279 Ham & Atkinson, 07 February 2002, p. 7. 
280 Ham & Atkinson, 18 January 2002, p. 2. 
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government could make a biometric ID optional.  Doing so still 
“limits the size of the haystack” that inspectors face every day 
and satisfies the privacy objections that some people have with 
biometrics.  Civil libertarians can continue to subject 
themselves to intrusive, thorough examinations at the border 
(but still have their privacy) while those who embrace biometric 
technology will be able to capitalize on the timesaving 
advantages that biometrics allow.  In short, everybody is happy.   
Most people would probably welcome the added security 
and economic benefits that biometric smart cards bring with 
them.  Once people see these benefits on a daily basis in 
action, this author is confident that most will want one.  The 
same phenomenon happened with the SENTRI system.  As people 
watched SENTRI participants whiz through the dedicated lanes in 
less than 15 minutes while they languished in 2-hour lines, the 
number of applicants surged so much that the INS could not 
process the applications fast enough and fell behind. 
Many of the current criticisms of biometrics just need 
time to be addressed fully. First, the standards problem is 
being addressed. The Liberian International Ship and Corporate 
Registry (LISCR), the second-largest shipping registry in the 
world, is using biometric technology to create the world’s first 
biometric seafarer’s identity card. The technology has an open 
architecture that will permit interchangeability with other 
biometric standards that might be established in the future.281  
Furthermore, the International Biometrics Group (IBG) is 
currently working with all nations to ensure that the world will 
be on the same page as technologies are procured.282  As 
                     281 Hickey, K. “Biometrics Onboard.” Traffic World, 24 February 2003, pp. 
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mentioned, a standard testing methodology has been developed so 
that accurate comparisons between systems can be made. 
Second, field-testing is forging ahead in earnest.  
Hand geometry has been used at San Francisco International 
Airport to provide access control for airport employees for 
several years with outstanding results.283  A recent operational 
test at Charlotte airport processed over 500,000 people over an 
18-month period with “flawless” results.284  Ben Gurion Airport 
in Tel Aviv, Israel has used hand geometry (first for frequent 
flyers, then for all Israeli citizens) for more than a decade,285 
and their airport security procedures are considered to be the 
best in the world by some. 
Third, the size of a land border database does not 
have to be a show-stopper.  There are many existing biometric 
systems that are functioning well with millions of participants 
(see table 4).  The way the system is built from scratch can 
ensure the system works, even one as large as a land border 
database would be.  If the government starts with pilot programs 
that include willing, frequent users (such as the SENTRI program 
did), and then expands from there, the technical glitches and 
inevitable problems can be worked out on a smaller scale before 
expanding the system.  U.S. Customs so far has been successful 
applying these principles to its multi-year, billion-dollar ACE 
and ITDS program for cargo security and automated trade. 
                     283 Anonymous, December 2001, p. 28-29. 
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Table 4.   Comparison of different large-scale biometric 
databases currently in operation. 
 
From: GAO 03-174: General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using 
Biometrics for Border Security. Washington DC, November 2002, p. 94. 
 
 
Table 5.   Comparison of critical metrics of biometric 
systems applicable to land border security. 
 
From: GAO 03-174: General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using 
Biometrics for Border Security. Washington DC, November 2002, p. 69. 
 
The question is not so much whether biometrics should 
be used, but which type best fits the land border problem.  
Table 5, extensively researched by the GAO, gives the best 
current comparison of all four biometric systems to date. 
A review of the above table indicates that hand 
geometry is probably the best option.  It has the best false 
  132
non-match rate and is the least intrusive of all four.  It also 
has the lowest enrollment and transaction times, and it takes 
the least amount of memory (these are critical to a land border 
system because of the sheer volume of people involved).  
Furthermore, it is the only system that so far has not been 
demonstrated to be vulnerable to hackers.  Finally, its 
characteristics are stable as people age and the technology has 
been around since the 1970s.  It also will not break the 
government’s bank account, as iris scanning might. 
While the cost may be high for such a system (see 
table 6), Ham and Atkinson have correctly pointed out that some 
of these costs could be defrayed by charging businesses a fee 
for the right to use the encrypted chip on the ID card for 
economic purposes.  Businesses would likely pay this fee because 
then they would be able to offer the full benefits of e-commerce 
to their customers without having to come up with money for the 
initial start-up costs of fabricating their own cards. 
SCENARIO INITIAL COST ANNUAL 
RECURRING COST 
Watch list check before issuing 
travel documents 
$53 $73 
Watch list check before 
entering the United States 
$330 $237 
Issuing visas with biometrics $1,399-2,845 $598-1,482 
Issuing passports with 
biometrics 
$4,446-8,766 $1,555-2,363 
Note:  Dollar amounts are in millions 
 
Table 6.   Total cost of biometrics in land border security. 
 
From: GAO 03-174: General Accounting Office, Technology Assessment: Using 
Biometrics for Border Security. Washington DC, November 2002, p. 15. 
All of the drawbacks to using biometrics for land 
border security can be addressed, as demonstrated above, except 
one: processing time.  Assuming that the largest volume of 
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people crossing the U.S.-Mexican border daily is 800,000 (as 
reported in Chapter III), is it feasible to biometrically check 
everyone?  No, it is not.  There simply is not enough time in 
the day.  Some simple math reveals that it will be impossible. 
Let us assume 800,000 people cross daily and that no 
new entry ports open in the near future.  There are currently 
154 land ports in operation.  If we assume that those 800,000 
people are evenly distributed across all 154 ports, then each 
port would have to process approximately 5,195 people in one day 
in order to meet the demand.  That translates to about 216 
people per hour, or about 3.5 people per second.  Even the 
fastest system, hand geometry, can only process one person every 
6-10 seconds.  Obviously, this model does not take into account 
that some ports are busier than other ports.  However, it does 
help illustrate that the government would be asking the 
impossible from its border inspectors to try to process the 
already existing volume of people at land ports of entry. 
There are unknown factors to consider as well.  What 
if people do not have their ID cards out and ready?  What about 
the time between transactions as people move up through the line 
to the inspector?  All these factors add time and time is one 
thing that cannot be added to an inspector’s day.  The bottom 
line is that despite the accuracy and added security that 
biometrics bring to the table, there simply are too many people 
crossing the borders to employ such a system. 
The GAO has also correctly pointed out that biometrics 
still do not address the fact that most illegal immigration (up 
to 60%) occurs between the ports of entry anyway.  Therefore, 
biometrics at land border ports might cut down on fraud and 
reduce the risk of terrorists getting into the country at ports 
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of entry, but they cannot stop someone from sneaking across 
between the ports of entry.286  Biometrics only solve a piece of 
the land border security puzzle. 
D. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, the use of technology to improve security 
along U.S. land border ports is not a panacea.  In particular, 
explosives and radiation detection are not mature enough to be 
deployed in a border security role yet.  VACIS and SENTRI, on 
the other hand, not only significantly improve border security, 
but also improve border wait times.  Congress should consider 
funding these projects long-term and expand their use to as many 
land border ports as possible.   
The jury is still out on biometrics.  It should not be 
employed on a large scale for land border ports.  However, this 
does not mean that biometrics should not continue to be employed 
for access control, airport security, and perhaps on a smaller 
scale at the busiest land ports of entry or at known smuggling 
routes along the U.S.-Mexican border.  Even better, why not 
address the privacy issues by issuing biometric ID cards a 
volunteer basis?  This would ensure that those who distrust the 
technology on privacy grounds are not required against their 
will to use it.  Yet the fact that some people would volunteer 
for such an endeavor might allow border inspection agencies to 
focus their inspection activities on those who do not have a 
biometric card.  Essentially, using biometrics on a volunteer 
basis or on a smaller scale still practices smart, risk 
management techniques while avoiding the privacy issue 
altogether. 
  
                     286 GAO 03-174, November 2002, p. 14. 
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V. COOPERATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE 
SECTOR TO IMPROVE SECURITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Much fanfare has been made about the need for inter-agency 
and international cooperation to combat terrorism.  Less has 
been written about the importance of federal agencies and the 
trade industry jointly solving security problems.  This chapter 
focuses on the increasing links between the trade industry 
(production, storage, transportation, importation and 
exportation, and distribution businesses) and federal 
governments in preventing terrorism, while simultaneously 
maintaining increased North American trade flows.  In short, 
this chapter is about cooperation between the private sector and 
federal governments. 
The vulnerabilities of the intermodal transportation system 
became more apparent after the 9/11 attacks.  The market 
opportunities created by NAFTA have molded a “just-in-time 
economy,” in which businesses use containers as “mobile 
warehouses.”287  Instead of ordering raw materials or unfinished 
goods in advance, companies order them just before they are 
needed, in order to save on warehouse costs.  Increased wait 
times at the border stop production and shut down factories.  
Clearly, the need for a border open to the movement of 
legitimate goods is paramount. 
However, on the other side of the coin, the argument for a 
secure border is also convincing.  The exchange that occurs 
between land modes and sea modes of transportation is an 
especially vulnerable time.  For example, in October 2002, 
                     287 Bartelme, T. “Ports called soft underbelly in war on terror.” The Post 
and Courier, Charleston SC, 17 February 2002, p. 1A. 
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Italian police intercepted an al-Quaida operative sealed inside 
a container, complete with mobile phones, false credit cards, 
plane tickets, and false identification proving the man was an 
airplane mechanic.  Countries such as the Philippines and 
Indonesia—both home to several militant, radical Muslim groups—
supply more crewmembers for international shipping carriers than 
anyone else.  These crewmembers have access to the docks and 
warehouses where a container’s contents are loaded onto trucks.  
A Senate panel recently concluded that a significant threat 
exists that terrorists could use the transportation system to 
introduce weapons of mass destruction into the country.288 
This chapter analyzes why a pre-clearance strategy to 
simultaneously improve transportation security while reducing 
wait time for commercial truck carriers on the northern U.S.-
Canada border was successfully created.  The chapter also 
analyzes why such a strategy has not developed along the 
southern U.S.-Mexico border.  The increased security following 
9/11 was so intense289 that businesses in all three countries 
were losing money due to the increased security checks and long 
truck lines at the border.290  In short, tightened security and 
long lines at the border (initiated primarily by the United 
States) necessitated a strategy to improve security while 
simultaneously reducing wait time at the border. 
The government’s need to secure its citizens against 
terrorism and industry’s need to keep the border open to 
increased trade flows created a unique partnership.  This 
partnership between industry and government is based on the risk                      288 Ibid. 
289 Graham, E.P.B. & Connolly, C. “Across U.S., A security scramble; 
Patchwork measures may be insufficient, Experts say.” Washington Post, 
Washington, D.C. (final ed.), 23 September 2001, p. A01. 
290
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management principles introduced in Chapter II, whereby the 
border is pushed back to its points of origin and goods are 
inspected and cleared in advance. 
The creation of a jointly administered pre-clearance 
strategy for commerce at North American borders is basically a 
two-step process.  First, individual countries develop a 
strategy whereby imported goods are inspected and determined to 
be low-risk before reaching federal inspection agencies at the 
border.  Second, countries agree to set aside and jointly 
administer dedicated lanes at the border for businesses that are 
considered low-risk.  In the case of Canada and the United 
States, domestic processes and a history of mutual border 
security cooperation have permitted both steps to happen.  In 
the case of Mexico and the United States, the process stalled 
early on due to domestic pressures. 
The chapter is divided into four sections.  The first 
section introduces the actors involved and how their preferences 
for or against a pre-clearance border transportation strategy 
developed.  It discusses their goals and preferences as utility-
maximizing individuals and groups.  The second section addresses 
the institutional context.  This section focuses on the 
framework within which the decisions were made.  The third 
section addresses the outcomes, specifically why an agreement 
has been reached with Canada and why an agreement has not been 
reached yet with Mexico. 
B.  ACTORS AND GROUPS 
In the case of the agreement between the United States and 
Canada, the major actors were: governmental border inspection 
agencies; Congress; the President; and key private-sector, 
special interest groups in the trade industry, such as the 
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National Customs Brokers and Freight Forwarders Association 
(NCBFFA), the National Tank Truck Carriers (NTTC), the National 
Industrial Transportation League (NITL), Less-Than-Truckload 
(LTL) Carriers, the American Trucking Association (ATA), and the 
Freight Transportation Security Consortium (FTSC).  
1. Actors in the United States 
The United States—whose largest trading partner is Canada—
wanted a free flow of goods across the northern border, but 
tended to err on the side of caution.  In the initial aftermath 
of 9/11, the United States advocated tighter security measures 
to protect U.S. citizens and more international and inter-agency 
cooperation against terrorism.  The United States was partial to 
international agreements that would stop terrorists from 
entering North America in the first place.291 
Most governmental border inspection agencies (DEA, INS, 
FDA, Dept. of Agriculture, Customs), in order to comply with 
their missions, envisioned an end state where contraband 
smuggling and illegal immigration declined.  These agencies were 
not necessarily against increased trade flows, but drew a line 
in the sand when it came to eliminating their individual 
inspection requirements.  Immediately after 9/11, security was 
the number one goal of the Bush administration and all 
governmental border inspection agencies.  Ultimately this 
translated into a more restricted border.292 
Immediately after 9/11, Congress debated legislation that, 
in general, increased security but also increased the costs293 of 
conducting trade for the business community.  A user’s fee on                      291
 Ibid, pp. 12-13. 
292
 Schneider, June 2000, p. 2; White & Case Limited Liability Partnership, 
18 June 2003, p. 8. 
293
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import/exports to fund security, a mandate to manually open and 
inspect all containers, and permanently placing the military on 
the border were three examples of extreme measures being 
threatened on Capitol Hill.294  Additionally, the President 
declared a broad “war on terrorism,” which would define the rest 
of his term in office.  One piece of the broad strategy called 
for increased security measures within U.S. borders.295 
In general, those who had a stake in policy outcomes 
included those actors involved in the supply chain process, 
namely production, storage, transportation, importation and 
exportation, and distribution.  In business, time is money.  
Therefore, as a group, private sector businesses wanted a 
relatively open border, with reduced inspections and wait time 
at the border.  A border supporting increased trade flows 
equated to increased profits.296 
Shippers and carriers in general were opposed to increased 
security measures because of the increased financial costs and 
the decreased trade flows it would cause.  Specifically, some 
U.S. traders opposed any government-mandated technological 
solutions such as GPS (up to $5,000 to install and $1800/year 
per truck to maintain) and automatic braking systems.  The trade 
industry opposed any action that increased the number of 
inspections on the border.297  The import/export fee was heavily 
discouraged by NITL and NTTC for two reasons: (1) costs were 
borne by shippers while the increased security benefits were 
                     294
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shared by everyone else in the industry; and (2) legislation did 
not specify where the money would go once Customs obtained it.298 
The governmental agency in the United States that broke 
this policy deadlock was Customs.  Customs took the lead in 
shaping a pre-clearance strategy for goods shipment that combats 
terrorism when Robert Bonner, Customs Commissioner, proposed a 
partnership between Customs and U.S. importers in November 2001.  
This partnership was called the Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).  C-TPAT was important for two 
reasons: (1) it provided incentives (reduced inspection time) 
for the private sector to become involved in increasing their 
own security practices; and (2) Customs invited the trade 
industry to collaborate with them to develop the guidelines. 
Once traders understood the benefits of C-TPAT, most trade 
private interest groups became interested in a pre-clearance 
regime.  After Bonner’s introduction of C-TPAT in November 2001, 
the largest U.S. automakers (GM, Daimler-Chrysler, and Ford 
Motors) allied with four other large companies (BP America, 
Motorola, Sara Lee, and Target) to support the initiative and 
become the first import companies to take advantage of its 
potential benefits.299  Peter Powell, who heads the National 
Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America (NCBFAA), 
also supported the initiative.  His praise of C-TPAT centered 
around three ideas:  (1) C-TPAT both improved security and 
maintained or increased trade flows; (2) C-TPAT was compatible 
with Powell’s belief that importers and exporters should be 
responsible for informing Customs early in the supply chain 
process about shipping details; and (3) C-TPAT requirements were 
                     298
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not overly burdensome and compliance increased a firm’s 
credibility with Customs.300 
The groups opposing C-TPAT were either relatively small in 
number compared to the rest of the U.S. trade industry, had no 
political clout, and/or offered no alternative solutions.  For 
example, the Financial Technology Services Consortium (FTSC—a 
group of technology vendors who sell security products to the 
transportation industry) opposed C-TPAT.  They criticized C-TPAT 
for only targeting terrorism that uses international supply 
chains while leaving supply chains within the United States 
vulnerable.  FTSC also criticized C-TPAT for not targeting 
terrorism that could take advantage of supply chains not 
approved by C-TPAT guidelines.301  However, the fact that their 
technology sales might be impacted by the new focus on risk 
management vice the status quo probably made their criticisms 
empty and invalid. 
U.S. and Canadian less-than-truckload (LTL) carriers, which 
represent 20% of the freight carried across the northern border, 
were also hesitant about C-TPAT benefits.  LTL carriers are 
small and medium-sized firms whose goods come from a wide 
variety of suppliers, both approved and unapproved by C-TPAT.  
Under the rules, even one supplier/importer not participating in 
C-TPAT disqualifies a carrier from using express treatment at 
the border.  Some larger LTL carriers were able to load approved 
and unapproved goods on separate trucks, but smaller firms were 
unable to do so.  Many LTL carriers were unwilling to change 
their business practices when dedicated lanes were unavailable 
                     300
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to their trucks, simply because the suppliers or importers they 
served were unapproved.302 
2. Actors in Canada 
Canadian major actors included both the public and private 
sector as well.  Major Canadian governmental agencies involved 
included Citizenship & Immigration Canada (CIC), the Canada 
Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), and Canadian Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade Canada.  Major private-sector groups in 
Canada also included exporters, importers, customs brokers, and 
transporters.  In general, the Canadian Trucking Alliance was 
the voice of the entire Canadian trade industry. 
Developing public-private security partnerships in Canada 
was not nearly as debatable as it was in the United States.  
Most businesses and private citizens in Canada want standardized 
U.S.-Canadian border laws in general and support a “North 
American Security Perimeter” instead of a closed northern 
border.  However, Canada preferred a balance between security 
and trade flows that favored less stringent inspections and a 
free, easy flow of goods.  Additionally, Canada was concerned 
about cooperative agreements limiting their sovereignty. 
The bottom line in Canada was that concentrated economic 
ties to the United States ensured whatever concessions were 
necessary to develop a pre-clearance strategy that satisfied 
U.S. security concerns.  The volume of trade Canada has with the 
United States overrode any sovereignty concerns Canadians may 
have harbored.  Canada, whose primary trading partner is the 
United States and whose trading relationships are not as 
diversified as the United States, has a greater stake in 
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maintaining trade flows across the U.S.-Canadian border.303  As 
mentioned earlier, the only concern that the Canadian Trucking 
Alliance voiced over C-TPAT was for the LTL carriers, who 
usually shipped from a wide variety of suppliers. 
3. Actors in Mexico 
Mexico’s preferences soon mirrored their pre-9/11 policy 
goal:  quick, easy transborder migration.  Mexico’s preferences 
were mostly centered around the transfer of people across the 
southern border.  Mexico wanted a cooperative venture that made 
migration into the United States safer and easier.  In addition, 
the Mexicans were also concerned about losing sovereignty.304 
Mexico, like Canada, understood that concessions would have 
to be made with regard to border security.  Mexico knows that 
the United States will ultimately tighten border security 
unilaterally at Mexican expense if they do not cooperate.  
Therefore, it was in the Mexican interest to cooperate to some 
degree in a pre-clearance strategy.  Otherwise, a future border 
might become near impossible for Mexicans to cross.305 
Interestingly, the Mexican Trucking Association continues 
to lobby against joint U.S.-Mexican transportation 
infrastructure planning and the incremental relaxation of 
national transportation restrictions.  Despite the NAFTA mandate 
in 1993 to both harmonize and relax these regulations, Mexican 
truckers fear that doing so will hasten the onset of competition 
with Canadian and U.S. truckers (Mexican truckers do not feel 
prepared for this).  In short, Mexican truckers continue to 
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advocate for the status quo and are resistant to the 
consequences of globalization and free trade in North America.306 
C. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
The institutional context for negotiations between the 
United States/Canada and the United States/Mexico were markedly 
different.  The United States has an impressive record of 
cooperation with Canada on transportation border issues dating 
as far back as 1995.  Conversely, Mexico and the United States—
while making valiant attempts at cooperation on border 
transportation issues—does not have a very good track record. 
In 1995, Canada and the United States announced the Accord 
on our Shared Border. Out of that agreement grew several 
cooperative initiatives. First, shared technology such as the 
Remote Video Inspection System (RVIS) permitted officials to 
monitor border crossings at remote locations where before there 
had been only orange cones.  Second, the Liaison Officer 
Exchange permitted joint training in each other’s customs laws.  
Today, there are U.S. customs officials operating in Canada and 
vice versa.  Third, a reciprocal program that reduced customs 
inspections from a 4-step to a 2-step process improved border 
crossings. Fourth, they planned and pooled resources to reroute 
commercial trucks entering the United States, reducing 
congestion.  Finally, joint construction projects in 
Washington/British Colombia, Montana/Alberta, and Alaska/Yukon 
were scheduled to be fully completed by summer 2003.307 
Mexican-U.S. border cooperation has been less harmonious.  
First of all, transportation-related standards, regulations, and 
operating procedures between the United States and Mexico were 
very different prior to NAFTA negotiations.  Before full access                      306
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to each other’s domestic trucking markets can happen, the two 
countries must standardize these procedures—a process that is 
still ongoing today (9 years after NAFTA was signed).  Despite 
the formation of a Land Transportation Standards Subcommittee 
(LTSS) under NAFTA to make compatible regulations (specifically 
safety standards), very little has been accomplished. 
The most difficult dispute for the LTSS is arguably full 
U.S. access for Mexican trucks.  Under NAFTA, the United States 
agreed to limited U.S. access across the border and promised to 
extend that to full access in its four border states by December 
1995.  By January 2000, applications were to be accepted from 
Mexican truckers to operate anywhere in the United States. 
U.S. domestic pressure has so far forced the U.S. 
government to break NAFTA promises.  The Teamsters and other 
labor unions mounted huge pressure during an election year to 
prevent Mexican truck access.  Most empirical evidence does not 
support the claim that Mexican trucks are unsafe.  Furthermore, 
Canadian trucks have full access to U.S. markets despite using 
trucks that are 60% heavier and drivers who log 30% more hours 
on the road than U.S. standards allow.  In short, the U.S. 
unyielding stance on Mexican truck safety equates to the use of 
a non-tariff barrier to protect U.S. trucking jobs. 
The Mexican trucking safety issue is as bitter now as ever.  
Mexico filed suit via NAFTA’s dispute resolution process.308  
After deliberations in summer 2000, the arbitration panel ruled 
in favor of Mexico.  President Bush subsequently ordered the 
southern border open to Mexican trucks by 01 January 2003. 
Nevertheless, Congressional and other actions have confused 
Mexico.  The U.S. Dept. of Transportation passed a series of 
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regulations (e.g., inspection of truck facilities in Mexico, 
additional safety checks, and renewal of permits for transborder 
carriers to continue operating in the currently allowed 27-mile 
border zone), all of which were violations of the 2001 NAFTA 
arbitration panel.  The U.S. Teamsters Union filed a federal 
suit because of the U.S. DOT’s failure to conduct studies of the 
environmental impacts of Mexican trucks in the United States. 
Mexico responded in dramatic fashion. CANACAR—a trucking 
association representing nearly all Mexican truckers—responded 
with drastic measures, citing dishonesty, unfairness, and 
cleavages in national sovereignty/international rights.  First, 
they requested suspension of equivalent access benefits to U.S. 
truckers and threatened to strike if U.S. applications for 
Mexican access were processed.  Second, some truckers staged 
partial blockades of international bridges to protest the new 
U.S. DOT rules.  CANACAR’s president even influenced the Mexican 
Sec. of Communications and Transportation to call for 
cancellation of the NAFTA transportation chapter.309 
Second, despite various binational forums (e.g., Border 
Liaison Mechanism, Joint Working Committee, Border Governor’s 
Conference, U.S.-Mexico Binational Group on Bridges & Border 
Crossings, and the Binational Commission),310 long-range 
solutions to inadequate transportation infrastructure remain.  
The only innovations have been at the local or regional level 
(i.e., Border Liaison Mechanism), but transportation corridor 
planning is not only inadequate, but also resisted by Mexico, 
who fears competition with Canadian and U.S. truckers.311 
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Finally, two other considerations must be mentioned.  
First, even if Mexico’s aggregate preference was to develop a 
pre-clearance strategy approximating the stringent private-
sector security requirements of C-TPAT and CSA/PIP, the private 
trade sector in Mexico is woefully unprepared to do so.  Most 
small and medium-sized businesses in Mexico lack both the 
finances and the information systems requirements inherent in C-
TPAT, CSA/PIP, FAST, or even Mexico’s own program. 
Second, the U.S.-Mexican trucking dispute is working at 
cross-purposes with the new pre-clearance initiatives.  Until 
long-haul Mexican trucks get U.S. access, shippers must use 
drayage carriers.  These firms pick up trailers on the Mexican 
side, submit to all required inspections on both sides, carry 
the load across the border, and pass the load onto U.S. truckers 
for transport within the United States.  Drayage carriers are 
small and medium-sized operations that lack the infrastructure 
to comply with trade security rules.  Most drayage companies 
have no automation capabilities, and therefore cannot be tracked 
by customs officials.  This fact alone poses a risk in the U.S. 
government’s estimation.  This problem could be remedied if the 
U.S. government would simply abide by its NAFTA obligations and 
grant Mexican trucks access into the United States because most 
of the drayage companies would not be needed anymore. 
In short, the setting for negotiations of a pre-clearance 
border strategy in North America developed over the course of a 
decade.  This setting can be broken down into four key points.  
First, “there is concern within Mexico’s trucking industry that 
Mexico is not ready to compete with trucking companies from the 
United States and Canada.”312  Second, a precedence of continued 
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cooperation regarding customs issues benefited the U.S.-Canadian 
negotiations while a precedence of failure regarding customs 
issues hindered U.S.-Mexican negotiations.  Third, there are 
powerful domestic pressures in Canada to push the concept of a 
border out to the North American perimeter.  Conversely, there 
are powerful domestic pressures in Mexico and the United States 
to protect trucking jobs and maintain the status quo.  Fourth, 
in the case of Mexico, the infrastructure requirements necessary 
to form public-private security partnerships do not exist. 
D. OUTCOMES 
1. Outcomes on the U.S.-Mexican Border 
Mexico and the United States could not overcome the 
existing protectionist, national sovereignty, and uncooperative 
impulses to develop a jointly administered pre-clearance 
strategy for commerce. Mexico has attempted to streamline 
commercial processing unilaterally, but its program is not as 
well developed as the U.S.-Canadian models and there is little 
information to suggest that anyone knows about it, at least in 
the United States.  Nevertheless, the fact that 300 companies do 
2/3 of the volume of cross-border trade encouraged the Mexican 
government to implement its Compliant Importer-Exporter Program, 
which certifies companies’ security compliance and offers 
benefits to companies that qualify.  As of April 2003, this 
program has certified 110 compliant companies in Mexico.313 
Mexico, despite the concerns of some domestic special 
interest groups (such as the Mexican Trucking Association and 
CANACAR), knows that security compliance is necessary if their 
privileged status as the second-largest trade partner of the 
United States is to continue.  Unfavorable changes in Mexican 
tax laws, higher labor and production costs, and chronic border-
                     313
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crossing delays due to poor infrastructure planning in the 1990s 
are threatening maquiladoras. Maquiladoras work almost 
exclusively on the just-in-time concept, whereby costs are 
minimized via not using warehouses and through bypassing taxes 
and duties by ordering raw materials and intermediate goods on 
the day of their assembly in Mexico, and then exporting them 
elsewhere.314  Sony spokesman Dan Sherman predicts the following: 
It’s not going to take long for companies to start 
doing the math and to see that [maquiladoras are] 
going to be less effective and less competitive with 
facilities that are located in other parts of the 
world.315 
As such, Mexican-U.S. cooperation is improving.  Mexican 
officials are working with U.S. officials to develop detailed 
profiles of frequent shippers and entry points.  The profiles 
analyze the types of goods crossing at each point at various 
times of the day.  When trucks cross the Mexico-U.S. border, 
agents on both sides compare electronic information received 
from bar codes placed on some shipments.  If Mexican data does 
not match the data collected U.S. data, a red flag is raised.316 
Other signs of improved cooperation are occurring as well.  
In April 2003, Mexico and the United States signed a joint 22-
point action plan—the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership—that 
outlines specific actions necessary to ensure the secure flow of 
people and goods and the development of a secure and sufficient 
infrastructure to facilitate the growing trade between the two 
countries.  The action plan, which embraces technology and 
enhanced bilateral cooperation, is similar to the one signed in 
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1993 by Canada and the United States. One of the three target 
areas is the secure flow of goods. 
One of the initiatives of the Border Partnership is to 
integrate C-TPAT with Mexico’s Compliant Importer-Exporter 
program.317  However, the program is still in its developmental 
stages, despite an announcement that a pilot FAST-lane project 
will start at the El Paso-Juarez crossing later this year.318  
This is evident in a current U.S. Custom’s strawman proposal: 
The Southern Border Cargo Release Strategy will mirror 
a system similar to the FAST concept with 
modifications to meet the cargo-processing needs of 
the southern border.  Currently, a select group of 
customs officials from both Mexico and the United 
States are coordinating their efforts to develop a 
similar release mechanism for the southern border, 
which will include a bilateral release strategy.319 
2. Outcomes on the U.S.-Canadian Border 
The Free and Secure Trade Program is a recently unveiled, 
jointly administered program that uses risk management and 
private sector-public security trust relationships to balance 
the security/increased trade flow issue. Before FAST became a 
reality, Canada and the United States developed strikingly 
similar pre-clearance transportation regimes to guard against 
the introduction of terrorism.  Canada’s model, introduced by 
the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) is called the 
Customs Self Assessment & Partners in Protection (CSA/PIP).  The 
U.S. model, introduced by U.S. Customs, is called the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).  Both models 
initially were intended for the final destinations of cargo in 
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their respective countries (U.S. importers and Canadian 
importers/carriers), although C-TPAT has progressively become 
available to each corresponding link in U.S. supply chains.  
Both processes involved partnerships between the trade industry 
and government that categorized cargo into low risk and high-
risk categories. Both models permit customs examinations and 
post-audit verifications when deemed necessary by government.  
Finally, both programs developed at about the same time, 
although the Canadian model was implemented first. 
The differences between CSA/PIP and C-TPAT are minimal.  
Initial implementation benefits of CSA/PIP provided only 
streamlined accounting and payment processes for imports, but by 
December 2001, CSA/PIP-approved firms enjoyed express treatment 
at the border as well.  Additionally, CSA/PIP currently only 
applies to Canadian importers and the carriers who serve them. 
Approval by the CCRA involves three steps: (1) a risk 
assessment that demonstrates a history of compliance; (2) proof 
that business processes, accounting procedures, and security 
measures both account for goods throughout the supply chain as 
well as have the necessary linkages, controls, and audit trails 
to support CSA requirements; and (3) a signed contract with CCRA 
outlining importer/carrier responsibilities, accounting/payment 
schemes, and who the importer/carrier’s clients and customers 
are.  U.S. and Canadian drivers who use CSA/PIP clearance 
benefits also must complete a rigorous prescreening process to 
be approved for the Commercial Driver Registration Program 
(CDRP).  CDRP drivers present a photo ID (with bar code) to CCRA 
at the border for express treatment.320 
                     320
 Canada Customs & Revenue Agency, January 2002; Shuman, September 2002. 
  152
C-TPAT was hailed as a win-win-win policy for government, 
business, and U.S. citizens.  Essentially, C-TPAT required U.S. 
import companies to evaluate and improve (when needed) their own 
security procedures in exchange for faster Customs processing at 
the border.  C-TPAT puts the onus on the private sector to self-
police their own supply chains, effectively places cargo into 
low risk and high-risk categories, and allows Customs to focus 
inspection energies on the high-risk cargo.  Benefits of the 
program are summarized in Table 7. 
CUSTOMS TRADE COMMUNITY U.S. CITIZENS 
Decreased volume of 
required inspections 
Dedicated lanes at land 
ports or entry 
Decreased lines at land 
border ports 
High-risk goods screened 
from low-risk goods 
before arrival at border 
Customs account managers 
dedicated solely to 
approved C-TPAT members 
Improved security 
against terrorism 
Customs officials able 
to focus inspection 
efforts on high-risk 
goods (companies not 







Standardized security Reduced inspections, 
audits, border wait time 
 
 Self-policing vice 
Customs verification 
 
 Security is standardized 
across trade industry 
 
Table 7.   Benefits of C-TPAT 
 
After: Shuman, J.R. “Preserving and Expanding our Important NAFTA Trading 
Relationship in Light of September 11,” Business Credit, pp. 53-60, September 
2002. Retrieved 14 June 2003 from ProQuest database. 
After: Whitten, D.L. “Con-Way Says It Will Impose $8 Border-Security Fee.” 
Transport Topics, 18 November 2002, p. 3, 36. 
In order to be eligible for the program, the trade industry 
is required to accomplish four basic tasks. First, conduct a 
comprehensive self-assessment of each link in their supply 
chain, using joint Customs-trade community guidelines.  Second, 
submit a supply chain security questionnaire to allow Customs to 
them as a potential C-TPAT member.  Third, use the joint 
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guidelines to develop and implement a program to enhance 
security along their respective supply chains.  Fourth, 
advertise the joint guidelines to all companies in their supply 
chain and encourage implementation. Sometimes this requirement 
means new contracts with suppliers and carriers.321  The 
requirements are specific to each industry sector. For example, 
truckers must show that they have security measures to prevent 
physical tampering of cargo in their possession. Importers must 
show that their paperwork and data procedures have safeguards 
against falsification of information.322 
Customs proposed the program first to U.S.-based importers 
in November 2001 and unveiled the program to the public in April 
2002.  At that time, sixty companies had signed agreements with 
Customs, including the initial members (General Motors, Daimler-
Chrysler, Ford Motors, BP America, Motorola, Sara Lee, and 
Target).323  C-TPAT was offered to transportation carriers in 
July 2002;324 to brokers and freight forwarders in August 2002;325 
to domestic port of entry authorities in January 2003; and will 
ultimately be offered to terminal operators, warehouse 
operators, and manufacturers. 326 
Due to the similarity and proximity of implementation dates 
for both C-TPAT and CSA, it was not difficult to develop a 
system whereby approved businesses from both countries could be 
given express treatment at the border.  Free and Secure Trade 
(FAST) is the name used to describe the jointly administered 
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program.  FAST participants submit two separate applications to 
each government’s FAST processing center(s) (administered by 
immigration and customs officials from each country).  
Essentially, if supply chain businesses from Canada importing 
into the United States are C-TPAT approved, they receive FAST 
benefits.  Conversely, if supply chain businesses from the 
United States importing into Canada are CSA/PIP approved, they 
receive FAST benefits.  FAST benefits include the following: 
• Reduced information requirements for customs clearance  
• Elimination of the need for importers to transmit data 
for each transaction  
• Dedicated lanes for FAST clearances  
• Reduced rate of border examinations  
• Verification of trade compliance away from the border  
• Streamlined accounting and payment processes for all 
goods imported by approved importers (Canada only) 
FAST was implemented at six northern border crossings in 
December 2002.327 
E. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
After significant discussion between customs/immigration 
agencies and the private sector in both Canada and the United 
States, a pre-clearance strategy that puts the onus on the 
private sector to police its own supply chains has emerged.  Its 
creation was the result of several years of Canadian pressure-
which date back to the early 1990s—to relieve bottlenecks at the 
northern border.  The cooperative ventures that preceded 9/11 
permitted an environment in which Canadian and U.S. cognitive 
processes mirrored each other with regard to border security 
strategies.  Instead of fighting U.S. domestic pressure to 
streamline and reduce inspection time at the expense of 
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security, the U.S. Customs agency effectively used those 
pressures to their advantage.  Both U.S. and Canadian customs 
agencies accomplished this by developing risk management 
techniques whereby the private sector bore the costs of 
improving security and automating commercial manifest 
information in exchange for express treatment at the border. 
Domestic pressures, a negotiating environment (framed over 
the past decade) in which Mexican transportation officials do 
not trust U.S. transportation officials, and an inferior 
industrial infrastructure in Mexico have so far prevented a 
similar arrangement between the United States and Mexico.  
Domestic pressures in Mexico center around Mexican truckers, who 
have traditionally resisted the following: participation in 
long-range infrastructure planning; opening Mexico’s 
transportation market up to competition; and loosening national 
transportation restrictions. Conversely, U.S. domestic interests 
have spurred an ongoing battle over permission for Mexican 
trucks to operate in the United States.  U.S. officials have 
used the lower safety and operating standards of Mexican trucks 
as a non-tariff barrier to protect U.S. trucking jobs.  The 
resulting mutual mistrust prevented a spirit of cooperation 
regarding transportation issues to materialize.  Finally, the 
lack of information management systems and financial resources 
inherent in the Mexican private sector trade industry has so far 
prevented a strategy comparable to the U.S.-Canadian model to 
emerge.  Since only the largest private sector trade businesses 
in Mexico can afford such infrastructure, much of the commerce 
crossing the southern border is still significantly scrutinized. 
Even though no pre-clearance strategic agreement 
currently exists between Mexico and the United States, the two 
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countries are currently attempting to develop one.  It remains 
to be seen whether or not the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership 
will yield real results regarding improved security and 
increased trade flows.  A significant first step might be for 
the United States to honor its NAFTA commitments and grant 
Mexican trucking access to U.S. markets. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, & POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Terrorism has been a perpetual problem for the United 
States and other countries for quite some time, but most U.S. 
efforts to combat terrorism in the past have focused on 
disrupting terrorist cells overseas.  The 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in New York City galvanized U.S. political will to do more to 
secure U.S. borders at home.  After 9/11, the current U.S. 
administration’s priorities expanded to not only conducting 
counter-terrorism efforts abroad, but also to strengthening 
border security efforts at home. 
This thesis makes a case for more fully studying U.S. land 
borders as the potential weak link in the border security chain.  
The reasons for this are twofold: (1) the geography of the 
United States is such that its land borders encompass a vast 
amount of space; and (2) the sheer volume of traffic moving 
across U.S. land borders is colossal, and continues to increase 
due to NAFTA.  The characteristics of U.S. land borders have 
created unique opportunities for future terrorists to exploit; 
yet land borders continue to be ignored by policy-makers. 
Traditional state threats have changed over time.  
Traditionally, the primary threats to states have been other 
states.  However, the end of the Cold War helped initiate an era 
in which most states accept—to one degree or another—free 
markets and capitalism as the economic model of choice.  In 
turn, these changes have accelerated the current phenomenon of 
globalization and closer integration (in both economic and 
security arenas) between states.  Unfortunately, globalization 
and integration also have a series of negative side effects, 
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including an increase in transnational threats (e.g., terrorism, 
illegal immigration, drug smuggling, and organized crime). 
This thesis reviewed current theory on how to structure 
border security to address these threats.  Most authors, policy-
makers, and think tanks agree that the best way to think about 
border security is to redefine what a border is.  Borders can no 
longer be viewed as a line in the sand where all inspection and 
security efforts converge.  The concept of borders must be 
shifted outward such that additional “filters,” or opportunities 
to weed out terrorism are added.  Doing so requires an 
integrated, cooperative effort on the part of all border 
inspection agencies and governments in a region. 
This thesis attempted to analyze three currently cited 
proposals for securing U.S. land borders against terrorism.  The 
first was increased manpower and financial resources for border 
inspection agencies. The second was the procurement of 
technology as a tool to combat terrorism at home was explored.  
Finally, increased cooperation between the private sector and 
government was also explored. 
Three important arguments emerge from the findings of this 
thesis.  First, there must be a balance between freedom of 
movement and security along U.S. land borders.  Focusing too 
exclusively on security right at the border—especially without 
employing the risk management concepts advocated by most border 
security experts today—can crush social and economic life along 
border communities. Second, illegal immigration is a significant 
problem with implications far more serious than just domestic 
job loss or taxpayer inconvenience.  In short, stopping illegal 
immigration is vital to the homeland security effort.  Third, 
the rash of spending by Congress in the 1990s to stop illegal 
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immigration has so far yielded no positive results in the 
overall level of illegal immigration into the United States.  
Furthermore, additional unwanted side effects of the increased 
emphasis on additional agents and high-tech deterrents along the 
U.S.-Mexican border are now commonplace. 
Harnessing the benefits of technology is an important part 
of risk management and “moving the border out.”  Currently, 
there are several technologies that are either being tested or 
piloted along U.S. borders in the war on terror.  The list 
analyzed in this thesis was not all-inclusive, but was 
representative of those technologies in which Congress has 
either made an initial investment or is considering doing so.  
This scrutiny is warranted because Congress is spending so much 
money on border security (and the “war on terror” in general) 
that deficit levels are again creeping back into the federal 
budget.  This thesis prioritized Congressional border security 
spending on technology that secures the United States against 
terrorism while simultaneously improving border wait times. 
Most people agree that if the government tapped into the 
resources already present in the private sector (e.g., 
ingenuity, technological prowess, and organizational skills), 
security could be improved.  The Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a strategy that entails 
prescreening goods before their arrival at the border, as well 
as putting more of the onus for security on the private sector.  
Such a system views the private sector as an integral part of 
security, rather than just a Custom’s customer.  This type of 
risk management strategy is something that Canada and the United 
States can agree upon, but despite its usefulness as a model, 
such a model is not as well developed in the supply chains along 
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the U.S.-Mexican border.  This thesis analyzed why this is, by 
examining some of the domestic and international political 
complexities that obstruct the development of such a scheme. 
B. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
The Border Patrol case study in this thesis provides 
insights into the effectiveness of increased manpower/resources 
on the prevention of terrorism.  The Border Patrol’s new 
strategy in 1994 hinged entirely on increased funding levels.  
Without the funding and new agents on the line, the strategy 
would have been dead from the start.  My findings indicate that 
a strategy that requires more money and agents on the line may 
not necessarily be effective against illegal immigration.  If 
these findings apply to the high-priced strategy of “prevention 
by deterrence,” then they likely apply to any other high-priced 
strategy under consideration. 
This is an important distinction because Congress is 
spending more money on border security than it ever has before.  
The significantly increased spending comes at a time when 
deficit levels are appearing again on the federal government’s 
radar screen.  During most of the past decade, the federal 
government was able to actually see surplus spending levels in 
the budget.  Nevertheless, FY 2001 marked a change in that 
beneficial trend and Congress is again starting to spend more 
than they have again. 
These findings should serve as a grim reminder to U.S. 
politicians—both in Congress and the executive branches of 
government—that spending a lot of money on border security will 
not necessarily equate to a more secure border.  A long line of 
border agents and inspectors holding high-tech gadgets are not a 
cure-all for the border security ills that 9/11 exposed.  
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Priorities need to be made and effective management, follow-up, 
training, and strategic vision must accompany any funding 
increases for the desired effect to occur. 
The meat of the immigration argument is two-fold.  First, 
the continued rising estimates of illegal immigration in the 
United States are becoming an increasingly serious cause for 
concern, not necessarily because of the high estimates 
themselves, but because of the increasing likelihood that 
illegal immigration may have national security implications.  In 
other words, the fact that illegal immigrants continue to pour 
into the country is not as alarming as the possibility that 
potential terrorists are increasingly taking advantage of a 
border security system that has not traditionally targeted the 
real problem, i.e., terrorism on U.S. soil.  The question then 
becomes, of course, how must the current system change so that 
border security protects against terrorism as an unwanted side 
effect of illegal immigration?  This is a subject for further 
research. 
Second, simply adding enforcement personnel and/or spending 
high levels of financial resources on current border 
institutions will not alone stem the overall level of illegal 
immigration on the southern border.  The current strategy has 
allowed the border patrol to gain a measure of control over 
illegal immigration that is unsurpassed in recent memory.  This 
control has been achieved in the face of formidable odds, 
including a seemingly overwhelming number of individuals 
determined to live in the United States. 
Nevertheless, despite these successes, the level of illegal 
immigration today still suggests that the border is porous and 
therefore subject to exploitation by terrorists who want to harm 
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America.  The implication is that Congress cannot expect to just 
increase funding levels and hope that terrorism does not rear 
its ugly head again.  U.S. political leadership and federal 
border security agencies (specifically those now housed within 
the Department of Homeland Security) must additionally provide 
an integrated, strategic vision for the “war on terror.”  
Technology spending must be prioritized and well studied before 
it is enacted into law or U.S. citizens risk wasting their tax 
dollars on an expensive border security campaign that does not 
yield the desired results.  In short, U.S. political leadership 
needs to define their desired end state before hastily embarking 
on the means to achieve their goals. 
As far as technology is concerned, some of the pilot 
programs for land border security are suspect.  The decision to 
equip all Customs officials with personal radiation detectors is 
especially questionable.  Unless these devices are intended to 
protect against potential radiation hazards caused by the VACIS 
machines being employed, they have no place on U.S. borders. 
Therefore, Congress should not fund additional purchases of 
these and other explosive detection devices until the technology 
is sufficiently tested in an operational environment and proven 
to be accurate for what they are intended to do. 
Congress is to be applauded for its investment in other 
technologies, including VACIS, SENTRI, ACE/ITDS, and the 
Container Security Initiatives.  These types of technologies 
should help protect against further terrorist attacks.  As far 
as biometrics are concerned, its use has a place in border 
security.  However, Congress should take great care in expanding 
the use of biometrics to all land border ports in some type of 
“national I.D. system.”  The main reason for this is not the 
  163
privacy implications of such a system.  These dilemmas can be 
solved with proper oversight, legislation, and offering 
biometric systems for frequent travelers, in much the same way 
as SENTRI works (and INSPASS in the airports).  However, further 
research needs to be done on how such a system would impact 
congestion at the border.  The sheer volume of people crossing 
the border makes a biometric system of identification 
technically impossible. 
This does not mean that biometrics could not be employed on 
a smaller scale.  For example, using biometric identification in 
U.S. visas and passports or with specific border communities 
along the U.S.-Mexican border would be feasible.  The important 
point here is that before spending millions of dollars on a 
biometric system of identification, border agencies need to test 
out such a system on a smaller scale in a rigorously studied 
pilot program.  The amount of funds allocated each fiscal year 
to such a project should never be more than 10% of the entire 
estimated cost; much like the Senate and House appropriations 
committees have handled the development of U.S. Customs’ 
Automated Commercial Environment.  Such oversight and scrutiny 
ensures that the program can be sufficiently analyzed and 
adjusted when necessary to yield the desired end state. 
Finally, understanding the barriers to private sector-
governmental security partnerships similar to the Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (in the United States) and the 
Customs Self Assessment & Partners in Protection (in Canada) 
along the U.S.-Mexican border has important implications for 
U.S. border security policy.  The dynamics of the U.S.-Mexican 
border are different than those of the U.S.-Canadian border.  
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U.S. political leadership must recognize these differences and 
address them. 
Domestic pressures, a negotiating environment (framed over 
the past decade) in which Mexican transportation officials do 
not trust U.S. transportation officials, and an inferior 
industrial infrastructure in Mexico have so far prevented a 
well-developed pre-clearance regime between the United States 
and Mexico.  Domestic pressures in Mexico center on Mexican 
truckers, who have traditionally resisted the following: 
participation in long-range infrastructure planning; opening 
Mexico’s transportation market up to competition; and loosening 
national transportation restrictions. Conversely, U.S. domestic 
interests have spurred an ongoing battle over permission for 
Mexican trucks to operate in the United States.  U.S. officials 
have used the lower safety and operating standards of Mexican 
trucks as a non-tariff barrier to protect U.S. trucking jobs.  
The resulting mutual mistrust prevents a spirit of cooperation 
regarding transportation issues to materialize.  Finally, the 
lack of information management systems and financial resources 
inherent in the Mexican private sector trade industry has so far 
prevented a private-sector/governmental partnership comparable 
to the U.S.-Canadian model to emerge.  Since only the largest 
private sector trade businesses in Mexico can afford such 
infrastructure, much of the commerce crossing the southern 
border is still significantly scrutinized at the border, 
creating bottlenecks and slowing down the economies of both 
Mexico and the United States. 
While developing the infrastructure for an electronic 
Customs manifest system in Mexico may be a significantly more 
long-term and difficult step, extending the hand of cooperation 
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is not.  The United States cannot expect Mexico to bow to its 
wishes for a more secure land border if the United States fails 
to keep its NAFTA commitments.  To this end, a significant first 
step in improving land border security on the U.S.-Mexican 
border is for the United States to muster up the political will 
to grant Mexican trucking access to U.S. markets.  To some, this 
may seem completely unrelated to border security.  But if the 
United States continues to place more emphasis on its domestic 
interests at the expense of Mexico—which is what U.S. political 
leadership is doing by not keeping its NAFTA commitments—then 
there should be no surprises when Mexico refuses to cooperate 
with U.S. border security measures. 
The tone of the conclusions in this thesis is not designed 
to condemn increased manpower and resources (or any federal 
inspection agencies) as potential solutions to the border 
dilemma.  Rather, the argument is that increased 
manpower/funding alone is not the solution. An appropriate mix 
of increased manpower/resources, technological advances, and 
cooperation between countries, federal agencies, and the private 
sector is probably the best solution to the current border 
security question.  This thesis has not attempted to define just 
what “an appropriate mix” of these variables is.  However, 
continued research focusing on the contributions of each of 
these variables (or the appropriate mix of these variables) to a 
border security policy that protects U.S. citizens from 
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